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Cohen and Levi both approached the rabbi in an attempt to
resolve a festering dispute between them. After Cohen relates to the
rabbi his side of the story, the rabbi pronounces to him: "You are
right". Following Levi's rendition of the facts as he sees them, the
rabbi declares to him, "You are right." Once the two have departed,
the rabbi's assistant turns to the rabbi and asks, "Rabbi, how can
they both be right?" To this question, the rabbi responds: "You are
also right. " -old Jewish story
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I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis is one of the most
complex of our time. Both sides feel that they have a legitimate,
exclusive claim over the same piece of land in the Middle East. Both
have their own perception of history and events, a history and
accumulation of events that they feel justify their respective
contentions and actions. After years of bloodshed between the two, it
began to appear that both sides finally accepted the other's existence
and right to exist and the fact that the other side is here to stay.' As a
result, the two sides entered into negotiations aiming at a peaceful
settlement to their dispute.
Although this peace process between the two is occasionally
punctuated by acts of extremists who are constantly attempting to
undermine it by igniting violence, it is imperative that the leaders and
their populations not get swept away by such outbursts of violence
which have the potential of turning the Middle East clock back
decades. Rather, it is vital, despite many setbacks along the way, that
both sides continue to proceed courageously on the rocky path
toward peace.
While at times this conflict appears insoluble due to mutual fears,
suspicions, tensions, animosities, threat perceptions, and years of
distrust, it is worthwhile to recall that this is not the first instance in
which bitter enemies have faced each other at the negotiating table
and forced themselves to overcome their hatred and apprehension
toward the other side. Today's world is witness to many former
battlefield adversaries who have become economic partners, strategic
allies, and even the best of friends. For example, the cases of
Germany and the other Member States of the European Union (EU),
and of the United States and Mexico, Japan, and Britain, stand out
and lend encouragement to the Middle East that the idealistic dream
of lasting, true peace and coexistence can become reality.
One of the crucial matters that must be discussed, even in the
midst of many hindrances along the way to peace between the
Israelis and Palestinians, is the ostensibly impossible task of
1. See, e.g., Kenneth V. Stein, Start at lome. JERUSALI-AM POST, Nov. 30,
1999, at 8.
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determining the nature of the borders between the two sides.
II. BORDERS IN GENERAL
Typically, examinations of borders were limited to the
consideration of particular aspects relating to them, such as their
anthropological, geopolitical, military, and strategic ambits, and the
influence of borders on controlling or ending international conflicts.
2
Although border issues are germane to any analysis of social or
economic interplay, political systems, or legal jurisdiction,' social
scientists, historians,4 lawyers, economists, or sociologists rarely
examined the border's function in modern political life.' Over
roughly the last decade, however, borders increasingly have entered
the forefront of political, popular, and scholarly consideration.'
Relationships between societies and between states demonstrate
the crucial nature of borders.' Borders create physical boundaries
between distinct units, circumscribe political boundaries of authority
2. See Gad Barzilai & Ilan Peleg, Israel and Future Borders: Assessment ofa
Dynamic Process, 31 J. PEACE RES. 59 (1994) (linking the focus of border studies
on the physical dimension because of the belief that border disputes cause
international war and conflict).
3. See Liam O'Dowd & Thomas M. Wilson, Frontiers of Sovereignty in the
New Europe, in BORDERS, NATIONS AND STATES: FRONTIERS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN
THE NEW EUROPE 1, 7 (Liam O'Dowd & Thomas M. Wilson, eds. 1996)
[hereinafter BORDERS, NATIONS AND STATES] (explaining that border studies
provide information about the forces shaping and redefining the state).
4. See MALCOLM ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY AND STATI
FORMATION IN THE MODERN WORLD 1 (1996) [hereinafter ANDERSON,
FRONTIERS, TERRITORY]. The background to this field, however, has been covered
extensively philosophically and historically. See id. It has also been dealt with
anthropologically.
5. See Malcolm Anderson, European Frontiers at the End of the Twentieth
Century: An Introduction, in THE FRONTIERS OF EUROPE 3 (Malcolm Anderson &
Eberhard Bort, eds. 1998) [hereinafter Anderson, European Frontiers] (concluding
that the effects of borders on the populations within them are difficult to assess).
6. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 2 (pointing out that recently, while
many national borders were being altered, the European Union sought to
deemphasize their importance).
7. See Barzilai & Peleg, supra note 2, at 59 (identifying the physical, political,
and social attributes of borders).
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in a territory, and delineate the boundaries of a separate society.' The
border is a line depicting the beginning of a society, and often, the
line past which exists the "enemy", the "barbarian" or the "other".'
However, borders are not merely map delineations; U rather, they
are institutionalized and legally constituted facts of political life."
The border is a fundamental political institution that is necessary to
establish any rule-based political, social, or economic life in a
progressive society.'2 This fundamental nature of borders is
embedded in international law in Article 11 of the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978,"
which stipulates that a succession of states does not affect a boundary
established by an agreement; nor does it affect treaty-established
rights and obligations relating to a boundary regime." Thus,
boundary agreements will remain in force despite a succession of
states. 5 In other words, borders are considered to exist prior to a state
being restructured and, therefore, are acknowledged as essential to
this restructuring. 
6
The state is a sovereign entity inside its own borders. As such, it
has total control over its own territory and may employ that control
at its borders. This signifies that sovereignty is still a major,
applicable doctrine when considering states and the relations among
them. 7 Various ideas concerning the institutional border have existed
8. See id. at 59-60 (referring to the relationship between states and societies).
9. See id. (expounding on the attitudinal relationships between societies with
regard to their borders).
10. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY. supra note 4, at 1-2 (stating that
borders reflect and symbolize national identity).
11. See id. (asserting that borders are institutions).
12. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 4; ANDERSON,
FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 1.
13. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 80/31 (1979), 17 I.L.M. 1488.
14. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 4 (finding that this
character of borders is reflected by the Vienna Convention).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Cf id. at 4-5 (stating that there is no absolute control over a nation's
borders since borders are not inviolable with respect to external forces);
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in the past, and others certainly will appear in the future.'" Currently,
there are indications of political upheavals that appear to be leading
in this direction. ' The character of the state is being altered due to
the inability of modem governments to manage, to any great extent,
the flow of goods, persons, and information over their borders."'
At the outset, one must recognize that the functioning of borders
throughout the world typically reflects well-developed notions of
sovereignty and is largely the outgrowth of nationalistic feelings.'
Yet, the character of both formal and informal relations across
borders, as well as those that transpire internally, are crucial factors
in stabilizing the relationship between the involved parties.2 Borders
are, after all, the political tissue that information, wealth, people, and
goods must penetrate for the state to consider them as either
unacceptable or acceptable.23 Part of an individual's identity is
defined legally by borders, since borders fix the limits of a person's
ability to exercise citizenship rights and nationality claims. 4 Europe,
for instance, is made up of varied and separate states, each with its
own borders, culture, language, history, and traditions.' Firmly
established borders never have existed in Europe, and current
ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 2.
18. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 5.
19. See id.
20. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the
government's lack of control over its borders in the modem age changes the nature
of states).
21. See S. WHITTEMORE BOGGS, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES: A STUDY OF
BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 6-7 (1940) (observing that nationalism
developed in Europe over the last two centuries).
22. See David Newman, Demarcating a Boundan' of Peace between Israel and
the West Bank, in POLITICAL BOUNDARIES AND COEXISTENCE 171, 172-74 (1994)
[hereinafter Newman, Demarcating a Boundary] (discussing the cross-boundary
relationships of neighboring countries).
23. See id. at 172 (discussing the movement of goods, people, and cultures
across borders).
24. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 3-4.
25. See Andreas G. Kourvetaris & George A. Kourvetaris, Attitudes Toward
European Integration: Ethnic and Cultural Dimensions, in THE IMPACT 01
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGF.S
151, 154 (George A. Kourvetaris & Andreas Moschonas, eds. 1996) (comparing
the cultural and ethnic diversity of Europe and the United States).
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European borders are still in dispute.:' Most of Europe comprises
states that are ill-defined units with unstable borders.:' Interestingly,
it turns out that only ten of the European states existing in 1899 had
the same borders in 1989.2" When a map of 1989 Europe is compared
with a 1999 map, tremendous changes stand out, such as the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the division of Czechoslovakia, and
the fracture of Yugoslavia. 9
Many wars and conflicts throughout the tumultuous history of
Europe were caused by historical discords of values and ideas against
a backdrop of heterogeneous, but clearly European, cultural
heritages. The states of Europe represent a political system of
independent, competing centers of power, each with its own
particular cultural uniqueness and characteristics." Generally,
though, European states, by themselves, are internally homogeneous
from an ethnic standpoint.'- Religious affiliations in European states
also generally relate directly to an individual's nationality."
The diversity of European cultures, nevertheless, simultaneously
presented benefits and detriments." It has been advantageous in its
consistency with democracy and freedom, which consequently has
26. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3. at 9 (asserting that nationalism and
imperialistic expansion brought about these unstable European borders).
27. See id. (contending that in the case of the European Union, border stability
was necessary to encourage economic interdependence).
28. See id.
29. See The Change in Europe, For Good or III, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1999, at
99 (discussing the changes in Europe since the fall of the Berlin wall).
30. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 154 (finding that while
Europeans are distinctly European, their diverse cultures and heritages have caused
animosity and conflict).
31. See id. (characterizing Europe as a collection of nation-states).
32. See id. (averring that as a continent. Europe is a multiculturally diverse
make-up of homogeneous individual states).
33. See id. at 155. For instance, the populations in France, Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Croatia, and Spain are generally Roman Catholic; Norway, England, and
Sweden are basically Protestant; Russia, Romania, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria
are predominantly Eastern Orthodox, and Germany is approximately half
Protestant and half Roman Catholic. See id.
34. See id. at 156 (stating that diversity is good for democracy but usually is
detrimental to unity and coordination).
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
enhanced the EU.3 European cultural diversity, however, has been
detrimental as well, since with this variety frequently comes
inconsonant ethnic and cultural nationalism.'6 These characteristics
reach to ethnic nationalism's very core. Furthermore, consequences
of ethnic nationalism include the lack of solidarity, singleness of
purpose, accommodation, and harmony." At its peak, ethnic
nationalism may eventually result in chauvinistic dominance and
war." Ethnic and cultural domination and imperialism of larger
nations have been at the forefront of Europe's violent and tumultuous
history for centuries.3" Promoting unity in an environment of
multifariousness is viewed as a demanding task that requires special
effort and dedication. 40 The continual nationalistic enmity is
35. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 156 (examining how
diversity affects governing the European Union).
36. See id.
37. See id. (asserting that nationality affects cohesiveness, and thus, affects the
European Union's ability to govern).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 160 (explaining that ethnic nationalism is not a new concept in
Europe, and that it has been increasing since the end of the Cold War).
40. See id. at 156. The task of creating a united superstate out of Europe has
been suspended, according to some observers, while European fears of potentially
giving up their individual national identities and policies are considered further.
See id. at 158. For instance, in a European identity survey from March 1999, more
people in each of ten European Union Member States identified themselves by
their countries alone than any other way. See Europe Goes to the Polls, Little
Respect, Less Love, but Growing Power, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1999, at 19, 21-22.
The next largest percentage of those surveyed identified themselves first by their
countries and second as Europeans. See id. These two categories of identification
-by country alone and by country first, then European-accounted for the
overwhelming majority of the populations in these states. See id. In the five other
European Union Member States, the categories reversed themselves-most
identified themselves first by their countries, then as Europeans, and the next
greatest percentage of people identified themselves solely by their countries. See
id. Nevertheless, when combined, the same two categories of identification
similarly resulted in accounting for an overwhelming majority in the populations
of these five European Union Member States. See id. Thus, the percentage of
people who live in the European Union and identify themselves as European only,
or first as European and second by country, is miniscule. See id. For further
discussion of the European identity issue, see O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at
1-2, 11-12 and infra note 81. Others believe that the centralization needed for a
European federal-type system is not currently acceptable to many states and would
create myriad problems of such an insoluble character that the Balkan ethnic
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demonstrated aptly by Scottish, Belgian, Welsh, and Spanish discord,
as well as by the long-lasting strife in Northern Ireland between
Catholics and Protestants. 4' Areas that contain unique cultural and
social attributes, often located far from metropolitan centers,
frequently are pushed simultaneously in different directions to adapt
to intricate adjustments. While people may currently believe that
borders preserve their interests, rights, and cultures, they are
generally less rigorous about policing them than compared to the
period immediately following the World War II." For instance, a
majority of the EU Member States have decided to eliminate
interstate border controls."
History is embodied in borders as the outcome of international
treaties, invasions, conquests, and/or population movements':, while
states have been the historical consequence of artificial borders
carved out during and after wars by the victorious and by
international agreements.! As demonstrated earlier, this arbitrary
character of border establishment has continually modified the map
of Europe throughout the course of history.' Belgium, for instance,
illustrates this type of border modification. The major powers at the
time, particularly Great Britain, established Belgium in 1830
following its revolt against control by Holland.4' Europe was teeming
conflicts would pale in comparison. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25,
at 158.
41. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 160-61 (observing that
ethnic nationalism continues to survive despite political and economic changes).
42. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 55 (citing
Northern Ireland, Corsica, and the Basque Country as examples of this
phenomenon).
43. See id. at 4-5 (noting the attitude change and the increased flexibility
concerning borders).
44. See id. (stating that nine out of fifteen members of the European Union had
already eliminated inter-state border controls).
45. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at I (explaining that the study of
borders is a study of the past).
46. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 153 (discussing the
arbitrary nature of state formation in both Europe and the Americas).
47. See id. (analyzing the volatile nature of European borders).
48. See id. (comparing the creation of states in Europe with the creation of
Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico in the United States).
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with other artificial entities, even as late as the twentieth century,
particularly in the wake of Austro-Hungary's dissolution.9 In a
similar fashion, following Mexico's drive out of Spain, the United
States ultimately annexed some of the areas previously taken over by
Spain in the Western Hemisphere, resulting in the formation of
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,0 and California.-'
While Europe's history is one of fragmentation and of war," post-
war Europe searched for ways to create a common awareness among
the states that were responsible for the terrible events." If the
European history of diversity, turbulence, violence, and conflict can
give rise to a "Europe without Frontiers, and if former enemies
like the United States and Mexico can sign the North American Free
Trade Agreement in 1992, 5 thereby bolstering the prosperity of both
49. See id. (providing a historical context to demonstrate the chaotic nature of
state formation).
50. See id. (demonstrating how conquests have led to the formation of states in
the Americas); see also Susan Kaufman Purcell, The Importance of Mexico-United
States Relations, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, 34(1) PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE I (Susan Kaufman Purcell, ed. 1981)
(indicating the loss of one-half of Mexican territory to the United States).
51. See, e.g., Robert W. Johannsen, America's Forgotten War, WILSON Q.,
Spring 1996, at 96, 103 (stating that the terms of the treaty ending the Mexican
War in 1848 included ceding New Mexico and California to the United States);
Mark J. White, The Case of the Yucatecan Request: American Foreign Polic* at
the Close of the Mexican War, 72 MID-AMERICA, AN HISTORICAL REVIEw 169
(1990) (elaborating on specific territorial expansion in pursuit of Manifest
Destiny); HOWARD F. CLINE, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 11 (1953)
(explaining that "revolution, annexation, conquest, and purchase" added pieces of
Mexico to the United States).
52. See Neil Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing, in THFI
FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 165, 173 [hereinafter Walker, The New
Frontiers of European Policing] (observing that the revival of nationalism has
drawn attention to the strong European bond).
53. See Giovanni Delli Zotti, Transfrontier Co-operation at the Erternal
Borders of the European Union: Implications for Sovereignty, in BORDERS,
NATIONS AND STATES, supra note 3, at 51 (describing how the European
community initially was formed and arguing that the movement toward political
integration is now being done out of necessity).
54. See, e.g., O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 1, 2, 11-12 (advocating for a
united Europe rather than one comprised of individual states).
55. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (chs. 1-9); 32 I.L.M. 605 (chs. 10-22) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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countries, there is no reason why a concept of porous or permeable
borders cannot exist between the Palestinians and Israel. In the case
of Israel and the Palestinians, just as in Europe, the question becomes
how the present may be accommodated with the past and joined to
the future. 6
Under the terms of the Declaration of Principles of 1993'" and
the Interim Agreement of 19955' between Israel and the Palestinians,
the permanent status negotiations are to cover various remaining
issues, including the crucial subject of borders." Presumably, the
drafters of these accords intended that the issue of borders would
encompass, among other things, the delimitation and demarcation of
the borders.60 Delimitation involves the proceedings related to the
"determination of a boundary line ... and its definition in written,
verbal terms."'" Demarcation refers to the method of actually and
physically drawing a boundary line.", Both delimitation and
For further discussion of the North American Free Trade Area, see inmra notes
700-708, 715-749 and accompanying text.
56. Cf O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at I (arguing that any change in
Europe's borders requires a thorough understanding of the continent's history).
57. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O. Team, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
58. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
59. Under these accords, the other remaining issues that the permanent status
negotiations were to cover include "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security
arrangements" and "relations and cooperation with other neighbors." Declaration
of Principles, supra note 57, art. 5, § 3, at 1529; Interim Agreement, supra note 58,
art. 31, § 5, at 567.
60. See David Newman, Boundaries in Flux: The *Green Line' Boundarv
Between Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and Future. in I BOL\DARY
AND TERRITORY BRIEFING 1, 23 (Clive Schofield. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Newman,
Boundaries in Flux]. Cf Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, Internatonal Boundaries,
84 J. ROYAL SoC'Y ARTS 4 (1935) (defining the two main stages in boundary
disputes, by distinguishing the terms "delimitation" and 'demarcation").
61. McMahon, supra note 60, at 4; see A.O. CUKWLURAIl, TIlE SETLE\E\T OF
BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LA\V 27 (1967) (explaining that the
delimitation of a boundary refers to the establishment of a boundary line in a treaty
or in an arbitral award); see also STEPHEN B. JONES, BOI_'NDARY-MAKING: A
HANDBOOK FOR STATESMEN, TREATY EDITORS AND BOLND.RY COMMISSIONERS
57-71 (1945) (establishing the aims and methods of boundary delimitation).
62. See McMahon, supra note 60, at 4; CUKV.RAI, supra note 61. at 28
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
demarcation have played a crucial role in Palestine, or the Land of
Israel, over the past one hundred years." While delimitation and
demarcation issues are critical, the functional characteristics of an
open or closed border are at least as important as a peace settlement.
Therefore, the Israelis and the Palestinians, as parties in the peace
process, must examine the bearing of their relations resulting from
cross-border cooperation or separation.6
III. OPEN BORDERS IN GENERAL
Ideally, open borders would be maintained as an expression of the
desire for economic, social, and political interaction across them.
Such cross-border interaction could result in the creation of new
links and the continuation of current ones between peoples of
politically equal entities. Such links can eventually establish a
beneficial by-product through an enduring normalization between
neighboring territories.65 Open borders would hopefully promote free
movement of people and goods,66 which in turn would help to allow
(explaining that the actual laying down of a boundary line may include placing
boundary pillars, monuments, and other permanent structures along the ground to
separate the territories); see generally JONES, supra note 61, at 165-225 (outlining
the technical process involved in demarcating boundaries).
63. See Barzilai & Peleg, supra note 2, at 59, 63 (providing a historical
examination of the political conflict in determining a future Israeli-Palestinian
border).
64. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 172 (describing
how relations between neighboring territories will affect whether the boundaries
function in practice as open or closed borders).
65. See id. (correlating the nature of boundary relations-both formal and
informal-to the level of political stability).
66. See David Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers of Conflict into
Political Frontiers of Peace, in ETHNIC FRONTIERS AND PERIPHERIES:
LANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY IN ISRAEL 17, 18 (Oren Yiftachel
& Avinoam Meir, eds. 1998) [hereinafter Newman, TransJbrming Ethnic
Frontiers] (suggesting that the success in achieving long-term stability in the
Middle East depends largely on economic, social, and cultural interactions
between the parties). The term "open" borders must be examined from an
appropriate historical viewpoint. See generally Borders: Good Fences.
ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998, at 19, 21. Unquestionably, it was easier for people to
cross borders in the nineteenth century than it is now. See id. at 21. In fact, from
1850-1900, roughly sixty million people came to the Western Hemisphere from
Europe. See id. Notwithstanding the current level of free trade, the degree of
freedom of movement now found in developed countries is significantly less than
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the dispersion and dissemination of a common realization of
perceptions, sensibilities, and sensitivities." These types of interplay
between individuals could permit each side to appreciate the other's
viewpoint and to achieve a useful insight into the inner workings and
the psychological makeup of the adversary's society." Accordingly,
the parties may be better able to understand not only each other's
actions, and especially the basic concerns of the other party, but also
the restrictions imposed on each other." Therefore, this process could
it was in the nineteenth century. See id.
67. See Newman, Deniarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 172 (recognizing
that mutual acceptance of a common boundary is more feasible in areas where
there are no fundamental issues of political or territorial conflict).
68. See Herbert C. Kelman, An Interactional Approach to Conflict Resolttion
and its Application to Israeli-Palestinian Relations, 6 INT'L INTERACTIONS 99,
115-16 (1979) [hereinafter Kelman, An Interactional Approach] (exploring how
certain problem-solving workshops can possibly facilitate the peace process
between Israel and the Palestinians).
69. See id. at 116 (suggesting that certain types of social interactions, such as a
problem-solving workshop setting, would allow both the Israelis and the
Palestinians to learn how each party defines one another, as well as themselves,
and to begin to take steps toward mutual acceptance). As early as the 1940s and
1950s, the prevalent thinking held that contact among differing groups would
ultimately alter mutual perceptions of one another, thereby improving long-term
relationships. See Rachel Ben-Ari & Yehuda Amir, Contact Between Arab and
Jewish Youth in Israel: Reality and Potential, in CONTACT AND CONFLICT IN
INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS 45, 50 (Miles Hewstone & Rupert Brown, eds. 1986).
The thought was that it was sufficient for people of varied backgrounds and
experiences to just be in contact with each other, to have a chance to get
acquainted with one another, and to increase their knowledge, approval, and
toleration of one another, which would diminish stress, discord, and bias between
the groups. See id. Later investigation revealed that although contact may indeed
actually alter predilections and interplay between varied ethnic groups, this
alteration of relations and attitudes may not always yield a positive result. See id.
at 51. For changes to occur in the desired direction, specific essential prerequisites
must exist in contact situations, since different conditions could produce a less
than positive outcome. See id. at 50-51. Contact must take place in "positive
exposure" situations for it to be useful. See id. at 51-52. In ethnic contact, to help
appreciate the other group's members as individuals instead of as members of a
stereotyped group, it is imperative to disclose sufficient information concerning
the other group's members. See id. at 51-52. The following prerequisites are
deemed the most essential for altering in a positive way the predilections and
interplay between varied ethic groups: contact of an equal-status nature between
the interacting groups' members; intergroup dependence; discouragement of
competition between the groups created by the search for a mutual objective
through cooperation between the groups; and a forum in which there is close
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stimulate and reinforce the evolution of amicable and cooperative
relations between people living on different sides of the border,7"
helping achieve the creation of a stable peace between former
• 71
adversaries. While the degree to which functional boundaries are
open for the movement of people and goods, representing one of the
crucial factors used to determine the extent to which border zones
between Israel and its neighbors become less confrontational, 2 it is
obvious that the implementation of peace cannot occur overnight.7
Rather, a peace settlement constitutes a long, drawn-out process
between prior adversaries with two objectives: first, decreasing the
extent of direct conflict; and second, gradually increasing the level of
political stability along the border.74 Longer-term objectives, such as
the normalization of relations between the two sides and the
complete opening of the borders to the free movement of people and
goods, are usually not attainable in the first stages of border
transformation. 1
contact between interacting members to acquaint each other beyond a superficial
level. See id. at 51. For further discussion of the contact issue, see infra notes 145-
156 and accompanying text.
70. See Newman, Denarcating a Boundary, supra note 23, at 172 (maintaining
that mutual awareness and recognition diminishes the potential for future conflict
and cross-boundary positional disputes). The shared perceptions and experiences
of Israeli Jews and Arabs, for instance, comprise positive elements, which may
eventually negate underlying stereotypes and tensions, thus improving relations
within Israel. See Ben-Ari & Amir, supra note 71, at 47.
71. See, e.g., Kelman, An Interactional Approach, supra note 68, at 99, 104.
72. See Newman, Transforining Ethnic Frontiers. supra note 66, at 17
(proposing that in addition to economic cooperation, peace in the Middle East
depends on the extent to which parties remove mutual suspicions of military threat
and foster cross-border interactions among ethnic groups).
73. See id. at 28 (recognizing that despite the signing and implementation of a
peace agreement, the history of animosity impedes any immediate changes in the
military and security landscapes); see also infra Part XII, (B) and (C) (notes 549-
666) in general (referring to Western Europe and North America to demonstrate
that conflict situations often take many years to resolve peacefully) and Part XIV
(notes 856-965) in particular.
74. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 18-19
(underscoring the importance of creating a long-term economic relationship after
the reduction of direct altercations).
75. See id. at 27-28 (suggesting that "global media, telecommunications, and
satellites" may help increase levels of cooperation in the short-term).
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Moreover, a peace process, at times, involves nothing more than
an agreement to end a state of warring without normal relations and
economic cooperation as an integral part of that process." The border
region may continue to exhibit intricate geographical-ethnic,
economic, strategic, and security interactions between former
adversaries,77 while emphasizing elements of a strategic and security
nature, which may never be totally eliminated. "' As borders display
trans-boundary interaction, however, the direction shifts to regional
and economic development.)" Moreover, early micro-area changes
can ease the transition to an ultimate situation of peace and
coexistence, particularly after macro-area changes have occurred."
IV. THE ABOLITION OF BORDERS
There seems to be a discernable trend in many parts of the world
today where borders are being "erased" or "eliminated." In this
sense, they are, or are becoming, either more penetrable, more
permeable, more porous," or more obsolete,'2 as demonstrated by
76. See id. at 19 (recognizing that the foremost concern in establishing peace is
the dismantling of perceived military and security threats).
77. See id. (establishing that to achieve long-term stability after the
implementation of a peace agreement. the parties must discuss a variety of issues
in the negotiation process).
78. See id. at 19, 28 (noting that while a true border of peace involves
removing military installations, the maintenance of peace necessitates the presence
of security forces to respond to any breach of the treaty. which will be perceived as
a renewed threat).
79. See id. at 19 (describing government-sponsored projects focusing on
economic development between the political entities).
80. See Ben-Aft & Amir, supra note 69, at 57 (maintaining that informal
relations between individuals through economic, social, and cultural interactions
across the border will reinforce the implementation of formal relations between the
political entities).
81. See SHIMON PERES & ARYE NAOR, TIlE NE\% MIDDLE EAST 172 (1993)
(recognizing that secular and religious considerations force Jordan, the
Palestinians, and Israel to allow people, ideas, and goods to move freely): see also
ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 7 (observing that in highly
developed countries, such as in Europe, borders "have become more permeable
and less clearly defined as . . . lines of cultural and social identities"); Victor
Konrad, Borderlines and Borderlands in the Geography Qf Canada- UnIted States
Relations, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS? INTEGRATING CANADA, THE
UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO 189, 193 (Stephen J. Randall. ed. 1992) [hereinafter
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NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS?]; Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at
19-20; Warren Hogg, The Bridge Between the Strict Interpreters and the Lovers of
Pleasures, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 7, 1999, at 1 IA (in Hebrew) (on file with author). For
instance, the European Union's eastern border, which hitherto was distinguished
by the line that divided Germany and was embodied by the Berlin Wall,
disappeared with the fall of that wall in November 1989. The fall of the Berlin
Wall epitomized the razing of the Iron Curtain, which until then separated the
European Union from its neighbors to the east. See Eberhard Bort, Mitteleuropa:
The Difficult Frontier, in THE FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 91.
Nevertheless, a somewhat muddled and complicated situation actually seems to be
occurring. According to some, the state, as such, is not being dismantled, but is
actually experiencing an evolution and diversification. See Kourvetaris &
Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 160. The world is currently witnessing the
expansion of ethnic nationalism and "subnationalism" that commenced with the
Cold War's termination and continued with the decay of a large part of state
socialism. See id. at 160-61. With the Soviet Union's downfall, a new world order
has concurrently emerged whereby both ethnic cleansing and warfare have been
employed to re-establish states and territories that are ethnically homogenous. See
Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 24-25, 30. Strong
inclinations toward shoring up their reacquired sovereignty is apparent in many of
the European Union's newly independent Eastern neighbors. See Bort, supra, at
95. Consequently, the world in which identity politics is becoming increasingly
deterritorialized is paradoxically a world of more profuse, and sometimes even
stronger, states. See Thomas M. Wilson & Hastings Donnan, Nation, State and
Identity, at International Borders, in BORDER IDENTITIES: NATION AND STATE AT
INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS 1, 2 (Thomas M. Wilson & Hastings Donnan, eds.
1998).
Places such as Quebec, Northern Italy, Flanders, and Scotland have separatist
movements that have been encouraged to reach out for more borders. See Borders:
Good Fences, supra note 66, at 21. Hence, in places where interests and identities
seem to be seriously threatened, states may accordingly attempt to harden their
borders. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 191. Thus,
"harder" borders may constitute the necessary result of more autonomy; new
borders evolve from the dissolution of a political community into a profusion of
diverse states. See Raimondo Strassoldo, Perspectives on Frontiers: The Case of
Alpe Adria, in THE FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 75, 88. The common
"harder" border between Slovenia and Croatia provides a good illustration of this
concept. See id. Thus, some borders are created while others come down. See
Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 19. In this way, the development of the
European Union has created more borders rather than fewer. See Thomas M.
Wilson, Sovereignty, Identity and Borders: Political Anthropology and European
Integration, in BORDERS, NATIONS AND STATES, supra note 3, at 199, 213.
According to some observers, the redefinition and relocation of national
sovereignty minimizes the significance of territorial boundaries. See Liam
O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty and European Integration: The
British-Irish Case, 19 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 272, 273 (1995)
[hereinafter O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty]. Although borders may
still exist, their importance will diminish since they will not contain political
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authorities with exclusive control over the spectrum of state functions. See id.
Rather, the emerging system would encompass a dispersion of the state's powers
among varied authorities. See id. Some view this phenomenon in Europe as the
establishment of a "Europe of the Borders," since the definitions of a border have
become both broader and more variable. See Wilson, supra, at 213. "Europe
without Frontiers," nonetheless, is still defined by many political, cultural, and
legal borders. See id. at 215. In addition, there are those who are convinced of the
resilience and flexibility in the definition of the contemporary state in territorial
terms. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty. supra. at 274. Even
inside the European Union, some suggest that territorial borders should be
maintained because such boundaries define nation-states and ethno-national
groups. See Liam O'Dowd & James Corrigan. Securing the Irish Border in a
Europe Without Frontiers, in BORDERS, NATIONS AND STATES, supra note 3, at
117, 129. Thus, as pointed out by some observers, European integration, both
politically and economically, does not necessarily portend the state's termination.
See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 156. According to these
observers, the European Union may actually preserve the sovereign state within set
territorial limits. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra. at 118. In this vein, according to
one account, signs of the Western European states' decline are sporadic, minimal,
and rare. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra, at 274. Thus,
Western Europe certainly should not be considered as the be all and end all of the
world: Western European states are "neither dying nor retiring; they have merely
shifted functions and may continue to do so in the future." Michael Mann, Nation-
States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversi'ing, Developing, Not Dying, 122
DAEDALUS 115, 133 (1993); see O'Dowd et al., Borders. National Sovereignti,
supra, at 274. This view also implies that national authorities that have obtained
much of their power and authority from the structure of the European Union-a
structure that they helped set up-will be reluctant to readily accept ethno-
nationalist or regionalist efforts to establish, or re-define, territorial borders. See id.
at 274. Although an alteration of borders has occurred in Western Europe, borders
have not disappeared despite the push to establish a common market in the region.
See Wilson, supra, at 203-04; see also A Thing That Won't Go Away, in A Survey
of the New Geopolitics: The Road to 2050, ECONOMIST, July 31, 1999, at 8
[hereinafter Survey of the New Geopolitics] (arguing that the spread of capitalism
and information technology has not diminished the role of the state).
Indeed, "economic integration, migratory protection, and external security" are all
different goals, each of which determines where a border is to be located. See
Michel Foucher, The Geopolitics of European Frontiers, in THE FRONTIERS OF
EUROPE, supra note 5, at 235, 236. The ensuing result is a system that establishes
different borders for different purposes, all of which obviously create an extremely
intricate arrangement in Europe. See id. at 236. Some suggest that in Western
Europe it is obvious that there should exist a general adherence to allegiance to the
state. See MALCOLM ANDERSON ET AL.. POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION 280
(1995) [hereinafter ANDERSON, ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION]. The
borders separating European Union Member States are still significant political
and legal institutions, and will continue to be so, at least until the current inter-
governmental system is transformed into a true intra-European arrangement
involving the policing of individuals under European law overseen by the
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European Court of Justice. See id. at 153. Such an arrangement might provide
practical grounds for sustaining an efficient European Union "outer shell." See id.
Although some Western European borders have disappeared, from a legal
perspective, they remain significant dividing lines. See id. at 18 1. In other words,
rather than restricting the formal sovereignty, European Union activity has limited
Member States' substantive sovereignty. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 60. For
example, the border denotes the beginning and the end of each European state's
criminal and police jurisdiction. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN
UNION, sup-a, at 181. European Union Member States have resisted attempts to
weaken the notion of state sovereignty. See id. at 153, 181. The state's exclusive
jurisdiction in law enforcement matters demonstrates that the territorial notion
attached to state sovereignty remains unimpaired, notwithstanding the increase in
commerce and travel and the expansion of European law. See id. The constituent
states are not yet confident in transferring the necessary authority to the European
Union, given the lack of a cohesive European identity that could potentially offset
the distinct political notions of sovereignty attached to a territorial state. See id.
The absence of support for the European Union is predicated on the fact that there
are no "European people." See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4,
at 178. The dissimilarities of culture, history, and language define European
peoples. See id. at 189. Furthermore, European peoples view themselves first and
foremost as nationals-for example, German, Italian, Greek, French--and as
Europeans second. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 159, 164,
165. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 40. Therefore, the
European Union's attempts to form a "European identity" are on a direct collision
course with the national identities that individuals deem to be controlling. See
Wilson, supra, at 208.
Some classify a "Europe without Frontiers" as a "new myth" and contend that
borders form a critical component of a nation's social life. See O'Dowd & Wilson,
supra note 3, at 7. Some contend that establishing any rule-oriented society would
be impossible without borders. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra
note 4, at 1; see also Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 19-20 (asserting that
a state must have a border). Stated differently, a state must have a border in order
to have significance. See id. at 22. Others, however, find that while the importance
of some established European Union internal borders are disappearing, new
"buffer" or "frontier" zones have evolved within the more "official" European
borders. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 13; see also Delli Zotti, supra
note 53, at 52 (detailing increased levels of regional cooperation, which improves
relations between Eastern and Western Europe). Thus, skeptics argue that no
indication exists for replacing the state as the fundamental unit of international
relations, which accordingly leads to their conclusion that borders are for the
present still with us. See Survey of the New Geopolitics, Yupra, at 8. Moreover, the
skeptics contend that the elimination of borders in Europe is a sui generis process,
not noticeable elsewhere in the world. See id. at 9-10. Nevertheless, even for those
who may argue that borders between states continue to exist and play an important
function, it is viewed as a worthwhile objective for borders in Europe to be
desanctified and depoliticized. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 64.
82. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 1 (observing that scholars argue
that borders are becoming so obsolete that they may no longer be able to impede
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national borders' dwindling importance, " or even by the vanishing of
traditional borders." Some observers speak in terms of "the withering
away," "softening," "weakening," or "defunctionalization" of
borders."
The Single European Market was designed as a step in the
direction of European political and economic integration. This
process of creating an internal market in the EU was meant to
establish a Europe without frontiers "-a Europe without territorial
borders, which create obstacles to the transnational free movement of
goods, capital, and people." The abolition of borders as obstacles and
the free movement concept were intended to energize and open up
societies in Europe." Linking political and economic
interdependence with the mutual understanding of creating a border
environment devoid of tension, the forefathers of the EU saw the
facilitation of the free movement of culture, goods, and people,
combined with trans-border cooperation, as a means to decrease the
significance of borders." The borders inside the EU thus have been
the flow of people, commerce, and ideas).
83. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that borders %%,ithin the
European Union have become less significant since the creation of the Single
European Market and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty).
84. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81. at 2 (proposing the emergence of a
new politics of identity defined by territorial boundaries with the incorporation of
gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and race to create transnationalismi.
85. See, e.g., Strassoldo, supra note 81. at 88 (arguing that the opening of
internal borders in Europe may have a detrimental effect on border town
economies that rely on border controls to maintain cost differentials in goods and
salaries).
86. See, e.g., Foucher, supra note 81. at 237 (discussing the realization of
economic and political cooperation within Europe).
87. See id. (summarizing the aspirations of the European Union's founders
who sought to promote the "'Four Freedoms." the borderless movement of goods,
services, capital, and people); see also Wilson. supra note 81, at 199. Some
observers view this European design for social and economic harmony as being
side-tracked and minimized when faced off with the horrendous atrocities
emanating from war in the Balkans. See i.
88. See Didier Bigo, Frontiers and Security in the European hnon. The
Illusion of Migration Control, in THE FRONTIERS 01 EUROPE, supra note 5. at 148,
151 (linking the opening of societies to the resurgence of immigration policy
issues).
89. See Foucher, supra note 81. at 237 (recognizing that the forefathers of the
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losing more and more their consequence,' ° and accordingly have been
taken off Europe's political docket.9'
As a result of the functional and characteristic alterations made to
the borders in Western Europe, there may be implications in other
areas of the world.92 Globalization seems to mean erasing borders
everywhere, not just those in Europe.93 Open borders have become
commonplace, even for the "alienated" regions located on the EU's
eastern edge.94 Indeed, some of the EU's external borders now may
be, in some ways, even more "open" than borders separating
members of the EU. 9' According to this reasoning, the historical
mission of territorial borders is not being accomplished since they no
longer serve either as obstacles to the transnational movement of
people, goods, and ideas, or as indicators of the geographical scope
European Union devised the concept of a European Union without borders
specifically for the purpose of ending tensions that arise from defining borders).
90. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 61 (suggesting further that external
borders will continue to lose their significance as more countries accede into the
European Union and become Member States).
91. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at I (pointing out that
borders similarly were not the central focus of the European agenda during the
Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union dominated Europe).
92. See id. at 6. Such an observation, however, may be somewhat problematic
since a specific analysis of borders in Europe may tend to lead to the allegation
that the European example, warranted by the fact that alterations to their functions
and characteristics have been more extreme there than in other places, is of a sui
generis type, and thus not one from which analogies may readily be made. See
Survey of the New Geopolitics, supra note 81, at 9-10. For further discussion, see
supra note 81.
93. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 3. The ECONOMIST
observed not long ago that it seemed that every country in the world was building
a road, a tunnel, and/or a bridge to its neighbor. See Borders: Good Fences, supra
note 66, at 20.
94. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 2 (describing
developments within Europe under the framework of a European Union); Bort,
supra note 81, at 91 (providing the boundary between Poland and Germany as an
example of a previously "alienated" border transforming into an open border).
95. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 7 (attributing global
economic and technological change to the opening of external borders). Some
observers have therefore linked the dismantling of the Iron Curtain to the creation
of soft and open borders coupled with a corresponding need to harden the
European Union's external borders. See Bort, supra note 81, at 94.
[16:1
PERMEABLE FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS
of state authority and power."' Therefore, the importance of borders is
decreasing as they are becoming more permeable. " Trans-border,
cooperative spirit opposes the creation of new borders and supports
greater permeability for existing borders.' A strong political
character for borders is unnecessary. Some borders may shed their
political importance and take on a role more administrative in
nature."
Decreasing international tensions in some areas of the world,'"
such as Western Europe," coupled with a radical alteration in the
96. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81. at 1 (predicting the end of nation-
states as the pre-eminent political structure in the modem world).
97. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 118. Some observe that the
diminution in importance of borders means that the state's sovereign powers are
being dispersed down to various groups within the state and extending up to
transnational agencies. See id.
98. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 64 (illustrating this point with an
examination of the Alpine region where certain territories are cooperating across
traditional borders and joining the Alps-Adria Working Community and the
Alpine Region Working Community).
99. See id. Unfortunately, the establishment of a territorial border rather than
an administrative border between Croatia and Bosnia resulted in national and
ethnic conflict. See id.
100. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 20. Yet there still remain
conflicts in almost every area of the world. See id. For instance, many Asian
borders, such as the ones between the two Koreas and between Pakistan and India,
are still in dispute. See id. Argentina almost waged war in 1978 with neighboring
Chile for possession of its southern-most part. In fact, Argentina waged war
against the United Kingdom for the Falkland Islands (known in Argentina as the
Islas Malvinas) in 1982. See id. Ecuador and Peru provide a further illustration of
border conflict, evinced by their mini-war fought in 1995, which culminated in a
peace accord. See id.
101. Some observers have contended that in light of European border-
establishment history, to claim that disputes about borders are a thing of the past,
or that border feuds and ethnic-national struggles quietly will fade away despite
demands for autonomy or secession, is incongruous considering the international
facts available. See O'Dowd, et al., Borders, National Sovereigny, supra note 81,
at 274, 275, 283. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 81. The
prominence of identities and border politics has been revitalized in both Eastern
and Western Europe. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 2-4. Border conflicts
in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are verifications of the
seemingly irrepressible desire of ethnic-national groups for distinct lands of their
own as well as the resulting significance of borders. See id. at 2. Ethnic
nationalism's increase in the republics of the former Soviet Union and the former
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magnitude to which borders can actually stay completely sealed-
due to the global communications network's obliteration of sealing
characteristics of borders-produced an outgrowth of border-
openings. ' °2 The ability to transfer information instantaneously
procures a loss of the sovereignty over information."" Satellites,
telecommunications, and the global media have altered the extent to
which closed borders exist in the modem world.41 The penetration of
borders by the Internet-or even the simple radio'015-and the
diffusion and dissemination of rudimentary information concerning
communities and peoples in the immediate vicinity are useful in
Yugoslavia, and the seemingly endless confrontations in Northern Ireland and in
other parts of Europe, do not portend a positive atmosphere for a Europe that is
meant to be integrated and unified. See Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25,
at 165; Karen Trew, Catholic-Protestant Contact in Northern Ireland, in CONTACT
AND CONFLICT IN INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS, supra note 69, at 93, 95 (providing
support for the argument that the augmentation of ethnic nationalism in certain
areas of the world exemplifies the increased significance of borders); A Protestant
Organization in Northern Ireland Killed a Catholic Lawyer in an Explosion of Her
Car, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 16, 1999, at 12A [hereinafter A Protestant Organization in
Northern Ireland] (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Riots and Additional Acts o/
Murder Threaten the Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 19,
1999, at 16A [hereinafter Riots and Additional Acts] (in Hebrew) (on file with
author). But ef Kourvetaris & Kourvetaris, supra note 25, at 163 (citing RIFFAULT,
EUROPEAN NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL VALUES 1991) (asserting that
Europeans indeed are heading in the direction of a multi-ethnic, integrated society
at the same time that ethnic groups everywhere are seeking more recognition and
autonomy). The ensuing result of this integration is the territorial state's
diminished importance. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra, at 2. On the other hand,
another observer, writing in 1981, argued that problems in the border regions
inside Europe stem from the desires of minorities to achieve their national goals
inside an organized state's apparatus. See id. at 7.
102. See David Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundatr,
The Re-Emergence of the Green Line, in 2 THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,
WORLD BOUNDARIES 71-72 (C.H. Schofield & R.N. Schofield, eds. 1994)
[hereinafter Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundar,]; see
also, ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 191.
103. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 6; see also ANDERSON,
FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 191.
104. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 27.
105. See Anthony P. Cohen, Boundaries and Boundarv-Consciousness:
Politicizing Cultural Identity, in THE FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 22,
33 (asserting that technological advances in communications have led to the
permeability of old jurisdictional frontiers and have called forth new jurisdictional
devices).
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reducing both social and physical obstacles that existed between
states formerly in conflict with one another.'"'
The instantaneous transfer of information and the trans-border
movement of people, which each year numbers more than the entire
population of the states involved, has altered the practical and
psychological significance of border controls."" The increasing
inability of governments to control this trans-border information flow
and movement of goods and people is altering the character of
borders, as well as states themselves, in the modem world.'"" Thus,
observers indicate that in light of contemporary reality, it is not
possible to erect totally closed borders that act to deter suspect
persons from traversing them.' Even the concept, in and of itselt, of
deterring unwanted foreign individuals from entering the EU
Member States, for example, will not hold up under serious
examination." ° As a matter of fact, the establishment and
maintenance of a hermetically sealed border has barely ever come to
fruition."' The more a border is sealed and the more powerful its
effect as a symbolic mechanism, the more powerful the feeling of the
person in charge that, in order to hold on to his or her authority, he or
106. See Newman, Transforninig Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 27
(discussing the effect of changes on nation-states in conflict due to the
development of communications). Such is the case of greater political and
economic cooperation between Western European states as well as of the Western
and Eastern European political barriers. See i
107. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY. supra note 4, at 4 (exploring the
transformation of the practical and psychological uses of border controls and
finding that the result has been more flexible attitudes of border policing).
108. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 5 (observing that the
amount of actual governmental border control is restricted by the state's practice
and policies); ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4. at 2 (advocating
the notion that traditional border controls that used to protect and promote
sovereign interests are becoming increasingly ineffective due to external
influences).
109. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at
154 (discussing various policing techniques being considered and implemented by
EU Member States).
110. See id. at 152.
111. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY. sttpra note 4. at 6 (citing as
examples of sealed borders that failed over time the Iron Curtain separating
Eastern and Western Europe and the militarized border of Franco's Spain).
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she must preserve rigorous control of the border."2 Well-known
examples of this during the twentieth century include the precarious
cease-fire line between Pakistan and India in Kashmir; the 38th
Parallel, which divides South from North Korea; the Iron Curtain,
together with its automatic killing apparatuses and surveillance
mechanism; the border between capitalistic Hong Kong and the
People's Republic of China in the New Territories; the partition line
in Cyprus, which separates the Greek part from the Turkish part of
the island; the South African apartheid regime known as the Black
African separation line; General Franco's Spanish militarized border;
and the Israel-Arab borders."3 However, even though the presence of
automatic killing equipment, border guards ordered to shoot on sight,
guard dogs, barbed wire, visual and electronic surveillance, and the
seas obviously reduce the number of illegal border crossings, they
have not succeeded in completely ending the movement of refugees
across borders." 4 For instance, between 1961, when the Berlin Wall
was constructed, and 1989, when it was demolished, East Germany's
western border maintained characteristics similar to those described
above. Although those methods diminished the trans-border
movement of emigrants, they did not succeed in completely halting
this flow."' Ironically, the border was quite porous in a number of
ways and in two directions. The permeability of East Germany's
western border to goods traded across it led East Germany to be
considered a thirteenth "shadow" member of the European Economic
Community. 116
This therefore demonstrates that the possibility of goods and
persons being rigorously controlled at the borders is substantially
restricted in light of present-day realities."7 Mass communications'
revolution, cultural and economic globalization, and increasing
mobility and tourism all seem to be decreasing the importance of
112. See id.
113. Seeid.at5-6.
114. See ANDERSON ET AL, POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at
152 (illustrating the failed attempts by governments to create a true "closed
border").
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 152-53.
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territorial borders as indicators of self-govemed, self-contained
societies of a collective identity. According to this rationale, national
borders are permeable, porous, and abstract.'' While technological
changes and economic globalization most likely have more effect on
some borders rather than others,"" fundamental operations of cultural
and economic globalization generally seem to be decreasing the
importance of borders and the sovereignty that they enclose, and, at
the very least, restructuring them. 12('
In the case of Israelis and Palestinians, open borders are a virtual
necessity for normal existence due to the small territorial area and the
intertwinement and interdependence involved. Realities of an
emotional, economic, geographic, and demographic nature dictate
that both Palestinians and Israelis are connected to one another and to
the entire area of Eretz Yisrael-The Land of Israel--or Palestine.
As a result, it would be impossible for two completely closed
societies to exist, separate from one another, with hostile relations
between them. For the two sides to even exist, let alone flourish and
advance, the only possible path is to live in conditions of mutual
cooperation. 2' In some respects, this may be similar to the mutual
cooperation existing in Europe against the backdrop of separate and
unique, yet intertwined, cultural traditions that are themselves the
118. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 4-5 (observing that increased
communications devalues the importance of borders). But see id. at 5 (offering the
premise of some that what really is taking place is the "relativization" of borders,
which was brought about by the rapid increase of borders rather than their
vanishing). Looking at the situation in this fashion allows for ethno-nationalism's
profusion, operating independently of specific political and economic authority.
See id. In this way, while there is a decrease in the significance of territorial
borders, they nonetheless exist side by side, or even overlap, with an abundance of
economic, military, and ethnic borders. See id. For further discussion of this issue,
see supra note 81.
119. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 6, 7.
120. Cf O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 6 (questioning the assertion that
borders are becoming entrenched and gaining significance).
121. See Herbert C. Kelman, The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers To a Negotiated Solution?, 8 J.
INT'L SOC'Y POL. PSYCHOL. 347, 348 (1987) [hereinafter Kelman, The Political
Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict] (proposing cooperation between
regions in conflict as a means of fostering advancement and growth for the overall
societal progress of the geographic region).
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result of a process of continual interchange. 22 Such is the case of the
Ireland-Northern Ireland experience, with some variations, of course.
The border on the island of Ireland has basically been open. The
people on both sides of the border speak an identical language, and
the border divides, at different places, both Catholics and Protestants
on one side from their co-religionists on the other. Many of the
region's similar, shared problems-high unemployment levels, low
levels of infrastructure, poor land, migration out of the area, and
small farm dependence-are likewise divided by the border.'2'
V. CLOSED BORDERS IN GENERAL
Territorial borders typically have been "closed" or even "sealed",
which often epitomizes the tense and hostile feelings between states.
Such antagonistic relationships have frequently resulted in the
establishment of security and military structures on the border and, at
times, the outbreak of actual conflict.'24 In particular, borders
between states in conflict have usually been closed, allowing for very
limited movement, if any, between the two sides. A border that is
completely sealed can create contrasting and entirely different
"settlement landscapes" existing alongside one another. This "spatial
differentiation" paradigm becomes prominent with sealed borders
enclosing different ideologies and/or cultures. 21 Yet, this "spatial
differentiation" may form over a relatively short time span by
imposing a border that firmly encloses what was once an ethnically
122. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 66 (demonstrating the benefits of the
continued cultural exchanges between the peoples of the Alps and Adria in Italy to
Italian society in general). For instance, Northern and Southern Italian cultural
differences have been tracked back to the geographic, racial, and historical
attachment of Southern Italy to the Mediterranean and Northern Italy to Central
Europe. See Raimondo Strassoldo, Ethnic-Regionalism Versus the State: The Case
of Italy's Northern Leagues, in BORDERS, NATIONS AND STATES, supra note 3, at
73, 74.
123. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra note 81, at 275.
For further discussion of the situation on the island of Ireland, see infra notes 192-
241, 400-437 and accompanying text.
124. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 18
(discussing closed border situations and the contrasting effects of a sealed border
on the respective sides).
125. See id. at 20.
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homogeneous and singularly functional entity. ' :'
The abrupt consequences that result from imposing a totally closed
border are clearly exemplified by the "green line", which separated
the West Bank from Israel between 1949 and 1967, and the division
between East and West Germany from 1950 to 1990.'27 Therefore,
closed borders may effectively preclude beneficial local and
individual relations, connections, commerce, and interactions.'
When cross-border interaction is limited, populations are alienated
from each other; exchanges of goods, services, and ideas are kept to a
minimum; and the threat of violence looms ever-present. '
Consequently, sealed borders prevent apprehensive populations on
each side of the border from gaining both a better perspective of
differing cultural and religious heritages and a positive awareness of
the other's population. " These segregated populations, thus, are
126. See id.
127. See id. In both the German and Israeli examples, a new "spatial
equilibrium" was sought for new transportation and settlement patterns as well as
new centers of economic activity. The then-newly imposed borders dictated the
geographical lines at which the diffusion of development stopped. See hi. The
creation of separate types of settlement is a consequence of the diverse populations
of each side of a sealed border, which develop different ideologies and/or political
apparatuses. See id. These two instances aptly demonstrate the fact that, in one
generation, diverse "human landscapes"-notwithstanding their geographic
proximity-evolved out of these regions that both operated as one prior to their
division. Economic and geographic centers were split down the middle with a
border that bisected the previous political entity's core. See hi. at 21. The
settlement patterns of the Arab population were altered significantly on each side
of the "green line", which for almost twenty years separated Jordanian from Israeli
control. The Jordanians basically ignored the side under their administration
whereas the other side benefited from Israeli development patterns. See id.
Similarly, the development of successful, western-oriented, economic policies in
West Germany impacted the patterns of settlement on one side, while, at the same
time, a socialist, strictly controlled development pattern influenced the other. See
id. at 20-21 (comparing the different social and economic developments of two
societies divided by a closed or sealed border).
128. See Newman, Dernarcating a Boundar", supra note 22, at 173 (arguing
that closed borders limit contact, and thus, prevent mutual understanding from
occurring).
129. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 6 (comparing the
ramifications of limited cross-border interactions with the opportunities presented
when borders are opened and regions become integrated).
130. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundar, supra note 22, at 173.
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precluded from arriving at a more favorable grasp of the sensibilities
of each.' On the other hand, open borders would greatly facilitate
these interpersonal ends, and may help to allay apprehensiveness and
serve to enhance awareness and positive understanding, which would
further promote continued maintenance of open borders. Besides,
sealed borders, in and of themselves, offer no fail-safe guarantees of
hermetic security for the populations enclosed within them.
VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND HUMAN ELEMENTS
To move toward a peaceful resolution of a conflict situation like
that between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the parties must
eliminate the cycle of hostility and violence and must achieve an
enhanced understanding of each side's interests and sensitivities. ' 2
Both sides suffer from actual anger and fears toward each other, yet
the anger and fears of each remain basically impalpable to the
131. See id. Some observers suggest, however, that under currently prevailing
conditions in Israel, an element of conflict reduction is brought about between
Israeli Arabs and Jews by separating them in political life, schools, and housing,
although levels of hostility and alienation may be greater as a result of the
separation. See Ben-Ari & Amir, supra note 69, at 54. Moreover, there arc
researchers who believe that friendships existing on an inter-religious level, such
as in Northern Ireland, generally do not make a significantly perceptible
improvement on either group's beliefs or social understanding of the other, despite
the fact that these relationships are easily formed. See Colin Knox & Joanne
Hughes, Crossing the Divide: Community Relations in Northern Ireland, 33 J.
PEACE RES. 83, 85 (1996). However, assisting individuals in comprehending the
diverse nature of the unique communities is indeed seen as the objective of
successful community relations work. See id. at 92. A beneficial method for
improving comprehension and increasing awareness of each side's different
traditions is to promote participation in group activities based on mutual interests
in similar cultural traditions, such as dancing, sports, and music. See id. at 93. For
further discussion of this issue, see infra note 192. According to the Community
Relations Council in Northern Ireland, a common appreciation of the groups may
be brought about through various stages. See id. at 94. Each group's own traditions
should be promoted and education should take place within each separate
community. A beneficial basis thus will have been created for progressing to the
next level-the inter-community stage-in which the groups experience together
each other's different traditions. See id. The ultimate goal is to partake in
discussions and debates about the different cultural traditions. See id.
132. See Ron Pundik, Is Oslo Alive? The Security Dimension, in Is OSLO ALIVE?
25, 26 (1998).
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other.'33 Similarly, neither party detects that its actions, at times, are
responsible for the existence and continuation of the other's anger
and fears.' The "diabolical enemy" image, ignoring factual elements
that may influence the actions of the enemy, lack of the ability to
empathize greatly with others---especially the enemy- and a strong
or moral self-image are all typical attributes of individuals involved
in intense conflict relationships.": The possibility that change on the
other side may occur is often underestimated. This demonstrates the
limitations of mental information processing by the groups enmeshed
in acute conflict situations. Negative interaction between the sides
involved in the conflict, in addition to their resilience to conflict
alteration, are exacerbated by the perpetuation of the morally
virtuous and righteous self-image and the "demonic images" of the
enemy. Furthermore, the threatening and militant stance of each
group becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby intergroup
interaction is controlled by the norms that arose from the conflict
situation.3 6 It is, after all, only natural that each side perceives the
conflict as a zero-sum game, whereby each maintains an intense
loyalty to its own identity, which it perceives as threatened, and, in
the case of the Israelis and Palestinians, to its own identical land. It is
not often in such a collision between diverse nationalisms that either
side is able to recognize or appreciate the relative justice of the
enemy's side, since by definition, nationalism glorifies itself and is
usually self-referencing. "'
133. See Ralph K. White, Misperception in the Arab-Israeli (onflit, 33 J. Soc.
ISSUES 190 (1977) [hereinafter White, Misperceptior in the ..rab-Israeli Conflictl
(discussing the causes of anger and frustration experienced by the parties involved
on either side of a closed border).
134. See id. (arguing that psychological factors contribute to the continued
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians).
135. See generally id. at 190, 193, 213, 217-18 (discussing the difficulties that
arise as a result of a group's conflicting perceptions of its own psychological
characteristics as compared with the enemy's).
136. See Nadim N. Rouhana & Herbert C. Kelman. Promotng Joint Thinking in
International Conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Workshop, 50 J. Soc.
ISSUES 157, 159 (1994) (discussing cognitive constraints of parties in conflict due
to negative images).
137. See Yehezkel Landau, Rehuianizing the "'/nenr'" and Con/ronting
Ourselves: Challenges for Educators ir an Era of Peace, 30l) PALESTINE-ISR. J.
POL. EcON. & CULTURE 65, 67-68 (1996) (explaining the complexities of conflict
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Negative interaction patterns must halt and, instead, become
patterns of positive interaction that encourage, among other things,
dilution of the enemy image, joint consideration of differing view
points, and, especially, mutual examination of the escalation
processes, to resolve conflict.'3 That is, party interaction at various
levels is crucial to reverse the conflict's reasons, escalation, and
continuance.' 9 A process of "de-demonization' 4 ° is therefore crucial
and must take place. 4 Furthermore, direct encounters with the
former "enemy," a significant method by which such stereotypes
may be razed, 42 may help to rehumanize the entire group'" ' by
expanding peoples' life experiences with intergroup exposure and
contact.'
44
A widely accepted idea, called the "contact hypothesis," postulates
that interaction between persons who belong to diverse groups can
reduce intergroup or ethnic stress.44 This theory is based on the
premise that contact may remedy each community's ignorance of the
between nations that each have passionate loyalty to their own respective nation).
138. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 159 (arguing interaction will
promote resoultion of problems).
139. See Kelman, An Interactional Approach, supra note 68, at 99-100.
140. See Landau, supra note 137, at 66 (stating that both Israelis and
Palestinians perceived themselves to be the "victims" that the barbarous enemy
threatened). For example, Palestinians viewed Israelis as aggressive settlers or
violent soldiers, while Israelis viewed Palestinians as fanatic terrorists. See id.
141. See, e.g., Kelman, The Political Psycholog, of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, supra note 121, at 362 (underscoring the importance of finding common
ground).
142. See Alice Shalvi, in Education for Peace: A Roundtable Discussion, 3(1)
PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL. ECON. & CULTURE 58 (1996) (promoting interaction as a
means to eliminate stereotypes created by Palestinians and Israelis of one another).
143. See Landau, supra note 137, at 67 (noting that direct contact between
groups in conflict is the best method of rehumanizing each other).
144. See Nabil Kassis, in Education for Peace: A Roundtable Discussion, 3(1)
PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL. EcON. & CULTURE 58 (1996) (arguing that exposure
through television, music, and other cultural areas will help parties in conflict
rehumanize each other).
145. See, e.g., Miles Hewstone & Rupert Brown, Contact is not Enough: An
Intergroup Perspective on the 'Contact Hypothesis', in CONTACT AND CONFLICT
IN INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS, supra note 69, at I (explaining the traditional view
that intergroup tension and ethnic prejudice can be reduced by interaction between
individuals in different groups).
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other-an ignorance that creates individual prejudices-since these
problems derive from psychological and educational origins."
However, just as such association may reduce prejudice, the
possibility nevertheless exists that prejudices may increase with
contact.147 Yet, under favorable conditions, contact experiences
repeated over time tend to produce mutual liking and understanding,
which leads to the neutralization of previously negative intergroup
relationships. 48 All of this results from the realization by members of
diverse groups that, in the end, everyone shares similar attitudes and
146. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 1 31, at 83-84 (arguing that the
fundamental problem with conflict between groups is ignorance); see also Thomas
F. Pettigrew, The Intergroup Contact Hypothesis Reconsidered, in CONT -,&T .ND
CONFLICT IN INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS. supra note 69. at 172, 173. While it is
recognized that in the field of social psychology multitudinous studies have been
conducted over the years, particularly regarding attitude change. the intent of our
article is not to analyze and develop each particular nuance in the various social
psychological theories. Rather it is our intention to present a broad, general
theoretical framework for analyzing attitude change resulting from interpersonal
contact and then applying those concepts to advocate open borders and peace
between Palestinians and Israelis. That being said, the idea that the image of a
group becomes clearer with more contact is not only dictated by common sense.
but it is supported by early research data. See William A. Scott, Psychological and
Social Correlates of International Inages. in INTl-RNATINAAL BEtlAVIOR: A
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 71, 93 (Herbert C. Kelman, ed. 1965). That
direct experience helps to reduce stereotypes, which result from superficially
understood objects, is likewise common sense. See hi. at 94; see also Ithiel de Sola
Pool, Effects of Cross National Contact on Vational and International niages, in
INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 106,
117 (finding travelers who have extensive contacts with people in the host country
form optimistic attitudes of the natives in that country).
147. See Hewstone & Brown, supra note 145. at 2, citing GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) (commenting that the type of contact
experienced affects how groups perceive each other); see also Herbert C. Kelman,
International Interchanges: Some Contributions Front Theories of .Attitude
Change, 10 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 83. 86 (1975) [hereinafter Kelman,
Izternational Interchanges] (expressing that individuals may not necessarily come
away with positive experiences from exchanges with foreign individuals in their
country); Herbert C. Kelman, Social-Psychological ,1pproac hes to the Sttda, o1
International Relations, the Question of Relevance, in INTERNATIONAL BEtAVIOR:
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 146, at 565, 573 [hereinafter
Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches] (admonishing that not all contacts will
result in positive experiences).
148. See Hewstone & Brown, supra note 145, at 5 (finding that indllduals
reported having favorable impressions of persons they knew well).
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values. 49 An increase in positive attitudes occurs once members of
the diverse groups recognize that they hold similar beliefs, and that
their perception of belief dissimilarity was inaccurate.O According to
the traditional perspective, intergroup harmony is enhanced the more
discrimination and prejudice obstacles are removed, which, in turn,
comes from intergroup contact among members of the different
groups increasingly resembling their own intra-group contact.'"
149. See id. at 5 (arguing that extended contact should overcome initial negative
reactions formed prior to contact).
150. See Trew, supra note 101, at 93, 102-03 (illustrating attitudinal changes
using an example from Northern Ireland when school-aged Protestant and Catholic
boys came into contact with each other over a five-week period).
151. See Donald M. Taylor et al., Intergroup Contact in Quebec: Myth or
Reality?, in CONTACT AND CONFLICT IN INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS, supra note 69,
at 107. For details of the conditions considered necessary for successful reduction
of conflict situations through intergroup contacts, see, for example, Yehuda Amir,
Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations, 71 PSYCHOL. BULL. 319, 338 (1969)
[hereinafter Amir, Contact Hypothesis]; Knox & Hughes, supra note 13 1, at 84;
ALLPORT, supra note 147, at 281; Hewstone & Brown, supra note 145, at 4-5, 7;
Stuart W. Cook, Interpersonal and Attitudinal Outcomes in Cooperating
Interracial Groups, 12 J. RES. DEV. EDUC. 97 (1978); Taylor et al., supra, at 107.
Some researchers have expressed reservations that contact, while important, is not
sufficient in and of itself for conflict resolution. See generally Hewstone & Brown,
supra note 145, at 2, 11-30; Knox & Hughes, supra note 131, at 84. While, by
itself, contact or interaction may not be adequate to reduce intergroup tension or
ethnic prejudice, a context without interaction or contact unquestionably will
facilitate intergroup tension and ethnic prejudice, hinder both sides in conflict from
developing better relations, create an obstacle to maintaining and preserving open
borders, and certainly, therefore, harm the peace process. Cf Hewstone & Brown,
supra note 145, at 2. Social isolation can result in an exceedingly different
development of values in addition to ignorance concerning the other group. See
Trew, supra note 101, at 106. Studies undertaken in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in
closed sectarian enclaves, provide a good example of selective perceptions of
events and their implications in areas that lack the representation of differing
perceptions. Under such conditions, communities sanctioned violence considered
to be part of the defense of their political affiliations. Accordingly, as Catholic and
Protestant communities' interpretations of events started to significantly diverge in
Northern Ireland, there was a corresponding decrease in the possibility of
reconciling their conflict. Were it not for interweaving relationships between the
Catholic and Protestant communities, the gap between the two sides might have
been so immense that activities designed to transcend it would have been
ineffective. See id. Skeptics of the contact hypothesis, however, find it difficult to
comprehend how contacts of an interpersonal nature between Northern Ireland
Catholics and Protestants could have an affect on the society's underlying
infrastructure, or that direct ideological influences could occur as the result of
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Categorization by group will become less important as the result of
group boundaries becoming less clear, which is what the cross-
cutting of social bonds rests upon.' Furthermore, learning theory
predicts an accumulation effect, which means that diverse individuals
involved in repetitious contact circumstances in a variety of social
contact between the two sides. Yet, even such skeptics grudgingly admit that this
does not mean that contact may not provide grounds for at least some group
members to reconsider their views toward the other group and their characteristics.
See id. at 105-06. Further, these skeptics concede that polarized perceptions may
be enhanced in an environment of social isolation. See id. at 106. Even in
describing the status of contact prior to the relatively recent constitutional changes
in what was previously the "non-contact" society of South Africa, dissenters to the
contact theory, nevertheless, conceded the desirability and necessity of contact
between white and black people to alter the South African social order. See Don
Foster & Gillian Finchilescu, Contact in a Non Contact' Societ'y: The C se of
South Africa, in CONTACT AND CONFLICT IN INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS, supra
note 69, at 119-35. Possibly, apartheid's bed-rock could have been the reverse
view of the contact hypothesis, whereby the diminution of white-black contact
would reduce racial problems and conflict and preserve peace. See hL at 120.
Hence, in a basic attempt to bring about the stabilization of intergroup interaction,
the South African government proceeded to apply its apartheid policy by
legislating behavior pertaining to a variety of inter-ethnic contact situations. See hi.
at 121. It is fair to question whether intergroup racial relations positively benefited
from the administration of apartheid over decades, or whether racial conflict
decreased while peace was preserved, as a result of the apartheid regime and its
enforced restrictions on white-black contact. See id. at 120-21. A very firm
negative answer is the only possibility for these questions. The effects of the
obligatory no-contact conditions on South African class and race relations were
demonstrated aptly in numerous instances. Race relations epitomized by harmony
or tranquility certainly were not the outcome of South Africa's "no contact"
policy, even according to the most adherent apartheid supporters. Thus, even the
contact hypothesis detractors do not hesitate to point out that their contention is not
that there are no positive effects that can flow from contact between white and
black people. See id. at 134. Although critics of the contact hypothesis postulate
that "[c]ontact is not the only-in fact, it is probably not even the principal-
mechanism of social influence across social groups" [Pettigrew, supra note 146, at
189.], this does not suggest that contact is not important at all or is unnecessary for
the occurrence of such social influences. Furthermore, although some observers
consider differences that exist between intergroup and interpersonal behavior to be
significant [See Hewstone & Brown, supra note 145, at 1, 2, 13.], one must not
lose sight, however, that such groups are, after all, made up of their individual
components-the individuals themselves who constitute these groups. For there to
exist any sort of intergroup interaction at all in the first place, individuals
comprising one group must interact with other individuals belonging to another
group.
152. See Pettigrew, supra note 146, at 183.
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environments likely will produce a cumulative effect.'" A cumulative
effect reduces intergroup hostility through engaging in a series of
cooperative activities based on achieving goals that one group alone
may not achieve-that is, superordinate goals.' Conflicting sides
that engaged in common efforts and experiences demonstrated a
significant reduction in conflict between them.'" Accordingly, a
favorable environment was created for further, structural changes due
to the adaptation of people to the changes.156
Common attitudes may be ameliorated and international
understanding heightened by interactions that cut across borders."'
These mutual experiences and interests that penetrate borders and
establish international networks would be facilitated greatly by open
borders.' This process may be encouraged, supported, and engaged
in by individuals and groups without interference by government.
For example, people who might engage in such activities include
teachers,' 5 business people, actors, artists, environmentalists,
academicians, tourists, entrepreneurs, and industrialists.'6 ° Because
153. See id. at 187 (finding a cumulative positive effect among school-aged
boys).
154. See MUZAFER SHERIF, IN COMMON PREDICAMENT: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 93 (1966); see also Pettigrew, supra
note 146, at 187 (finding an elevation in the mood of school-aged participants after
achieving a superordinate goal through intergroup contact).
155. See Pettigrew. supra note 146, at 187 (discussing the reduction in hostility
and conflict between groups participating in intergroup contact through the
achievement of superordinate goals).
156. See id. at 191.
157. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 83, 90, 98
(asserting that friendly relations between nations promote restructuring of negative
attitudes to more positive attitudes).
158. Cf Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 548
(arguing that positive international contact creates networks that supersede
national boundaries).
159. For instance, encounters between individuals on similar planes could occur,
like administrators of one side meeting with administrators on the other, inspectors
meeting with inspectors, teachers with teachers, and pupils with pupils. See Shalvi,
supra note 142, at 63.
160. See Yair Hirschfeld, Keeping Oslo Alive: Developing a Non-governmental
Peace Strategy, in IS OSLO ALIVE?, supra note 132, at 68, 77, 82 (arguing that
people to people contact must occur in order to achieve peace).
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processes like this are involved at the individual level and are related
to the interactions between individuals such as insight, learning,
empathy, and creative problem-solving, they are considered critical
to resolving conflict situations. Macro-level change can then result
from the individual-level change that entered the disputant
communities' decision-making processes and political debate."' This
increase in informal trans-border contact and economic activity thus
may persuade governments to ease restrictions and thereby alter the
formal character of political relations across borders."'
Cross-border arrangements for individuals are developed with the
help of international cooperation and interchange. Continuing
relationships based on mutual interests of a professional nature are
the probable outcome for participants in successful activities of this
type; they are practical for participants who find these relationships
to be pertinent to their personal professional concerns and to their
effective professional performance. ' In this manner, both long-term
and short-term objectives may be pursued by Palestinians and Israelis
who are committed to joint cooperation on a practical level."'
Interdependently linked groups and individuals can create a
network that develops a sense of loyalty, without reference to group
differences.' Scholars have observed, in different contexts,
responses of loyalty of international professionals to their professions
instead of to their national loyalties. ' This loyalty to profession acts
independently of national loyalty rather than competitively with or
161. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 159.
162. See Newman, Trans forming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 20.
163. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84 (arguing
that individuals have a vested interest in maintaining professional relationships);
Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147. at 575 (stating that
professional relationships promote loyalty to order).
164. Cf Kelman, Inter-national Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84 (noting that
relationships that cut across nationalities are necessary for the pursuit of individual
goals).
165. See id.; Kelman, Social-Psychological .Approaches, supra note 147, at 575
(explaining that international global integration promotes loyalty to profession).
166. See Sheldon A. Silverman, Reflections on the Cultural Impact of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS?, supra
note 81, at 307, 312 (asserting that loyalty in professional networks is independent
of national loyalty).
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antagonistically to it, since it cuts across national lines.161 Individuals
belong to diversified groupings involved in varied conflicts along
different lines. For example, members of a single political support
group who stand together in a conflict with another political
grouping may simultaneously be members of antagonistic religious
groups. Accordingly, chasms are prevented along the common line
since the divergent groups have conflict lines that do not intersect.'"
Put another way, a desire to preserve the system's integrity, as well
as its pluralistic attributes, should be the outcome of many persons
on both sides performing diverse functions, arising from the creation
of networks that cut across borders. 69 In this manner, an Israeli-
Palestinian border cut by professional or interest lines may serve as
the basis for integration and stability. 70 This helps counteract the
tendency of completely subordinating all interactions between the
sides to one underlying conflict based on national issues. '17 In other
words, cross-cutting border networks help to mitigate the shift
toward total polarization instead of focusing on doing away with
conflicts entirely.'
72
To the extent that national lines are cross-cut by groupings
according to the professions or interests of individuals and have
become truly interdependent, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will tend
not to be defined strictly in terms of national issues that totally
suppress all other associations and connections. 'v7 It will thus remain
167. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84 (asserting
that relationships serve professional interests that reach beyond national
boundaries); Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 575
(noting that professional interests promote cooperation due to individual desires to
achieve current and future goals).
168. See Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 575.
169. See id. at 576.
170. Cf Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84 (explaining
how individuals and groups have an interest in internatibnal cooperation); Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 575-76.
171. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84; Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 576.
172. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84; Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 576.
173. Cf Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84 (explaining
that individuals who are part of true interdependency will not confine themselves
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in the interests of people on both sides to preserve the situation's
integrity,' 7 since its collapse would bring with it the collapse of the
transnational networks in which they participate."' Increasingly more
resilient obstacles to the system's collapse will tend to appear, since
Israelis and Palestinians will develop a vested interest in creating a
sturdy and pluralistic relationship between them.'" This interest is
due to the enhanced and ever-increasing connections that cut across
borders, thereby increasing the prevalence of cooperation and
interchange. 7 7 Accordingly, conditions for the creation of peace are
bolstered to the extent that international cooperation and interchange
are involved in cross-cutting loyalty development.'- ' The health
profession provides a constructive example of cooperative interaction
on the professional level between Palestinians and Israelis. A
research project jointly undertaken by the Brookdale Institute and Al-
Quds University found that in 148 joint Israeli-Palestinian projects
conducted in the health field between 1994 and 1998, approximately
one-half of the Palestinian participants and approximately one-third
of the Israeli participants reported that the joint activities positively
influenced their attitudes toward coexistence.' Moreover, the report
indicated that after five years of activities, 99 percent of the Israelis
and 88 percent of the Palestinians suggested a desire to continue
to national lines); Kelman, Social-Psychological .pproaches, supra note 147, at
576 (noting that individuals with interdependent ties oppose national affiliations
superseding all other relations).
174. See Kelman, hIternational Interchanges, supra note 147, at 84-85 (arguing
that a breakdown of interdependency causes the loss of necessary professional
networks); Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 576.
175. See Kelman, hIternational Interchanges, supra note 147, at 85: Kelman,
Social-PsychologicalApproaches, supra note 147, at 576.
176. Cf Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 85; Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147. at 576.
177. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 85; Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 576.
178. See Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, siqra note 147, at 575
(explaining how cooperation on matters outside of the conflict help to make
resolution of the conflict more peaceful).
179. See Lili Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological FanulY, HA'ARET/. Nov.
1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
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working together. 80
As alluded to earlier, attitudes favorable to the other side are not
necessarily the universal outcome of participation in international
exchanges. 8' Yet, assuming that the interaction is professionally and
personally satisfying for those involved, there is a tendency that
some significant changes in attitude may, and most often will, result
from interchanges of this nature.' A feeling of personal involvement
in the fate of the other side will likely evolve through personal
connections arising from participation in such interactions. Yet,
while individuals will develop an augmented attitude of openness
resulting from their greater involvement and understanding, these
personal attitude changes alone probably will not be able to surmount
the two sides' actual conflicts of interest.'8
However, an enhanced propensity to trust the other side, to view it
as non-threatening, and to be responsive to it, should be the outcomes
of developing their patterns of continuing interchange and
cooperation.8 4 Accordingly, there presumably will be a decrease in
the tension level exhibited in the conflicting parties' general
interactions if they are participating in cooperation and interchange
180. See id.
181. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 86; Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 573; Hewstone & Brown,
supra note 145, at 2. Compare Anita L. Mishler, Personal Contact in International
Exchanges, in INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
supra note 146, at 550-51 (pointing out that evidence is sparse in support of the
contention that foreign exchange students develop favorable attitudes for the host
country's activities and foreign policies as a result of cross-cultural contacts per
se), and de Sola Pool, supra note 146, at 113-14, with Mishler, supra, at 551, 559-
60 (predicting that a more varied and complex image of the host nation may be
created if students who go abroad make contacts and friends), and de Sola Pool,
supra note 146, at 114-15, 117.
182. Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 86; Kelman,
Social-Psivchological Approaches, supra note 147, at 573 (discussing attitude
changes based on fulfilling experiences with the hostile group).
183. See Kelman, Iternational Interchanges, supra note 147, at 86.
184. See id. at 86-87; Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note
147, at 573. Yet, the types of contacts created and the possibility for them to
become lengthy interactions depend, to a certain extent, on factors existing before
a foreign student, for instance, engages in an exchange experience, or on particular
predispositions. See Mishler, supra note 181, at 560.
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activities with each other. 5 While contacts between the parties of
this nature may facilitate an environment that promotes efficient and
effective negotiation to arrive at political settlements, such positive
relationships will be able neither to convince the sides to ignore
seeking objectives that are incompatible with each other, nor to
succeed in totally eradicating the underlying conflict. ' If interparty
conflicts nevertheless appear, an atmosphere of increased openness
between parties comprising individuals who maintain close and
friendly contacts should lessen the likelihood that either party would
construe the matter strictly or view the other as a threat against it. In
addition, this should produce an enhanced desire to communicate
with one another to resolve outstanding issues. "
A decrease in the tension level between two sides historically in
conflict, arising from the positive relationships developed concerning
interests outside the conflict itself, will likely create a certain element
of mutual trust-a trust that was previously eroded, thus making it
difficult to arrive at political arrangements that may have benefitted
both parties-and, consequently, may lay the groundwork for earnest
negotiations to resolve outstanding conflicts.' " As the introductory
paragraph of the preamble of the Constitution of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
stipulates, "[s]ince wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds
of men that the defences of peace must be constructed..'
Polarization tendencies of conflicting sides may be offset by the
creation of cooperative interaction in particular areas." ' Thus,
185. See Kelman, Social-Psychological .4ptroachIe. supra note 147, at 574.
186. See Kelman, International Interchanges, suqra note 147, at 85, Kelman,
Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147. at 574 (explaining how
pleasant contacts can help lead to more cooperati, e negotiations but do not resolve
conflict).
187. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 87.
188. See id. at 85; Kelman, Social-Psychological ..Ilpproaclhe, supra note 147,
at 574 (identifying the Cold War relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union as an example where the absence of mutual trust impeded the
negotiation of mutually beneficial agreements).
189. CONST. OF THE U.N. EDUC., SC., & CL LTLRAI. ORG. preamble.
190. See Kelman, International Interchanges, supra note 147, at 85
(demonstrating how interaction between groups can help bring them closer in
conflict negotiations).
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international relationships and cooperation might influence the
interaction between two parties, which might in turn diminish the
possibility that their conflicts will incorporate violence,
notwithstanding the fact that international cooperation's role in
developing peace might be long-term and even circuitous.'9'
A. THE IRISH EXPERIENCE
In Northern Ireland, for example, tolerance and appreciation for
contending cultural and political traditions is sought through cross-
community contact.'92 The Irish example may be instructional and
constructive for Palestinians and Israelis for many reasons. Like the
situation between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the Northern
Ireland situation is well-known internationally due to the degree of
disorder and violence attributed to seemingly insurmountable
intergroup divisions.'93 Over the last two hundred years or so,
191. See Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 573
(suggesting that interactions will help reduce violence and promote peace).
192. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 131, at 83. Note that analyses of various
Northern Ireland contact programs indicated that unless relations between the
Protestant and the Catholic communities were handled at an intergroup level,
contact alone was likely to be unsatisfactory in dealing with the relations between
the two groups. See id. at 86. For further discussion of the "contact is not enough"
approach, see supra note 151. It was suggested that it is not possible to formulate
cross-community generalizations regarding contacts of an interpersonal type,
and/or that such contacts were transient in nature. See Hewstone & Brown, supra
note 145, at 41. It is not entirely certain that creating interpersonal friendships to
influence permanent relations between Protestants and Catholics will bridge the
religious divide between the two communities. See id.; Knox & Hughes, supra
note 131, at 86. However, even skeptical researchers have acknowledged that
some positive contact is likely better than no contact at all. See id. In other words,
in a situation of"no hope", the contact theory may nonetheless offer an element of
hope. See Trew, supra note 101, at 100; Knox & Hughes, supra note 131, at 86.
Northern Ireland's local council community relations program, however, cannot be
characterized by this less than optimistic analysis. See id. On the contrary, there is
the belief in Northern Ireland that a positive result has accrued from even short-
periods of intergroup contact occurring under appropriate conditions and taking
place in isolated settings. See Trew, supra note 101, at 100.
193. Cf Trew, supra note 101, at 93 (discussing the violence and disorder
occurring in Northern Ireland based on intergroup divisions). Yet, it bears noting
that some, however, believe that there is little to compare between Israel and
Ireland and that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is much more complex than the Irish
dispute. See Yossi Melman, "The Israeli-Palestinian Dispute is More Complex
Than the Irish One, " HA'ARETZ, June 27, 2000, at I IA (in Hebrew) (on file with
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recurrent inter-community violence developed into a way of life due,
in large part, to processes which brought about societal divisions.'
This hostility persisted despite the fact that the Republic of Ireland-
Northern Ireland border turned into a border within the EU, thereby
becoming subject to the ever-expanding influences of the political
and economic integration of Europe. '  Furthermore, attempts at
negotiating a peace process ' " were dead-locked"' due to continued
author).
194. See Trew, supra note 101, at 95.
195. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81. at 117; see also Wilson, supra
note 81, at 209. Integration barriers, both national and cultural, nevertheless
continue to thrive in a "frontierless" Europe. See id. at 205. For further discussion,
see supra note 81.
196. See Riots and Additional Acts, supra note 103, at 16A.
197. See Sharon Sadeh, The British Government Has Frozen the Peace
Agreement in Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, July 16, 1999, at 9A (in Hebrew) (on
file with author); A Protestant Organization in Northern Ireland, supra note 10 1,
at 12A; Efforts to Save the Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, June
29, 1999, at 1 IA (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Groundhog Day, ECONOMIST,
July 24, 1999, at 55 (observing that the Northern Ireland peace talks are marked by
endless repetition with respect to the frequent impasses); Northern Ireland: UU-
turn [sic], ECONOMIST, May 22, 1999, at 63 (noting that the Northern Ireland
peace process stalled, in part, due to the fact that the IRA was prevented from
taking seats in the cabinet of the Northern Ireland government until the IRA
disarmed); Parking the Process, ECONOMIST, July 17, 1999. at 51 (explaining how
the inability to resolve the issues of disarmament delayed the Northern Ireland
peace talks); Race Against the Clock in Northern Ireland to Save the "'Good
Friday" Agreement, HA'ARETZ, July 1, 1999, at 16A (in Hebrew) (on file with
author); Sharon Sadeh, Additional Effort to Advance the Peace Process in
Northern Ireland Has Ended Without a Breakthrough, HA'ARETZ Apr. 2, 1999, at
12A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Sharon Sadeh, .1 Declaration o" the 1&4
Raises Suspicion Regarding the End of the Cease-fire, HA'ARETZ, July 23, 1999,
at 10A (in Hebrew) (on file with author): Sharon Sadeh, .4 War of Declarations in
Northern Ireland Saddles the Peace, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 29, 1999, at 10A (in
Hebrew) (on file with author); Sharon Sadeh, Blair at a Cross-Roads, HA'ARETZ,
July 18, 1999, at 1 lA (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Sharon Sadeh, Daily
Telegraph: Evidence to the Effect That the IRA Doesn 't Intend to Part From Its
Weapons, HA'ARETZ, July 6, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew) (on file with author);
Sharon Sadeh, Initiative for Emergency Legislation in Britain in an Attempt to
Save the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, July 14, 1999, at 9A (in
Hebrew) (on file with author); Sharon Sadeh, The Anerican Mediator Mitchell
Will Try to Save the Agreement, HA'ARETZ. July 18, 1999, at 1 IA (in Hebrew) (on
file with author); Sharon Sadeh, The Leader of the Protestants in Northern Ireland
is Opposed to Blair's Peace Initiative, HA'ARETZ, July 12, 1999, at 5A (in
Hebrew) (on file with author); The Establishment on Time of the Local
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hostility until recently." The lengthy British and Irish history of
violence in the area'9 has resulted in thousands of deaths over the
course of the conflict.
2 °
The background to the area's recent strife is as follows. The
British Government of Ireland Act of 19200' separated Ireland into
two groups, each with its own, different national aspirations, by
establishing a border between them. Shortly thereafter, the Anglo-
Government in Northern Ireland is Cast in Doubt, HA'ARETZ Mar. 30, 1999, at
16A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Woman Slain in Northern Ireland,
HA'ARETZ, June 6, 1999, at 3 (English language ed.).
198. As of late, there finally appears to be room for increasing optimism over
Northern Ireland. See Sharon Sadeh, The Protestants in Northern Ireland Agreed
to Establish a Local Government, HA'ARTEZ, Nov. 28, 1999, at IA (in Hebrew)
(on file with author); see also Northern Ireland Received Independent Status,
HA'ARETZ, Dec. 2, 1999, at 9A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); North Meets
South, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 109 (considering the possibility of peace in
Northern Ireland); Sharon Sadeh, Britain and Ireland Removed Their Sovereigntyv
Claims Over Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 3, 1999, at IOA (in Hebrew) (on
file with author); Sharon Sadeh, IRA Representatives Will be Brought Into the
Government in Northern Ireland, HA'ARTEz, Nov. 28, 1999, at 12A (in Hebrew)
(on file with author); Sharon Sadeh, Protestant and Catholic Representatives
Established a Common Government in Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 30,
1999, at 1OA (in Hebrew) (on file with author); The Irish Underground Has Begun
to Dismantle Its Weapons, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 6, 1999, at I IA (in Hebrew) (on file
with author); Yes, Minister, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 5 (observing that the
creation of a power-sharing Northern Ireland Parliament has renewed the prospects
of peace). Yet the recent optimistic initiatives are certainly not free of troubles.
See, e.g., Sharon Sadeh, Britain Announced the Disbandment of the Government in
Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 4, 2000, at IA (in Hebrew) (on file with
author); Sharon Sadeh, Northern Ireland: The Talks Between Trimble and Adams
Ended Without Results, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 6, 2000, at 9A (in Hebrew) (on file with
author); Nil Return, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2000, at 14-15; Stymied in Ulster,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2000, at 51-52; Sharon Sadeh, The Legislative Assembly was
Disbanded in Northern Ireland, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 13, 2000, at IA (in Hebrew) (on
file with author).
199. See Wilson, supra note 81, at 205 (discussing the relation between firmly
entrenched national identities at the Irish border and how the European Union is
perceived).
200. See A Brief Histo, of Strife, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 56 (describing
the loss of life resulting from the cultural and social clash in Ireland).
201. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 118 (describing the terms of the
Irish partition, which was agreed upon without input from Irish nationalists).
202. See Trew, supra note 101, at 94; see also ANDERSON, FRONTI[.RS,
TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 51 (explaining the origin of Ireland's division into
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Irish Treaty of 1921 reaffirmed this border.:"' Of the thirty-two
counties that comprise the island of Ireland, twenty-six of them-
populated mostly by Catholics--eventually became the independent
Republic of Ireland, while the other six mainly Protestant counties
located in the northeast sector of the island remained part of the
United Kingdom. ' ° People referred to the latter area either by its
official British name, Northern Ireland. its name given by the
Protestants, Ulster, or the name given by Catholics, "'the six
counties. ' -° In the northeast sector, the Protestants constituted a
majority, whereas, on the island of Ireland itself, they were in the
minority.2* Nevertheless, Catholics comprised more than one-third of
Northern Ireland's population and were generally against
maintaining a constitutional connection between Northern Ireland
and the United Kingdom.2°'
A primary reason for the dispute in Northern Ireland continues to
be national identity.2" Surveys show that while most Protestants
identify themselves as British, most Catholics identify themselves as
Irish.209 These identities -"1 encompass divisions on cultural, social,
and political levels."" Catholics and Protestants both perceive
themselves as part of separate traditions that have been present in
two parts).
203. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 118. see also ANDERSON,
FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 51.
204. See Trew, supra note 101, at 94 (basing the division of Ireland on religious
affiliation).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. (finding, nevertheless, that about half of the Catholics prefer to
remain a part of the United Kingdom).
208. See id.
209. See Trew, supra note 1 01. at 94.
210. See id.
211. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY. supra note 4, at 45 (describing
the division between Northern Ireland Protestants and Catholics as a "cultural
divide"); O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81. at 119 (ascribing the Protestant
identification with Great Britain and the Catholic identification with Ireland as the
hallmark of Northern Ireland's social and cultural divisions); Trew, supra note
101, at 94 (detailing the divisions in Northern Ireland between the controlling
Protestants and the politically-excluded Catholics).
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Ireland since the seventeenth century, when Protestant farmers from
Scotland and England were given land confiscated from Irish
Catholic natives.2 2 Therefore, Protestants remain separated from
Catholics by a social, cultural, and political cleavage resulting from
numerous elements present in Northern Ireland's social structure.2 '
The seemingly intractable and incessant Northern Ireland divisions
that have been perpetuated by the threat perceived by each
community of the other, and by difficult-to-dismiss memories of
violent struggle that dates hundreds of years, are rooted in
differences of religion, traditions, political allegiances, education,
and symbols.2 4
The Republic of Ireland-Northern Ireland border symbolized the
territorial separation between British and Irish sovereignty from the
time it was established in 1920, and since has played a major role in
Northern Ireland's national-ethnic conflict."5 This erratic and
straggling border is, in some respects, reminiscent of the border
between Israel and the Palestinians. The Irish border, which is
approximately 240 miles long, is strewn across a region of spread-
out, primarily agricultural settlements, and runs along the existing
boundaries of local authorities.216 At its creation, the border cut
through a number of villages, and in places, through individuals'
homes.1 7 The border, likewise, ran across nearly 200 roads and about
212. See Trew, supra note 101, at 94; see also O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note
81, at 119 (explaining how Catholics were rendered powerless by the controlling
Protestants and were excluded from the Northern Ireland government).
213. See Trew, supra note 101, at 95 (observing that Northern Ireland is so
religiously divided that every aspect of life is classified as either Catholic,
Protestant, or commingled).
214. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 52 (delineating
reasons for continued violence and unrest in Ireland).
215. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 117. Notwithstanding the
porous nature of border relations involved in the nationalist-ethnic conflict, which
were created by the lengthy history of joint power and culture in Ireland, the
United Kingdom nevertheless tried to establish powerful political and social
control mechanisms at its border with Ireland. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note
8 1, at 11. For further discussion regarding the situation in Northern Ireland, see
infra notes 405-437 and accompanying text.
216. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 119 (describing the landscape
of the border through Ireland).
217. See id.
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1400 agricultural properties. : ' For instance, Pettigo, a village in
County Donegal, was separated down the center of the bridge in the
town.219 In addition, an enclave was created by the border of Clones,
a town located in County Monaghan.':" The final drawing of the
border ended up including over a half million Catholics and
nationalists in Protestant Northern Ireland, and resulted in three
Ulster counties, which contained about 70,000 Unionists, becoming a
part of the Catholic Republic of Ireland.' The Republic of Ireland-
Britain border, which had become more militarized since the 1960s,
represented a process that seemingly contradicted the Maastricht
Treaty as well as the designed abolition of internal controls on
borders in the Single European Market.')
The year 1969, when the British army arrived in Northern Ireland
to assist the civil authorities in attempting to quell the significant
civil disorder that erupted, witnessed the onset of the most recent
chapter of this on-going conflict. The Provisional Irish Republican
Army conducted a long, drawn out campaign of terror!-' As one in
the succession of terrorist campaigns waged since the early 1920s,
the IRA terrorist campaigns of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s
represented not only the most recent but also the most persistent of
them all.24
The fundamental issue in the Republic of Ireland-Northern Ireland
conflict centers around the idea of change. The Protestant majority of
Northern Ireland are diametrically opposed to it, whereas most of the
Catholic minority supports it.--5 Yet, the Protestants' majority
position is not secure according to demographic trends. Northern
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81. at 119.
222. See id. at 117-18. Sovereignty of the state represents, among other things,
the claim to have complete control in a set territorial area over means of legal
violence, which, often, is reflected by border militarization. See id. at 118.
223. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS. TERRITORY, supra note 4. at 5 1.
224. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 188 (describing the IRA
campaigns that challenged Britain's claims to sovereignty).
225. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY. supra note 4, at 52-53.
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Ireland's western part gradually is becoming more Catholic. Within
the next twenty-five years, the Catholic majority, feared by the
Protestants, is predicted to take hold of Northern Ireland. '26 The
concern over losing support to steadfast extremists had created a
situation where moderates had hitherto been unable to reach
agreement.227 Northern Ireland society therefore reflects a deep chasm
between two distinct groups, each with its own religious persuasions,
political desires, social values, and cultural traditions. From these
societal differences political instability and violence flow, carrying
with them tragic human and high financial costs.2 Most of Northern
Ireland's people related the conflict's continuation to radicals,
representing a minority in each community, who support the use of
violence to achieve their goals. 29 Certainly, for extremists on each
side, there are numerous sympathizers, and the average Protestants
and Catholics remain polarized. Given this context, individual
"bottom-up" programs were proposed 230 that would help structure a
society striving to take into account divergent desires, traditions, and
beliefs of different people. Such a framework was set up to
promote equality and further mutual respect and reconciliation for
Northern Ireland's distinct cultures and traditions.232
In this regard, both voluntary and governmental agencies have
earmarked tremendous resources for programs aimed at uniting
Catholic and Protestant children during community relations
holidays.233 To enhance such contact and gain public support, most
226. See id. at 53.
227. See id. (detailing the changing demographics in Northern Ireland and
attributing difficulties in the peace process to the presence of extremists on both
sides). For further discussion, see supra notes 196-197 (describing various
impediments to the Northern Ireland peace talks).
228. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 131, at 90 (advocating the need for
community relations programs to help bridge the social and cultural divide
between Northern Ireland's Catholic and Protestant communities).
229. See id. (observing that these extremists view violence as a legitimate
method to obtain their objectives).
230. See id. at 87.
231. See id. at 86.
232. See id. at 86, 87.
233. See Trew, sup-a note 101, at 101.
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Northern Ireland community relations officers encourage activities
that satisfy the mutual interests of both groups of children or provide
overall entertainment value.2" When participatory contact based on
mutual interests is maintained, the result is more trusting Protestant-
Catholic interaction.25 Studies in Northern Ireland indicate that
intergroup contact is partly accountable for enhanced intergroup
relations.! At the political level, for example, cross-community
interaction could facilitate the necessary, positive social environment
to diminish prejudice, although the benefits are not easily
measured. -7 Yet, according to studies undertaken analyzing the
outcome of exclusive sociability and denominational segregation in
Northern Ireland, inter-denominational contact, at least of a limited
nature, may nonetheless produce benefits.2'" For instance, interaction
234. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 131, at 90. Community relations officers,
through their experiences, found that more well-defined programs aimed at
addressing "prejudiced, sectarian attitudes and other diverse issues, tend to appeal
more to a minority of sympathetic and interested individuals." hi.
235. See id. at 92. This approach, however, recognizes that contact alone will
not produce the necessary attitudinal and behavioral alterations. See hl. For further
discussion, see supra notes 151, 192 (discussing the "contact is not enough"
approach). Even though people may have "latent, but potentially volatile, negative
social stereotypes" of other groups, they nevertheless may be able to cooperate and
interact with each other on an interpersonal level. See Knox & Hughes, supra note
131, at 93. Efforts are made through community relations work to deal w ith
attitudinal matters and diminish suspicion, prejudice, and ignorance through
several projects including: workshops designed for Catholic and Protestant
encounters and aimed at reducing prejudice and anti-sectananism; inter-church
conferences; and peace and reconciliation groups. See id. Community relations
officers who adopted the "ripple" or "multiplier" effect targeted interested and
sympathetic, organizational and community. activists and leaders who were
considered to be in good positions to distribute information and encourage
discussion or workshops. See id. (setting forth methods that groups may use to
enhance their appreciation and increase their awareness of varied traditions).
236. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 131. at 96. More significant changes in the
social sphere, however, were deemed necessary to develop the requisites for
intergroup contact that was actually successful. See hi.
237. See id. To diminish prejudice, proponents contend that a significant
requisite is that a favorable social climate and/or an authority should endorse the
contact. See id.; see also Amir, Contact Hypothesis, supqra note 151, at 338 (noting
the uncertainty of successful intergroup contact and the extent to which prejudice
is consequently reduced).
238. See Trew, supra note 101, at 106 (noting, ho\\ev'er, that both Protestants
and Catholics limit the opportunity for reconciliation when their perceptions are so
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may foster close, personal friendships for Catholics and Protestants
who, in the past, only socialized with members of their own religion,
at least in suitable institutional frameworks or on non-partisan
grounds.239  Moreover, an appreciation of common, cultural
backgrounds, and a diminution of gross misperceptions regarding the
other group may be facilitated in part by contact.240 Observers thus
believe that beneficial "human relationships" will facilitate harmony
in Northern Ireland.24'
B. ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS
While governments actually sign peace agreements, it is the
people living under the former antagonists who often must
implement many of the terms of those agreements. 242 Annex III of the
Declaration of Principles of 1993,243 entitled the Protocol on Israeli-
Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs,
and, particularly, Annex VI of the Interim Agreement of 1995,4
entitled the Protocol Concerning Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation
Programs, recognize the importance of the "people to people" aspect
of the peace-making process between Palestinians and Israelis.
24
"
A mutually satisfactory solution to the conflict is ultimately based
different).
239. See id. at 104-05.
240. See id. at 105. Interestingly, the same observer who expounds the
immediately preceding viewpoints concerning the benefits of contact, nevertheless
notes that contact, in and of itself, will not necessarily influence societal
sectarianism or alter long-standing political beliefs. See id.
241. See id. at 104. This view moved both scholars and professionals to
advocate integration of schools by virtue of the belief that intergroup contact in an
educational setting is an originating point for improved relations overall. See id.
However, proponents neglect the fact that the separate educational systems reflect
Catholic and Protestant desires to keep education segregated. See id. Moreover,
there is scant evidence that education alone necessarily changes social mores. See
id.
242. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 82 (discussing the "bottom-up" or
people-to-people concept).
243. Declaration of Principles, supra note 57, Annex III, 32 I.L.M. at 1523.
244. Interim Agreement, supra note 58, Annex VI, art. 8, 36 I.L.M. at 551
(addressing the The People- To-People Program).
245. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 82.
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on satisfying the human needs expressed through core identity
groups.2' The alteration of stereotypes is the main goal. "" This
requires eliminating preconceived notions and assisting both sides in
appreciating the human dimension 4" that is involved in the peace-
making process.2 49 Allowing each side to see the face of the other
side, resulting from the enhanced contact between them, may
"humanize" the enemy.' 50 Appreciating and understanding the other's
fundamental sensitivities, and realizing that the other side also has its
own goals, visions, and needs, is a crucial part of the peace process.
While furthering international understanding through various
activities may not necessarily create the conditions for peace,2': both
sides need to recognize that those on the other side seek peace and
dignity and would rather build families, communities, professions,
and businesses and make the most out of their lives than continue the
246. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 157, 158. The predicament,
however, is that often times conflict encompasses "non-negotiable human needs"
such as identity, security, or recognition. Id. at 158. In such situations, favorable
conflict resolution depends on the ability of both parties to understand each other's
concerns. See id.
247. See Manuel Hassassian, in Education.for Peace: .4 Roundtable Discussion,
3(1) PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL., ECON. & CULTURE 55, 57 (1996).
248. See Shalvi, supra note 142, at 58.
249. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 82.
250. See Erel Shalit, Within Borders and Without - The Interaction Between
Geopolitical and Personal Boundaries in Israel, 8 POL. PSYCHOL. 365, 374 (1987)
(examining the psychological aspects of self-segregation and the resultant "'fear of
the foreign"); see also Landau, supra note 137, at 66-67.
251. See Kelman, The Political Psycholog" of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
supra note 121, at 362. This understanding may occur when both Palestimnans and
Israelis engage in interactions that test each other's desire for coexistence and
peace. See id. These relationships can produce outcomes that lead to mutual trust
and acceptance of the fact that, despite differences, each has a "nght to
nationhood" and to the "'symbols and institutions" that characterize the nationhood.
Id.
252. See Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 572
(describing the "minds-of-men formulation" whereby men create and control
societies and institutions). Therefore, "'since wars begin in the minds of men, it is
in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." Id.
Consequently, successful reform activities must actually permeate politics and not
just exist in the minds of men. See id.
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long-standing hostilities.25'
It is equally important for both Palestinians and Israelis to
recognize the overriding significance of security issues,'5" since
satisfactorily addressing this issue is a prerequisite for the resolution
of any protracted conflict.25 For instance, Israelis who fear the
establishment of a Palestinian state1 6 believe that it would pose an
increased security risk for Israel.2 7 This apprehension is predicated
on the supposition that the Palestinians ultimately would select, or
perhaps-even beyond their control-would be forced to accept, the
route of a militant, fundamentalist state that would naturally display
hostility toward Israel."' Internal terrorist activities could be ignored
completely, or a weak Palestinian state could facilitate terror to
253. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 82; see also White, Misperception in the
Arab-Israeli Colfict, supra note 133, at 216 (observing how minor attention is
given to the coupling of "physical self-preservation and economic progress,"
reflecting a desire for peace).
254. See Landau, supra note 137, at 69.
255. See Elizabeth Crighton & Martha Abele MacIver, The Evolution of
Protracted Colflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in
Northern hleland and Lebanon, 23 COMP. POL. 127, 140 (Jan. 1991).
256. Even the Israel Labor Party, for many years, opposed the establishment of
an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. See Barzilai & Peleg, supra
note 2, at 67. For further discussion regarding a Palestinian state, see infra Part
VII.
257. See, e.g., David Bar-Illan, Why a Palestinian State is Still a Mortal Threat,
96 COMMENTARY 27 (1993) (elucidating several factors that are associated with
the security risk, including: (1) continued violence through the importation of
small arms by a Palestinian state; (2) the future inability of Israelis to carry out
effective anti-terrorist tactics; and (3) the ease with which states can obtain heavy
arms despite international sanctions); Efraim Inbar & Shmuel Sandier, The Risks of
Palestinian Statehood, 37 SURVIVAL 23, 31-34, 38 (1997) (explaining that the
instability of a Palestinian state, its geographic proximity, and its uncertain foreign
orientation, all pose continuing threats to Israel); Kelman, The Political
Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, supra note 121, at 354 (describing
the fear of a continued national existence as the primary concern in the
establishment of a Palestinian state). This concern grows from the perception that
only one side can exist as a nation, not both. See id. Such a view originates from
the problem that since both national movements-the Palestinian movement and
Zionism--claim the same land, recognizing a Palestinian state may thus mean for
Israelis that they are diminishing, if not completely giving up, their right to that
land. See id.
258. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 96.
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promote its own interests, even if the state were neither
fundamentalist nor militant.25 Many Israelis still consider terrorism
to be a valuable lever in the hands of the Palestinian Authority,
which uses terrorism as a tactical "weapon" to force further
concessions from Israel and thus is not as keen as it might be in
effectively squelching the armed opposition, which could potentially
bring about civil war in the West Bank and Gaza. In Israel, many are
wary that in a Palestinian state terrorists would be nurtured,
proliferate, and eventually assume control of it, turning it into a base
of international terror." Understandably, the predominant fear of
continued perpetration of violent terrorist acts is shared by both
Palestinians and Israelis alike. The Palestinians, for their part, aspire
to determine their own destiny, live as they see fit, earn decent
livings, and be treated with dignity.i
C. LEARNING TO COOPERATE
Israelis and Palestinians must confront the other's fears:" and allay
mutual suspicions, tensions,2 animosities.:" threat perceptions,
and distrust years in the making:" in order for the peace process to
259. See, e.g., Inbar & Sandler, supra note 257, at 33-34.
260. See, e.g., id. (observing that a weak Palestinian state, vulnerable to faction
sponsored terrorism, would ignore such activity due to an inability, or
unwillingness, to eliminate armed opposition and that if created, a Palestinian state
could mirror the "PLO mini-state in Lebanon" in the 1 970s- 1 980s, and turn into a
center for international terrorism).
261. See, e.g., White, Misperception in the .nib-lsrael ('onflict. supra note
133, at 194-95 (describing Palestinians' desire to be independent, or minimally,
autonomous "in all civilian affairs").
262. See Kholoud Khayyat-Dajani, in lintes of Cont erence on Labor
Migration, in LABOR MIGRATION: PALESTINE. EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL 127,
163 (Mohammad Shtayyeh, ed. 1998) [hereinafter LABOR MIGRATION: PALESTINE,
EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL].
263. See Landau, supra note 137, at 69: see also Salem 1. Aweiss, Educhating br
the Future, 3 (1) PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL.. ECON. & CLTURE, 71. 72 (1 96).
264. See Aweiss, supra note 263, at 72.
265. See id.
266. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers. supra note 66, at 28.
267. See Aweiss, supra note 263, at 72
268. See Manuel Hassassian, in Presentations anid Discussions, in S( .N.RIOS
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continue and to succeed.269 Furthermore, the degree to which mutual
suspicions are removed will be one of the determinants of the extent
to which Israel's borders become less confrontational with its
ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM 105, 157, 159 (Mohammad Shtayyeh, ed. 1998)
(emphasizing that fear and distrust have created stumbling blocks in all types of
negotiations). This also means that it may take a long time to alter former images.
See Mohammed S. Dajani, The Future of Jerusalem: One Twin City, Two Peoples
& Three Faiths"A Troika Solution, in SCENARIOS ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM,
supra, at 47, 90 [hereinafter Dajani, The Future of Jerusalem]. According to some
observers, within ten or twenty years nothing appears to adjust images in about 40
percent of most states' populations. See Karl W. Deutsch & Richard L. Merritt,
Effects of Events on National and International Images, in INTERNATIONAL
BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 146, at 132, 183.
For the remaining 60 percent or so of these populations, very little can alter their
attitudes and images. See id. Moreover, spectacular events, enormous efforts of
governments, and the absence of significant cross-pressures are necessary to
reinforce, and combine with, cumulative events to allow even these infrequent
situations to arise. See id. The impact of cumulative events tends to be greater over
longer periods of time-maybe twenty years or more, and especially through
generations. See id. Combinations of external events and attempts by government
have little effect on the readjustment of the chief images existing for most people.
See id. The full impact of external alterations is achieved most fully when one
generation is replaced by the next. See id. Societies' long-term process of learning
is benefited by a significant resource-young adults' and adolescents' increased
openness to new impressions and images. See id. This is an invaluable resource
because of the enhanced learning ability and increased sensitivity of the young in
addition to the fact that they are less encumbered with rigid, psychic structures and
antiquated images. See id.
269. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 97 (explaining that in order to gain
support from Israel for Palestinian state-building, Palestinian society must confront
and dispel Israeli fears). See, e.g., Kelman, The Political Psychology of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, supra note 121, at 362 (arguing that it is not necessary for
either nation to accept the other's visions, but merely to "penetrat[e]" the other's
ideology to develop a common goal regarding their shared land). According to
observers, reality interpreted in a contradictory fashion serves as the basis for
conflicting groups' mutual images, which, to some extent, tend to mirror one
another. See Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 236.
Generally speaking, the evil nature of the opposing side, which tends to be viewed
in negative terms, is exaggerated, while one's own side, similarly exaggerated,
tends to be seen as positive. See Ralph K. White, Images in the Context of
International Conflict, Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in
INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note
146, at 238, 255 [hereinafter White, Images in the Context of International
CoJflict]. States that interact with one another similarly possess mutual images of
the other. See Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches, supra note 147, at 392.
PERMEABLE FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS
neighbors.7  The objective is to encourage relationships that will
change the existing attitudes of indifference, antagonism, or
suspicion into favorable ones.!" Enhanced international cooperation
and ensuing communication may be the eventual outcome of mutual
trust. There is a possibility that communication can diminish
inaccurate conclusions regarding the perceived threats of either
side.2 72 Both parties must show that they want, and are able, to live
peacefully with each other, that security for both is in their mutual
interest, and that terrorism is a criminal and punishable act!" The
two sides each must feel that there is no danger to their respective
values, identities, economic and social welfare, and physical
existence. Psychological needs, identity, and security are not, in
and of themselves, part of a zero-sum game, and therefore it is
frequently possible to resolve outstanding disputes in a mutually
agreeable fashion by exposing and exploring the concerns of security
and identity that underlie the supposedly irreconcilable positions of
the two sides.27' Thus, resolution of the conflict could lead to a
genuine and stable peace that would serve to dissipate each side's
fundamental fears and satisfy their fundamental needs, potentially
270. See Newman, Transforining Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 17
(providing three necessary elements of less confrontational borders, two of which
are the degree to which borders are opened to the movement of people and goods
and the nature of the ethnic backgrounds of people).
271. See Kelman, Changing Attitudes Through International Activities, 18 J.
Soc. IssuEs 68 (1962) [hereinafter Kelman, Changing Attitudes] (examining the
barriers to change, and suggesting some facts that could result in lasting change).
272. See Dean G. Pruitt, Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of
International Action, in INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 146, at 393, 397 (discussing the relationship between
distrust and threat perception).
273. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 97 (pointing out that Israeli security is
also a Palestinian concern).
274. See Aweiss, supra note 263, at 72 (stating that the first step to
reconciliation is to assure both sides that their social values and identities are not
threatened by the reconciliation process).
275. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 157-59 (arguing that unofficial
conflict resolution approaches, such as the "interactive problem-solving model,"
can be effective in addressing the individual and societal aspects of international
conflict); see also Kelman, An Interactional ,4pproach, supra note 68, at 116-17
(providing a more detailed example of how an interactive problem-solving
workshop between Israelis and Palestinians might function).
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resulting in a reproach, followed by cordial and cooperative
interaction between the two.2 76 Accordingly, the focal point of
constructive action must be the future and present, not past
277
occurrences.
Although the mere dissipation of mutual hostile feelings may not,
in and of itself, achieve peace, it will create a climate favorable to
peace-making. An environment of mutual trust is best established
through the enhancement of favorable attitudes of one side that are
agreeable to the other; this facilitates the negotiation of political
settlements. Establishing peace is a varied and complicated process
that typically may not take place in the absence of the essential
2781ingredient of changed attitudes. One side, the "sender", must
supply updated information about itself and its people to the
"recipient" party in the context of positive interaction. 7" The end
result is the creation of friendly attitudes out of once neutral or
hostile ones.28° Therefore, the recipients will have a more powerful
motivation as well as a better opportunity to view the sending side
positively within the framework of the positive interaction.' As a
result, there is a greater likelihood that the recipient will be more
accepting of the new information under these circumstances that will
enhance and accentuate the positive qualities of the sender.
2 2
Furthermore, with both sides engaging in positive interactions
with each other, the sender's perceptions tend to become
restructured. The recipient's positive interaction with the sender
276. See Kelman, The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
supra note 121, at 348 (describing how resolution of the conflict is not only
favorable because it promotes peace, but also essential because of the geographical
location and social ties between the Israelis and the Palestinians).
277. See White, Misperception in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, supra note 133, at
194.
278. See Kelman, Changing Attitudes, supra note 271, at 68 (arguing that
reducing hostility can function to facilitate an environment of mutual trust and
encourage negotiation).
279. See id. at 69-73, 85 (proposing a formula to change the entrenched, hostile
attitudes of adversaries).
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id.
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evolves into a factor which becomes part of that side's definition for
him or her, and, eventually, becomes an element in his or her
evaluation of that side.2: ' Consequently, an individual may be
prepared to alter his or her attitude toward the other, since the other is
one with whom he or she cooperated, became friendly, and agreed,
since due to the circumstances, positive interaction had been
promoted between the two. He or she will thus be more amenable to
new information calling for an altered attitude relative to the other
side within the framework of this positive interaction.24
D. EDUCATION, SOCIALIZATION, MASS MEDIA, AND CULTURE
PRESERVATION
Since relations and attitudes between varied ethnic groups are the
result of a continuous and lengthy development process, long-term
educational programs for inculcating positive and stable relations and
attitudes must commence early.' " Schools are one example of a
societal group that establishes norms.2" Therefore, new attitudes and
values must be developed through the existing educational system.:"
Intergroup contact stressing emotional and societal aspects of
intergroup and interpersonal interactions may be effective as part of
an integrated program that also includes cognitive contents.'" A
283. See Kelman, Changing Attitudes, supra note 271, at 85-86.
284. See id. at 86. Yet, since behavior alone simply supplies the openness and
motivation for accepting and analyzing supporting information, positive
interactions alone are not sufficient. To positively alter attitudes, friendly
interaction must combine with truly new information. See id.
285. See Ben-Ant & Amir, supra note 69, at 55 (stating that because of the
ingrained quality of attitudes and beliefs, long-term educational programs are
preferable to workshops which typically meet only once).
286. See Scott, supra note 146. at 96 (describing the man, "norm-providing
groups" within a society, including family and schools). In the past, however, the
data supporting this finding was less direct. See 1d.
287. See Ben-Ari & Amir, supra note 69. at 57 (arguing that the .'contact"
methods of improving relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel is inadequate
because of, among other things. the lack of geographic proximity and common
language).
288. See id. (suggesting that because of the limits imposed on the contact
method by geographical location and lack of a common language, a cumculum
using the cognitive approach may be more effective-at least initially-than face
to face interaction).
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broad-based educational program could establish a powerful element
for instituting peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews.' 9 Such a
comprehensive program would provide a formal environment for
Jewish-Arab contact, thereby encouraging peaceful coexistence
between them.2 ° It is therefore crucial that these educational efforts
accompany and follow successful peacemaking."' These efforts, in
turn, will promote and help preserve open borders and peaceful
relations. As in Northern Ireland, psychiatrists and psychologists
believe that an integrated educational system could facilitate
289. See id. at 58 (arguing that such an educational program can validate and
stabilize Arab-Jewish relations in Israel).
290. See id. (explaining that a general program with a wide scope in the
education framework would lend institutional support and would legitimize
relations between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs).
291. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 176; Hirschfeld, supra note
160, at 96 (arguing that a long-term peace education plan is necessary to change
the long-standing bitterness between Israelis and Palestinians). The experience in
Northern Ireland may be instructive in this respect. Schools have used a formal
curriculum as a framework, within which intervention projects of a long-term
nature have been designed to enhance mutual understanding and contact. See Knox
& Hughes, supra note 131, at 86 (describing the various successes and failure of
the "contact hypothesis" and integrated schools in particular). The Department of
Education for Northern Ireland ("DENI") has acknowledged and acted on its
statutory duty to sponsor and formulate policies for improving community
relations. See Trew, supra note 101, at 104. For example, DENI financially
supported activities like community relations holidays and encouraged
development projects for schools designed to create an environment for children
that is free from hatred, fear, or ignorance of people from whom they are
educationally segregated. See id. Serious attempts at enhancing cooperation
between Protestant and Catholic schools, and promoting joint activities between
students from diverse religious backgrounds, have taken place. See id. For
instance, two interdisciplinary themes, which encompassed cultural traditions and
mutual appreciation, were part of a major educational reform program initiated in
Northern Ireland. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 131, at 85. In analyzing the
efficacy of the program, which was created to teach children to learn to respect
others as well as themselves, and to understand and gain knowledge about both the
shared and different aspects of their cultural heritage, observers concluded that,
while students lean to preserving allegiance to their own national group, the result
of teaching subjects like history in a more objective fashion allowed the students to
develop more critical attitudes of their own groups and to move away from a
polarized perception of society in Northern Ireland. See id. at 85-86. Once again,
even the detractors of the contact theory, who think that these schemes will not
alter society, admit that contact may help diminish some of the ignorance barriers.
See Trew, supra note 10 1, at 104.
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enhanced intergroup relations. They therefore view complete pupil
integration in all levels of education as the single most important
factor in breaking down community barriers and maintaining peace
on a long-term basis. "2
Both the Palestinian and Israeli school systems should teach how
to resolve conflicts without the need to resort to violence in addition
to encouraging comprehension and appreciation of the former
antagonist's justified goals and wishes.:' A basic objective of peace
education is to implant in each society"M the fact that those living on
292. See Trew, supra note 101, at 104. While the Northern Ireland
interdisciplinary scheme was developed in the framework of its segregated
schools, planned integrated schools have emerged since the mid-1980s from the
belief that a segregated school system perpetuates the conflict and preserves
negative social attitudes. See Knox & Hughes, supra note 13 i, at 86. The contact
hypothesis helped inspire the development of integrated schools. See ul An
environment for children where cultural diversity is tolerated and appreciated is
encouraged by integrated education in the schools. Developing a set of less
polarized social attitudes and creating inter-religious friendships among students
resulted in the positive social effect of religious interaction in Northern Ireland's
first such school. See id. However, it has been argued that research data in this area
is equivocal since, according to certain findings, attendance in an integrated grade
school, after seven years, had little or no effect on pupils' intergroup perceptions.
See id. Although an integrated Belfast school's students developed less polarized
attitudes, the change was attributed to the fact that they had adopted strategies to
avoid mixed community intergroup relations. See id. The detractors of such
integration processes allege that advocates of integrated schools lost sight of the
fact that Northern Ireland's schools are segregated because both Catholics and
Protestants have separate educational goals. See Trew, supra note 101, at 104. For
example, Catholics desire denominational schools to affirm the practices and
convictions of their faith that are taught in the homes. See ih Moreover, it has
been asserted that there is little support for the theory that education systems, by
themselves, have an impact on social values embedded in society. See id. Further,
some researchers have concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that formal
education's possibilities for affecting non-positive social attitudes were present, it
should not be overestimated since the home environment was found to be the most
important determining factor for social attitudes. See Knox & Hughes, supra note
131, at 86. Note that we are not contending in our article that any action or contact
should take place in isolation. Rather, the cumulative effect of all human activities
is, and will be, the determinative factor for enhancing open borders and peaceful
relations.
293. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 99 (listing the two main functions of
peace education as instruction in non-violent dispute resolution strategies and
acceptance of the legitimate aspirations of the former enemy).
294. See Landau, supra note 137. at 69 (arguing that schools should teach non-
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"the other" side have a basic, fundamental right to live in an
atmosphere free from fear.29' The parties, therefore, must work jointly
to develop ideas for solutions that deal equally with one another's
concerns and needs. Both sides require an opportunity to understand
and explore the constraints, concerns, and needs of the other.29 6 The
goal is to create appreciation, recognition, and understanding in each
society regarding the other's security, stability, and peace
demands.9 7 Each side must understand that the other has its own
needs, visions, and purposes as well.2 8 In other words, the idea is to
violent methods of expressing anger and grief over the conflict).
295. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 99 (stating that an important aspect of
the peace education process is teaching Palestinians that Israel has an inalienable
right to exist without fear and that Israel's security concerns are legitimate). See
generally Landau, supra note 137, at 69-70 (arguing that once people understand
that the other side has strengths and weaknesses then it becomes easier for both
sides to learn more about one another and how to peacefully coexist).
296. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 158, 174.
297. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 99 (describing a meeting between
Israelis and Palestinians and how the ability to speak openly with one another
about their concerns created a sense of equality and respect); Gershon Baskin, in
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIE[S
98 (Gershon Baskin & Zakaria al Qaq, eds. 1998) (acknowledging that while both
Israelis and Palestinians have valid concerns about their security, not all so-called
security measures currently in place address security problems); Hillal Adiri, in id.
at 98; Mohammad Shtayyeh, in Minutes of Conference on Labor Migration, in
LABOR MIGRATION: PALESTINE, EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 262, at
127, 184-85; Gabi Bar, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT
ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra, at 100. But see Samir Hulaileh, in ISRAELI-
P ALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra,
at 90 (arguing that many of the Israeli government's concerns are political and not
security-related).
298. See Kelman, The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conlict,
supra note 121, at 361-62; see generally Irving L. Janis & M. Brewster Smith,
Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images, in
INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note
146, at 190, 213. One way to accomplish this goal is to avoid directly attacking
existing stereotypes to create more understanding and tolerance. See id. at 213.
This might be accomplished by carefully choosing subsidiary or minor issues to
attack from the side in which less resistance, relatively speaking, might be
expected. See id. For example, Soviets and Americans during the Cold War
viewed, in a stereotypical fashion, the other side as being too treacherous or hostile
to be trusted to abide by an international agreement. See id. Thus, a more
sophisticated and varied perspective might be substituted if side attacks, taking the
place of direct assaults, were focused on such matters as family life patterns of the
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create an appreciation, awareness, and understanding in the
Palestinian society that the sensibilities of Israelis revolving around
security and the battle against terrorism are valid and authentic."
Likewise, Israelis must develop an appreciation, awareness, and
understanding that Palestinian demands for a separate entity,
economic security, and recognition of their dignity"... are also valid
and authentic. °' To resolve the conflict between them in a mutually
satisfactory fashion, both sides' needs must be met. Each concerned
party must have a chance to understand and examine the other's
limitations, worries, and needs, and they must both search together to
jointly create possible solutions that address such concerns and
requirements in an equal manner..t2
"Human history," wrote H.G. Wells, at the end of his OUTLINE OF
HISTORY, "becomes more and more a race between education and
catastrophe." 03 Education, therefore, can become an effective
mechanism of socialization for coexistence and peace."" Negative
stereotypes of each side, which developed over time due to the
disaffection and the distance between the parties, must be confronted
rival side; medical, cinema, and literary accomplishments; and leisure-time
activities. See id. The respective audiences may tend to become more accepting of
the other side once they realize that the "'others" are not really that different from
themselves. See id. Hence, introducing a succession of minor exceptions to the rule
that the other side only contains evil people eventually may result in the break
down of the rule itself. See id.
299. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 99 (describing peace education and its
major functions).
300. See Khayyat-Dajani, supra note 262. at 163 (emphasizing the role that
human dignity has played in Palestinian labor migration).
301. See, e.g., Herbert C. Kelman, Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of
Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations. 28 J. PALLSTINE STLD. 36, 47,
49 (1998) [hereinafter Kelman, Building a Sustainable Peace] (stating that while
the Oslo Agreement's demonstration of mutual recognition is a good beginning,
both sides must agree that the other has a valid right to exist).
302. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 158 (applying the interactive
problem-solving model to conflict resolution through its use of psychological
analysis of the individual in international conflict and conflict resolution).
303. H.G. WELLS, OUTLINE OF HISTORY, BEING A PLAIN HISTORY OF LIFE -ND
MANKIND 1198 (1949); Landau, supra note 137, at 66 (quoting Wells).
304. See Hassassian, supra note 247, at 56 (discussing the importance of
education for peace as part of the socialization process).
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through effective teaching methods9' Skilled group leaders could
utilize mixed encounter role reversals and simulation exercises to
overcome conditioned "ideological reflex" responses.0 6 Educational
institutions on both collective and individual levels could help allay
the mutual fears and emotions of Israelis and Palestinians.
Both sides must strive to develop educational contexts that
embrace multicultural learning in order to appreciate each side's
history, language, and culture.0 8 In this framework of multicultural
learning, which, in essence, means learning about the cultures of
others,0 Palestinians and Israelis could participate jointly in social
activities, student exchange programs,1 ° and joint field trips.
Multicultural learning can involve several elements, including
developing positive feelings about other groups to reduce
prejudices;'" recognizing stereotypes that are culturally biased;"2
instructing with an emphasis on recognizing the achievements of
others in all of life's facets to demonstrate tolerance and diversity;"'
teaching students to recognize that varied viewpoints within a
305. See Landau, supra note 137, at 66 (challenging parents and educators to
work toward "re-humanizing the enemy" through educational tools and programs).
306. See id. at 68 (stating that such exercises can facilitate the development of
empathy for the other side).
307. See id. at 69 (arguing that the education system must adopt more programs
which address the emotional and creative needs of their students in order to
facilitate understanding of the other side's emotional landscape).
308. See Aweiss, supra note 263, at 73 (providing a definition of multicultural
education, which involves learning about other cultures, and explaining several
multicultural teaching methods).
309. See id. (explaining that in this context, multicultural education is the
teaching about the culture of others).
310. See id. at 74 (listing the use of books and materials from the other culture
and the participation in the other culture's religious ceremonies as ways students
can learn about the other culture); see also Landau, supra note 137, at 67
(believing, however, that student exchanges will not occur in the immediate future
because both sides need time to arrange and prepare for such exchanges).
311. See Aweiss, supra note 263, at 73 (stating that prejudice reduction is an
essential aspect of multicultural education).
312. See id. at 74 (suggesting that schools should create a climate where
students are instructed on how to identify such stereotypes).
313. See id. at 73.
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discipline can influence the development of that discipline;"'" training
the teaching staff to promote the instructors' appreciation and
sensitivities for tolerance-encouraging strategies;' and national and
regional joint collaborative academic and education efforts designed
to increase the positive relationship between Israeli and Arab
educators and academics in order to encourage idea exchanges
pertaining to additional ways to include educators in strategies for
resolving conflicts. '16 In short, awareness and appreciation of, and
sensitivity for, the other side's viewpoints, customs, and beliefs
could evolve through learning about the cultures of others, or in other
words, multicultural learning, despite the fact that students may have
entered school with misconceptions and negative ideas concerning
other ethnic and racial groups."'
Beyond the classroom's contribution to tolerance, reconciliation,
and peace, the roles that mass media and other methods of electronic
communication play are crucial."' Thus, the involvement of mass-
media communication, which contributes to stereotyping groups
since such misapprehensions often are created without physical
contact with the typecast group, can actually serve an important
function: they improve images of the other group by communicating
materials that demonstrate that a common humanity knows no group
boundaries." 9 The Israeli and Palestinian co-production of the half-
hour series "Sesame Street" demonstrates the mass media's presence
and impact on modem cultures.'32 Additional forms of technology,
such as CD-ROM programs and video and computer games, should
also be used to assist in the development of positive images of the
other group.321
The goal of all of these efforts is that, instead of dwelling on the
enmity of the past, both sides will look for common ground to find
314. See id.
315. See id. at 74.
316. See Aweiss, supra note 263, at 74.
317. See id. at 73.
318. See id. at 71.
319. See Pettigrew, supra note 146, at 190.
320. See Landau, supra note 137, at 67.
321. See id.
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the positive aspects of the other side. Nonetheless, use of the term
"open borders" does not imply, necessarily, a "single culture." For
EU Member States, for example, the Maastricht Treaty states that the
Community "shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the
Member States, '322 and respect their regional and national diversity
while at the same time bringing to the fore common cultural
heritage. 2 1 Moreover, Community action is to be geared toward
promoting, supplementing, and supporting Member State
cooperation in European historical and cultural dissemination,
knowledge improvement, and heritage safeguarding and
conservation.3 24 Thus, it is clear that, as pertains to cultural
preservation or promotion, the primary responsibility rests with the
Member States, and community action in this domain is meant to be
supplementary1 25 Furthermore, other provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty require the Community to take such cultural aspects into
account.126 Accordingly, respect for regional and national cultural
diversity and the multitude of traditions thus existed from the outset
alongside the important function cultural action was to have in the
EU's commercial and economic strategy.3
2 7
VII. PALESTINIAN STATE
It is a foregone conclusion to most observers that at some point
soon, whether through the Palestinian-Israeli peace process or
outside of it, a sovereign and independent Palestinian state will
322. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 3(p), 128,
O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
323. See id. art. 128.
324. See id.; Joseph A. McMahon, The Protection of Cultures, in TIlE
FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 205.
325. See McMahon, supra note 324, at 206.
326. See EC TREATY art. 128, cl. 4.
327. See McMahon, supra note 324, at 216. Yet, it will not be a simple task to
bridge cultural and economic goals in light of the integrating Community's
historically-significant economic objectives. See id. If diverse regional and
national cultures and traditions are to be respected, however, this cultural and
economic bridging is required. See id. When viewed in this fashion, borders must
exist to protect national cultures, which means accepting some economic
protection in order to encourage cultural protection. See id.
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ultimately be established,' de jureJ although many already see a de
328. See, e.g., Aluf Ben, Israel Prepares for a Lnilateral Palestinian
Declaration, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 24, 2000. at 4A (in Hebrew) (on file with author);
Ravital Levi-Stein, Oded Eran: A Palestininan State wdl be the Result of the Talks,
HA'ARETZ, May 2, 2000, at 3A (in Hebrew) (on file vith author); Dov Alfon,
Sharon: The Autonomy fill Eventually Lead to a Palestinian State, HA'ARETZ,
Jan. 14, 1999, at 7A (in Hebrew) (on file with author): A State Called Palestine,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 17-18: Dani Rubenstein & Itim, Peres Eitpressed
Support for a Palestinian State and IfWas Showered With Cheers in the Pale.'tinian
Parliament in Ramallah, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 12. 1999, at 6A (in Hebrewv) (on file
with author); see also Newman, Boundaries in Fhl, supra note 60, at I. As a
practical matter, for an entity to enjoy the benefits and status of statehood, a large
number of states must recognize it as an entity and treat it as a state. See I
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §202. cmt. b (1987); see also
Kathryn M. McKinney, The Legal Effects of the Israh-PLO Declaration oJ
Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 18 SEATTLEU U. L. REv. 93, 95
n.13 (1994) [hereinafter McKinney, The Legal Efkects]. The EcoN\MIST pointed
out that in Algiers, on November 15, 1988. Yasser Arafat declared an independent
state of Palestine, which approximately 60 states recognized almost immediately.
See Palestine by Proclamation, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21. 1996. at 13. Some sixty or
so others have since recognized it as well. See id. In a later article, howe% er. The
ECONOMIST, using the Palestinians as an example. explained that nations are able
to exist without being states. See Borders: Good Fences. supra note 66. at 20.
329. The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed at Monte% ideo,
Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 1) [hereinafter Montevideo
Convention] stipulates four qualifications for statehood: a permanent population; a
defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with other states.
See id.; see also ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPE -%N UNION, supra note
81, at 123; Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 9. The Montevideo Conention
provides the classical definition of a "state." See Hurst Hannum & Richard B.
Lillich, The Concept of Autonon
' 
in International Law. 74 AI. J. INT'L L. 858,
886 n.170 (1980). The Montevideo Convention, reflecting customary international
law in this respect, sets forth the criterion for the determination of statehood and
represents the declaratory approach to being regarded a state under international
law. The declaratory approach to being a state means that if an entity meets these
objective criteria, it is considered a state. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, L. X\ AiPONG
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-58 (5th ed.
1986). Under this approach, there is no need for any formal action as such on the
part of other states. See McKinney, The Legal Efl'cts, supra note 328, at 95, 105;
Fred C. Morrison, Comment, Recognition in International Law" .,1 Functional
Reappraisal, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 857, 861-63 (1967). Some believe that a
Palestinian state exists since it now possesses the attributes necessary for
recognition as a state under international law. See, eg, Richard Wilner,
Nationalist Movements and the Middle East Peace Process: Everitses in Sell-
Determination, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 297, 326 n. 124 (1995) (arguing
that the Palestinian state has a permanent population, a defined territory, reflecting
the borders implanted by the Partition Resolution of the United Nations General
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facto state in existence,330 since it appears that many symbolic
indications of statehood are now in place. For example, the
Palestinians already have a separate international dialing code,
postage stamps,"' a national flag, travel documents, "2 and an intent to
raise the level of Palestinian diplomatic representation throughout the
world in countries that have yet to recognize fully a Palestinian
state.333 Moreover, it seems that Israel has already indicated in
Assembly of November 1947 and the Palestine Mandate; a government, the
PLO/Palestinian Authority; and the capacity to enter into relations with other
states, which the PLO/Palestinian Authority has been doing with respect to the
Palestinian state's economic development); see also McKinney, The Legal Effects,
supra note 328, at 115, 118, 125, 127-28; Palestine by Proclamation, supra note
328, at 13. Many international legal writers, however, believe that under
international law, the Palestinian entity does not fulfill the necessary criteria to
qualify for statehood. See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres & Zalman Shoval, Why a
Demilitarized Palestinian State Would Not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under
International Law, 11 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 347, 349-50, 350 n.9 (1997);
see also Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status
of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 79-89
(1997); J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 9, 11 n.6 (1991); Eyal Benvenisti, The Status of the Palestinian Authorit', in
THE ARAB-ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 47, 58-59 (Eugene Cotran &
Chibi Mallat, eds. 1996); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Admission of 'Palestine' as a
Member of a Specialized Agency and Withholding Payment of Assessments in
Response, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 218, 219-20 (1990). The customary view has long
held that the Palestinian entity is not a state since it has not fulfilled the declaratory
approach's objective requirements. See McKinney, The Legal Effects, supra note
328, at 95, 114.
330. See, e.g., Aluf Ben, The Foreign Minister is Against an Early Transfer of
Abu Dis to the Palestininans, HA'ARETZ, May 2, 2000, at 1A (in Hebrew) (on file
with author); Amira Hess, The Central Council of the PLO: The State is an
Existing Fact, HA'ARETZ, Apr. 30, 1999, at 8A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
The Central Council of the PLO adopted a decision that stipulated that the
Palestinian state is an existing fact based on natural rights, United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 181 [the Partition Resolution of November 1947], and its
Declaration of Independence of 1988. See id. The Chairman of the Palestinian
Authority, Yasser Arafat, has stated that the Palestinian state, in essence, already
exists. See Yareach Tal et al., Netanyahu: I Prevented the Declaration of a
Palestinian State, HA'ARETZ, May 5, 1999, at 4A (in Hebrew) (on file with
author).
331. See Netanyahu Outside the Picture, HA'ARETZ, Apr. 19, 1999, at IA (in
Hebrew) (on file with author) (presenting the picture of a Palestinian Authority
stamp commemorating the signing of the Wye River Accords of October 1998).
332. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 173.
333. See Yareach Tal et al., Israel Opposes the Intention of the Palestinians to
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principle, albeit reluctantly, that it may give its consent in the near
future to the establishment of a Palestinian state."A
VIII. MENTALLY IMPRINTED BORDER
PERCEPTIONS
The rigid and restricted border, which separated Israel and the
West Bank from 1949 to 1967,"5 became extremely permeable,"' or,
in essence, "erased" in the period following June 1967."' Its
"presence," however, remains strongly etched in the minds"' of
people on both sides of the "green line,""' -the pre-1967 border. '"
The green line functioned as a cognitive schism to exclude and
Raise the Level of Its [sic] Missions in the World, HA'ARETz, May 3, 1999, at 12A
(in Hebrew) (on file with author).
334. See Akiba Eldar, Israel Will Agree in February to a Palestinian State,
HA'ARETZ, Nov. 1, 1999, at lA (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Dalia Shahori,
The Prime Minister Hints Regarding his Support for the Establishment of a
Palestinian State, HA'ARETz, Apr. 10, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew) (on file with
author).
335. See Shalit, supra note 250, at 368.
336. See id. at 365, 370.
337. See id.
338. One observer assesses that the hardest borders are not the ones on the
ground, but rather, they are the ones imprinted in peoples' minds. See Raimondo
Strassoldo, supra note 81, at 88. Another scholar speaks generally of the
"divergent mental images" of borders. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra
note 5, at 5. Another views borders as ambiguous and amorphous "matters of
consciousness." See Cohen, supra note 105, at 28. Borders leave complicated and
intricate imprints on the mind, and have an impact on peoples' consciousness and
culture. See Strassoldo, supra note 81, at 87. Consequently, mentally imprinted
borders are more difficult to dismantle. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66,
at 21.
339. See David Newman, Demarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 174; see
also Muhammad Nakhal, Closure and Borders, 3 (3-4) PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL.,
ECON. & CULTURE 118, 121 (1996): Newman, The Functional Presence of an
'Erased' Boundary, supra note 102, at 80; Shalit, supra note 250, at 370.
340. See Shalit, supra note 250. at 370. The "green line," which developed after
the Armistice Agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1949,
resulted in Arab ethnic and geographic dislocation. See Newman, Translorning
Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 31. Some of these Arabs became Israeli
citizens, while others in the West Bank became citizens of Jordan, which then
controlled and administered the West Bank. See id.
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confine the other side.14 ' The green line has stayed in the collective
consciousness of people following the opening of the border in
1967142 in a manner similar to that of the Berlin Wall, which
continues to symbolize the numerous differences between the
reunified inhabitants of Berlin.4 3 Comparable to the green line in
Israel, this separation line in Germany still exists not as a tangible,
visible border but as a "border of the mind" and as a separation of
standards of living despite massive funds transfers from Germany to
the area formerly constituting East Germany.
34
A perceptible impression of a border separation 4 ' between Israelis
and Palestinians exists in the formal prohibition, for instance, on
West Bank and Gaza Arab workers who remain overnight within
Israel "proper"-within the green line.14 ' These restrictions, however,
have been eased so that Palestinian workers in Israel now can receive
permits to extend their work until late evening hours or even
overnight. 4 7 In addition, different military and civilian laws have
341. See Shlomo Hasson, From Frontier to Periphery in Israel: Cultural
Representations in Narratives and Counter-Narratives, in ETHNIC FRONTIERS AND
PERIPHERIES, supra note 66, at 123, 126.
342. See id. at 126-27.
343. Cf Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 24; see also Bort, supra note 8 1, at
91. The Berlin Wall has been the origin of great fear and fantasy. The Cold War's
most physical symbol of the separation of the world into two entities in one city, in
a previously unified state, was the Berlin Wall. See John Borneman, Grenzregime
(Border Regime): The Wall and Its Aftermath, in BORDER IDENTITIES, supra note
81, at 162, 165-68. Like most others, this border limited, restricted, confined,
contained, and separated people while it produced desire by developing yearnings,
hatred, love, monsters, heroes, and traitors. See id. at 179. Understandably, adults
perceive this "mental" wall as more sturdy than do children. See id. at 182.
344. Cf Bort, supra note 81, at 104.
345. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 174; Newman,
The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra note 102, at 80.
346. See Shalit, supra note 250, at 371; Nakhal, supra note 339, at 121-22. As a
practical matter though, many Arab workers do spend the night in Israel. See, e.g.,
The Police: Illegal Lodging-A Serious Offence, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 28, 1999, at 7A
(in Hebrew) (on file with author). They often sleep in primitive facilities and
orange groves. See Shalit, supra note 250, at 371.
347. See Amos Harel & Merav Sheri, The Labor Ministr, Initiates an
hIbrmation Campaign to Encourage the Employment of Palestinians in Israel,
HA'ARETZ, Mar. 20, 1998, at 9A (in Hebrew) (on file with author). For example,
by August of 1998, about 5,000 Gaza Strip laborers were permitted to spend the
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been implemented on each side of the green line since 1967."'
Mutual fears of Israelis and Palestinians have also helped to
promote the perception of a border separation in the sense that
crossing the "nonexistent" or "invisible" border between the two
sides is, if possible, often avoided by both.u' In fact, there exists a
division between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem, despite their
physical proximity to each other, due to the lack of social, economic,
ethnic, and religious homogeneity." Palestinians may tend to think
twice before, or may not even consider at all, crossing from the East
side of Jerusalem to the West side, while many Israelis feel that
venturing into the Old City of Jerusalem, or traveling through the
West Bank for that matter, is too dangerous."' Accordingly, fewer
Israelis than before enter Gaza and the West Bank."2 and many will
now consult maps to avoid traversing the green line and to
circumvent the West Bank totally."' In fact, parents often do not
permit their children to participate in school trips that will cross the
night in Israel. See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Defense,
Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations August 1998 (visited Aug. 27, 2000)
<http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07scO> [hereinafter Israeli-
Palestinian Economic Relations]. As of early 1998, however, few of the overnight
permits had actually been used. See Harel & Sheri, supra, at 9A.
348. See Economic Office at Orient House. Israeli lmnpethimnents to InvestIent in
Palestine, 3 (3-4) PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL., ECON. & CULT Rt 152, 156 (Summer
1996) (pointing out that in the territories numerous military regulations and orders
are in effect); see also Newman, Transforming Ethnic Fronttters, supra note 66, at
30 (observing the role of military regulations in response to changes in regional
demographics).
349. See Newman, Demnarcating a Boundarv. supra note 22, at 174; Mohammed
Dajani, in Presentations and Discussions, in SCENARIOS O\ THE FLTL RE OF
JERUSALEM, supra note 268, at 105, 129, 137 [hereinafter Dajam, in Presentations
and Discussions] (discussing and comparing administrative and socioeconomic
divisions among Israelis and Palestinians): see also Shalit, supra note 250, at 373
(analyzing the psychological ramifications of perceived geopolitical boundaries).
350. See Nakhal, supra note 339, at 120.
351. See Dajani, in Presentations and Discussions, stqra note 349, at 137
(observing the effect of socio-economic divisions on separation betw\een East and
West Jerusalem).
352. See Shalit, supra note 250, at 370. 373 (noting the effects of the Six-Day
War on the curtailment of trans-border traffic).
353. See Newman, The Functional Presence of tin 'Erased' Boundta'. supra
note 102, at 87-88.
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"nonexistent" border. "4 This is a common reaction, since studies
show that once a group is considered an enemy, information
processing entertains biases respecting the group's actions.'" The
crossing of the border becomes tantamount to passing into a
forbidden or dangerous land due to a superstitious, all-encompassing
fear surrounding closed borders that act as transition lines between
two different worlds.5 6
Curfews and closures, imposed following terrorist attacks and
other violent acts, preventing Palestinians from entering Israel, and
identity checks at army roadblocks..7 often established at these
"erased" borders3. 8 between the West Bank and Israel, ', give the
354. See id. at 88.
355. See generally Brett Silverstein & Catherine Flamenbaum, Biases in the
Perception and Cognition of the Actions of Enemies, 45(2) J. Soc. ISSUES, 51, 52-
77 (1989) (theorizing the existence of a correlation between cultural biases and
behavioral perceptions).
356. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 6 (analyzing the
sociological and psychological factors which have historically contributed to de
facto geographic boundaries); see also David Newman, Boundaries in Flux: The
'Green Line' Boundaty BeNeen Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and
Future, in I BOUNDARY AND TERRITORY BRIEFING 1, 23 (Clive Schofield, ed.
1995) [hereinafter Newman, Boundaries in Flux] (discussing the ways in which
the intifada reinforced defacto geographic boundaries).
357. The checkpoint at the entrance to Jerusalem provides a good example of
this as border patrol soldiers authoritatively indicate who shall pass and who shall
be required to remain in line, subject to a security check. See Amos Harel, The
Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, HA'ARETZ, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in
Hebrew) (on file with author). For further discussion regarding closures, see infra
note 757.
358. See Nakhal, supra note 339, at 118-19.
359. As part of the European Union's attempts to police its external borders,
spot-checks are permitted in the zone adjacent to the EU's outer borders. See Bort,
supra note 81, at 94. For further discussion on spot checks and restrictions on
movement and their rationale within the European Union context, see infra notes
389-393 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Advocate-General at the European
Court of Justice has indicated that border authorities have been permitted to
question individuals behaving suspiciously, or in situations where there is a special
threat to public security. The Proposal for a Council Directive on the Elimination
of Controls on Persons Crossing Internal Frontiers of July 1995, does not prevent
national laws from requiring individuals to carry documents, such as an identity
card or a driver's license. See Peter Cullen, Frontier Issues before the European
Court of Justice, in THE FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 187, 196 (noting
that inspection of these documents by police does not violate the law of the
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impression at least that the green line serves as more than a simple
administrative or "nonexistent" border. "' Borders between two states
commonly offer points of entry and exit for their nationals. Security
checkpoints and closures, like other Israeli security measures, create
a situation allowing Israelis to enter the West Bank and Gaza
freely-without permits. Israel allows West Bank and Gaza Strip
Palestinians into Israel only if they have valid entry permits, which
constitute a sort of "visa" similar to what most countries require
foreign nationals to possess for entry. " The fact, incidentally, that
traffic jams have occurred at the Erez Checkpoint between Israel and
Gaza, and that fees are levied for using Israeli-operated forklifts' : are
issues that are reminiscent of complaints surrounding cross-border
trucking between Mexico and the United States. Although the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") '"' was designed to
terminate cross-border controls by the end of 1995, long lines of
traffic due to lengthy border checks still persisted years later.
Moreover, after enduring such a trying experience at the Mexican-
American border, truckers, who are restricted to a narrow border strip
in each country, must offload their shipment and return to their
country of origin.3
Thus, from both a functional and a perceptional standpoint, the
European Community).
360. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra
note 102, at 90; see also Nakhal, supra note 339, at 119-20, 123; Amira Hess, Is
Israel Trying to Isolate Bethlehem?, HA'ARETZ. Sept. 24, 1999, at 3A (in Hebrew)
(on file with author).
361. See Nakhal, supra note 339, at 119-22.
362. See Israeli Impediments, supra note 348, at 156 (discussing the extensive
security procedures undertaken for Palestinian imports); see also Amos Hard, The
Normal Traffic at the Karni Checkpoint Has Been Resumed. HA'ARETZ, Mar. 26,
1999, at 6A (in Hebrew) (on file with the author).
363. For further discussion of the North American Free Trade Area, see inra
notes 700-708, 715-749 and accompanying text.
364. See The Trucks That Hold Back NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, at 23.
Commercial vehicles are only allowed to freely traverse the six Mexican states and
the four American states that comprise the region of the border, even pursuant to
NAFTA's stipulations. See id. In the United States it was contended that the
Mexican trucks were not safe and, thus, should be prevented from traveling on
American highways. See id. In addition, the United States refused to implement a
provision designed to allow commercial bus service across the border. See id.
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"nonexistent" border between the Palestinians and the Israelis
definitely exists in reality, 6 ' as evinced by the daily Israeli and
Palestinian activity patterns and the unambiguous perceptions in their
minds.1'
6
IX. OPEN/CLOSED BORDER PARADOXES
It is rather paradoxical that those among the Israelis and
Palestinians who presumably would have favored the disappearance
of any semblance of a border probably have done the most to
preserve it. 6 7 For instance, the same Arab "enemy," who must be
controlled on the other side of the green line, legally is allowed into
Israel proper to work.'6 Many of these workers also often dwell on
the Israel side of the green line. Moreover, various sectors of the
public and many politicians in Israel-both in and out of
government-have made demands following violent acts"" to
restrict, more severely, Palestinian freedom of movement within
Israel." Ironically, many of the same people make a great effort to
365. See Newman. Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 29
(addressing the development of geographic divisions resulting from the threat of
the intifada).
366. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary. supra
note 102 at 74; see also Nakhal, supra note 339 at 120, 123. Similarly, the two
totally separate systems of health and welfare, administration, and education have
created invisible barriers differentiating the social life on both sides of the
Republic of Ireland-Northern Ireland border. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note
81, at 129.
367. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra
note 102, at 90.
368. See Shalit, supra note 250, at 371 (observing the effects of regional ethnic
polarization on the composition of the Israeli work force).
369. See id. at 371-73. For further discussion, see supra notes 346-347 and
accompanying text.
370. See Barzilai & Peleg, supra note 2, at 64 (noting the impact of Israeli
domestic policies on territorial and regional stability).
371. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundarv supra
note 102, at 90; Ezra Sadan & Ruth Lowenthal, , 4 (3-4) PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL.,
ECON. & CULTURE 151, 152 (1997); Ezra Sadan, in ISRAELI-PALFSTINIAN-
JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at
98-99 (discussing the impact of domestic security concerns on Israeli labor trends);
see also, e.g., Simcha Bahiri, Economic Separation or hitegration: A Rejoinder to
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emphasize that no border should exist.'" The result of this irony is
illustrated by the paradox of policies of successive governments:
opposing territorial concessions,'' while, at the same time,
implementing stricter punishments, curfews, and closures subsequent
to terrorist activity. 74 These controls defied the idea of a single,
unified territory, and, in essence, promoted distinct territorial
partition.17 On the one hand, for instance, decision-makers in Israel
have understood that to halt the influx of workers from the Gaza
Strip at the green line would bring about unemployment and a drastic
reduction in income, which, in turn, could result in an "explosion."
Work, commerce, and investment in industry likely will increase the
trust between the two sides; he who has something to lose, it is said,
likely will find it more difficult to engage in confrontation."' Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak, on the other hand, has announced his
support for employing foreign workers instead of Palestinians; thus,
the Ministry of Internal Security began to revive separation schemes,
which include the establishment of a security barrier on the green
line.377 Similarly, the general trend of both the two elite groups in
Dr. Sanir Hazboun, 3 (2) PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL.. E('ON. & CLLTLRI 91, 92
(1996) (calling Israel's economic domination of Palestinian temtories colonial,
while suggesting that only peace between the two groups can create economic
equality).
372. See Newman, The Functional Presence of-an "Erasel" Bounlary upra
note 102, at 90; see also Keeping People in Their Place, EcoN\oMIST, Sept. 12,
1998, at 48 (analyzing the effect of Israeli border restrictions on the development
of a Palestinian economic infrastructure).
373. See Newman, Boundaries in Flux. supra note 60, at 25 (indicating the
paradox of more stringent Israeli efforts to maintain peace engendering ethnic
divisiveness); see also Barzilai & Peleg, supra note 2. at 64, 67.
374. See Newman, Boundaries in Flux. supra note 60, at 25. 32.
375. See id.; see also Elias Sanbar, in NEW VISIONS FOR TIM, Eco\o.\I -\ND
SociAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 5 (1996) (summarizing an
international conference sponsored by the Economic Development Institute of the
World Bank and the French Institute for International Relations).
376. See Harel, Tire Israeli-Palestinian (Common Market, supra note 357. at 6A.
For further discussion, see infra notes 754, 766 and accompanying text.
377. See id. Prime Minister Ehud Barak by September 2000 began to % iew the
idea of total separation between Israel and the Palestinians as unworkable and
seemed to be ready to eventually support an economic cooperation framework
with the Palestinians. See Amos Harel. Tire Charrnran Prer~s Busines.s Before
Independence, HA'ARETZ. September 13. 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew) (on file with
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Israeli politics-the Labor and the Likud parties-has been toward
more separation between Israelis and Palestinians,17" which is
supported by much of the Israeli public. 79 This phenomenon is not
surprising, though, since there is a natural tendency for rival
communities to promote separation between them through territorial
borders, which serve as unquestionable social boundaries. Ethnic
separation can be created using borders in the framework of
intractable conflict situations 8 ° The disputes between Turks and
Greeks in Cyprus and between Pakistan and India are demonstrations
of territorial separation's power as a method of resolving conflicts. If
a community believes that separation from another community will
enhance its self-preservation and its efficacy in handling conflict
situations, that community is likely to consider a separation option
seriously, since the concept is linked to the idea that each community
tries to improve its conflict management ability.38'
It is equally paradoxical for the Palestinians to complain about
closures,382 which of course lead to obvious economic hardships, '
author). For further discussion, see infra note 754.
378. See Barzilai & Peleg, supra note 2, at 59, 65, 67-69 (discussing the
increasingly polarized political policies favored by the Israeli Likud and Labor
parties and their effect on reinforcing geographic separation).
379. See id. at 65, 66, 67, 70 (providing and analyzing data on Israeli support
for policies of geographic separatism).
380. See id. at 64.
381. See id. (commenting on the trend toward separate ethnic territories
resulting from recent hostilities). However, Turkish-Greek relations, for instance,
have been improving recently since the assistance each side gave the other
following their respective earthquakes in the summer of 1999. See Taiwan 's
Disaster From Below, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 49. For further discussion on
the Cyprus situation, see infra note 580.
382. See, e.g., Hisham Dasouqi, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE:
PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 94-95 (addressing
obstacles and impediments to Palestinian-Israeli trade relations).
383. See, e.g., Bahiri, supra note 371, at 92 (maintaining that Israeli regional
economic dominance is the result of both government policies and the failure of
the Oslo accords to increase economic parity between Palestinians and Israelis);
Samir Hazboun, Politics and Economics, Closure and Separation, 3 (2)
PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL., ECON. & CULTURE 86 (1996); Khalili, in Minutes of
Conference on Labor Migration, in LABOR MIGRATION: PALESTINE, EGYPT,
JORDAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 262, at 127, 130, 131 (assessing the impact of
Palestinian labor migration on the Israeli economic infrastructure); Sadan &
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while, at the same time, demanding the establishment of a separate,
territorial entity as soon as possible."
Along similar lines, the basic freedom of movement that existed
within and between the territories of Israel before the Oslo process
began creates an interesting juxtaposition with the Palestinians'
perception of the current restrictions on their movement. ' " Israel
attributes trade and labor barriers and the resulting movement
restrictions38 6 to its security concerns, " while the Palestinians view
them as collective punishment.'
The European Union likewise permits similar restrictions on the
movement of foreigners and similar spot checks in the external
border zone of the European Union as part of its endeavors to control
Lowenthal, supra note 371, at 152; Elias Sanbar, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note
375, at 6; Radwan Shaban, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 2; Amira Hess,
Netanyahu: The Closure Was Implemented Because the Palestinian Authority Is
Not Fighting Terror, Arens: There is Securit
" 
Cooperation, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 1,
1999, at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hess, Netanvahu: The
Closure]; Amira Hess, The UN: The Closure in September Diminished the
Influence of the Inprovements i the Palestinian Econonm
" 
Since the Beginning o
the Year, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 10, 1998, at 6A (in Hebrew) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Hess, The UN]; Keeping People im Their Place, supra note 372, at 48;
Israeli Impediments, supra note 348, at 152-154.
384. See Newman, Boundaries in FhLr, supra note 60, at 1, 25.
385. See, e.g., Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Comnnon Market supra note 357, at
6A; Amira Hess, Low Expectations, Little Interest, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 2, 1999, at
3A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
386. See, e.g., Dasouqi, supra note 382, at 95 (maintaining that Israeli
restrictions are punitive rather than based on security concerns). For further
discussion of restrictions on movement of Palestinians, see supra Part VII.
387. See Arie Amon & Avia Spivak, The Oslo Peace Process: The Economic
Dimension, in IS OSLO ALIVE? supra note 132, at 40, 51 (discussing the
significance of the Oslo peace accords to the liberalization of labor markets and
the futherance of trade between Israelis and Palestinians); see also Newman,
Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 29; Sadan & Lowenthal, , supra
note 371, at 152; Amos Harel, The Closure Was Lifted From the Territories,
HA'ARETZ, Mar. 4, 1999, at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Harel, The Closure was Lifted].
388. See Arnon & Spivak, supra note 387, at 40, 51; see also Bahiri, supra note
371, at 92; Hazboun, supra note 383, at 89; Khalili. supra note 383, at 131;
Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48.
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it." Even though a border zone of twenty kilometers is allowed
under the Schengen Agreement,'" the entire German state of Bavaria
is, in essence, considered a border zone.9 ' Collective and individual
security, from a European perspective, is considered to commence
beyond the borders of the EU and continue deep inside Europe itself.
Accordingly, senior officials in Europe have supported applying the
concept of spatial geography to borders rather than the linear method,
since the latter approach is not capable, in their opinion, of
withstanding the challenges of a modem world. 9 Random checks of
trucks on the European Union side of the external borders, although
such searches generally are conducted for economic reasons, serve
additionally as a means by which the Member States can control their
borders at a level of control similar to that which they ceded with the
increased movement of goods and services in the single economic
391market.39
Just as important, an open border, with strong, economic ties
traversing it, need not imply less autonomy.9 4 An open border may
be viewed as posing a less formidable strategic threat than a closed
border-behind which a potential threat may be perceived as
lurking. ' 95 Moreover, even the existence of a border does not
necessarily imply that a state will be able to protect itself from
outside influences. 9 It was, after all, an outcome of World War 1I
that economic integration was deemed crucial to preserve peace in
389. See Bort, supra note 81, at 94. For further discussion of restrictions on
movement and spot checks in the European Union, see supra note 359 and
accompanying text.
390. For further discussion, see infra notes 834-839 and accompanying text.
391. See Bort, supra note 81, at 106 n.21
392. See id. at 94. For further discussion, see supra note 359.
393. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 21 (showing that some states
have increased the number of spot-checks on trucks behind borders).
394. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 13 (stating that the inter-state rules
of the EU protect the smaller and weaker states from being arbitrarily controlled
by the large states).
395. See Newman, Boundaries in Flux. supra note 60, at 32 (noting that open
borders may not be perceived as threatening as closed borders).
396. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 10 (providing examples of
countries, such as Serbia and Russia, whose central governments have been unable
to secure their respective border areas from outside influences).
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Europe. 9'7 The 1951 integration of the strategically important
industries of steel and coal significantly diminished the future
possibility that countries of Western Europe would confront each
other militarily.' "
The permeability alongside the rigidity, and the expansion
alongside the constriction, of borders can therefore contribute to
diverse and paradoxical border ideas, which at times are in conflict
with each other and at times are being altered, such that they
influence reality as interpreted by society and the individual."' Thus
the ensuing, and at times seemingly paradoxical, actions of both
Israelis and Palestinians to unfolding events are far from atypical. In
fact, they appear to be a natural outcome of occurrences, as further
demonstrated by similar experiences in Northern Ireland. Increasing
integration in Europe is enhancing the permeable nature of its
internal national borders in diverse ways, which raises the issue as to
under what terms, and to what extent, borders continue to constitute
an important barrier or serve a significant security role in Northern
Ireland.40 Following the creation of the border separating the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, political and administrative
difficulties for the two governments became apparent. Various
controls had to be imposed on each side of the border, and separate
397. See Joseph McKinney, Lessons from the W1'estern European Erperiencelor
North American Integration, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS?, supra note
81, at 31 [hereinafter McKinney, Lessons from the I1'estern European £rperience]
(suggesting that although the Western European powers had for some time pursued
economic integration, they did not view it as essential for maintaining peace until
after World War II). For further discussion, see in/r, notes 548, 959-964 and
accompanying text.
398. See McKinney, Lessons front the Wiestern European Erperience. %upra
note 397, at 31-32 (noting that the initial signatories to the 1951 Peace Treaty,
which established the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") were
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany).
399. See Shalit, supra note 250, at 370-75 (offering examples of people's fears
and insecurities regarding the possibility of hostile borders being crossed by the
enemy).
400. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 118 (explaining that as borders
become more permeable, some believe that the sovereign power of a state becomes
diffused, while others believe that sovereignty can be maintained). For a
background to the conflict in Northern Ireland, see supra notes 192-241 and
accompanying text.
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systems of revenue collection required that customs and excise taxes
be divided.40 ' A customs station and border post were established on
each side of the border for the sixteen different approved border-
crossings. The approximately 180 unapproved passages prohibited
commercial and vehicular traffic with limited exceptions. 40 However,
unofficial roads generally remained open and cross-border economic
controls were lax.40 ' This, incidentally, is reminiscent of the "open"
avenues usually available to the tens of thousands of undocumented
Palestinian workers who ordinarily, on a daily basis, circumvent the
legal routes via army roadblocks from the West Bank into Israel
404proper.
401. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 120 (detailing the
administrative difficulties of establishing an international border).
402. See id. Exceptions were granted, for instance, for residents living within
five miles of the border who for business reasons had to cross over to the other
side and for individuals like doctors and clergy, but to use a border crossing permit
for social reasons was prohibited. See id.
403. See id. (showing the difficulty of maintaining absolute control of an
international border).
404. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A;
Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48 (observing that the number
of undocumented Palestinians working in Israel is roughly equal to the number of
Palestinians legally employed there); see also Israeli-Palestinian Economic
Relations, supra note 347, at 2-3 (providing statistics on the number of
Palestinians working in Israel, which as of August 1998 numbered 100,000-
60,000 of whom were legally employed-and discussing the joint Israeli and
Palestinian efforts to increase the number of Palestinians lawfully employed in
Israel); see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, BACKGROUND PAPER, February 1998,
at 1-2 (1999), (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.israel-
mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOsdO)> [hereinafter ECONOMIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY] (estimating that as of
February 1998, 45,000 Palestinians were legally employed in Israel, while an
additional 20,000 to 40,000 Palestinians without work permits cross from the West
Bank into Israel each day). The Israeli army eventually suspended attempts to stop
Palestinian workers who did not have the required security permits from entering
Israel from the West Bank. See Amos Harel, Relying on the Economic Interest of
the Palestinians, Less on Preventing Infiltration, HA'ARETZ Mar. 5, 2000, at 2A
(in Hebrew) (on file with the author) [hereinafter, Harel, Relying on the Economic
Interest of the Palestinians]; cf Bigo, supra note 88, at 161 (noting that labor
needs in some economic sectors of Europe have precipitated a silent acceptance by
employers towards illegal immigrant workers). For further discussion, see infra
notes 449-450, 759-772 and accompanying text.
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Beginning in the 1960s, the border between the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland gradually became more militarized,
which paradoxically seemed in general to negate the single market
European Union's efforts to eradicate border controls under the
Maastricht Treaty.0' The communal violence that resurfaced at the
time resulted in increased border fortification by way of mobilization
of security forces and the closing of particular roads that traversed
the border. 06 The conflict's expansion in the early 1970s, in addition
to bringing direct British rule to Northern Ireland, led to the British
Army's direct involvement in border control and the establishment of
complex security fortifications for the border and the surrounding
region."
Consequently, the British security forces' all-encompassing road
closure policy, when viewed together with national goals and
obligations to enhance infrastructure such as border-traversing
tourism and roads, thus specifically appears to contravene the idea of
a single European Market since it is incongruous with the concept of
eradication of internal border controls within the European Union.
Accordingly, the majority nationalist communities on the border's
tvo sides opposed the border's reinforcement, and viewed it as
incompatible with their belief that the island of Ireland be a united
entity.& The road closures debate was a product of the internal
conflict, the setting up of the initial borders, and intermittent defiance
to the policy.4'0 Northern Ireland's major concerns regarding roads
traversing the border were concentrated in the field of security and
405. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 117-18 (explaining that
militarization of borders is a display of one of the most basic characteristics of
sovereignty, which is the claim to generate the means of legitimate violence).
406. See id. at 120-22 (providing as an example, one road that had been closed
at various times since the 1920s in response to surges in communal violence).
407. See id. at 122. Initially, Catholics looked upon the British Army as a
protector against Protestant sectarian attacks. Eventually, however, it started to be
considered by many Catholics as an "'occupying force" in Northern Ireland. See id.
408. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignt.y supra note 81. at 281.
409. See id. (noting the use of words such as "'unnatural divide," "artificial,"
"hindrance," and "illogical," among others, to showcase the negative attitude of
border residents to the border reinforcements).
410. See id. (explaining that the conflict remained largely unchanged for many
decades).
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politics,"' with anywhere between 103 and 160 of the 227 roads
subject to closure orders under the Emergency Provisions Act of
1990.412 Many saw the imperative aspect of closures of the roads,
especially when they considered the Republic of Ireland to be an area
for supply and training for deadly border assaults.4 1 Nonetheless, the
security forces of Northern Ireland and the British Army adapted the
road closure policy to address different conditions along various
parts of the border.1 4 For example, major border crossings in the
northwest contained fortified checkpoints with permanent police and
army bases while minor passage ways were blocked.4 ' In areas
where IRA activity was most prevalent, army bases were abundantly
fortified with watch towers, "microwave" fences, and high-tech
surveillance.' 6 Almost all roads traversing the border in the middle
border area were closed,4'" despite it being the poorest and most rural
border region whose economy is dependent on tourism and
411. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 120 (discussing the relation of
the border to the road network).
412. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra note 81, at 281
(setting forth disparate statistics on the number of roads subject to closure tinder
the Act, as provided by the Northern Ireland Office and the Dublin Department of
Foreign Affairs, which place the figure at 103 and 160, respectively).
413. See id. at 282 (noting that Unionist border communities and Unionist
politicians from the border areas endorsed the road closure policy as a means of
preventing IRA attacks in these areas).
414. See id. at 281-82; see also O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 122
(showing that certain areas, where IRA activity was high, were highly militarized,
while other areas, with less direct threat, were not).
415. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra note 81, at 282
(describing the border scenario in the dangerous areas compared to the less
dangerous areas); see also O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 8 1, at 122 (explaining
the buildup of fortifications along the border). On the other hand, the large system
of roads traversing the border in the eastern region basically stayed open. See
O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra note 81 at 282.
416. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra note 81, at 282
(observing that border forification policies varied by region, ranging from heavily
fortified army bases in the areas most vulnerable to IRA attacks to security
checkpoints in other border areas); see also O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at
122.
417. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereignty, supra note 81. at 282
(explaining the security measures taken in the mid-border regions); see also
O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 123.
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farrning.' Protestants in this region perceived themselves to be
particularly under the threat of IRA attacks. ' Thus, greater social,
cultural, and economic impact occurred here as compared to any
other region due to the road closures.' :"
The policy of closing roads had a particularly disparate impact on
areas containing a vastly nationalist presence in both Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 2' This probably also helped to
intensify the frequent perception among Catholics that they were at
war with British and local security forces. 22 In addition, Catholic
opposition to the border fortification policy is grounded in their
belief that the policy actually opposes both governments' declared
objectives regarding cooperation across the border. 2' Interestingly,
some Unionists also desired that additional roads not be closed due
to the negative economic impact, for example on such matters as the
region's tourism and cross-border trade.'' Some complained that the
roads were not closed for military reasons, but rather for political
purposes, specifically, that the overall security policy was part of a
greater political agenda of the United Kingdom to maintain its
territorial sovereignty over Northern Ireland.:" While the Republic of
418. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Soveregnty. supra note 81, at 282
(stating that the small settlements in Fermanagh, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan, and
Tyrone bear the brunt of the physical effects of contested sovereignty); see also
O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 123, 126 (discussing the contradiction
between the middle border region's reliance on tourism and the adverse effect that
border fortifications have on tourism).
419. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereigntv. supra note 81, at 283
(analyzing inflamed divisions in the middle border region).
420. See id. at 282 (explaining the effects of road closures); see also O'Dowd &
Corrigan, supra note 83, at 126.
421. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereigny. supra note 81, at 282
(commenting on the Nationalists' desire to see a more permeable border).
422. See id. at 283 (noting that generally Catholics are opposed to fortification
and militarization of the border).
423. See id.
424. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81. at 124-125 (summarizing the
results of a survey of councillors from Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland).
425. See id. at 125 (discussing the findings of a nongovernmental commission
which concluded that security concerns did not warrant the restrictions on freedom
of movement between the border communities caused by the road closure policy).
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Ireland's government was sympathetic to Northern Ireland's security
considerations, it too believed that road closures seriously
disadvantaged the area. 26 According to Ireland's Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the potential adverse economic and social impact of keeping
the borders closed had to be balanced against the serious security
concerns stemming from the continued campaign of violence .4  The
enhanced border fortifications appeared increasingly incongruous in
light of the European Community's efforts to eliminate controls on
internal borders.4 0 Late in 1994, cease-fires in Northern Ireland
resulted in a gradual decrease of security force presence and almost
all roads traversing the border have since been opened up. 29 While
both governments would like to take credit for the peace process and
the ensuing benefits to the border region, demilitarization is a much
slower process in the border regions than in the principal trouble
430
areas of the cities.
The border fortification issue in Northern Ireland and especially
the closing of roads traversing the border accordingly were viewed as
a physical and visual portrayal of the conflicting aims of economic
development and national security, with the Unionists and the
British, as well as the Irish government to a smaller degree, acting as
proponents of security at the expense of economic progress.4 " Border
fortification logic basically was founded on the assumption that the
IRA was safe in Ireland, using it only as a base.4"32 According to
426. See id. (commenting on the economic and social impact of road closures in
border areas).
427. See id. (implying that the region's economic difficulties stem from the
security measure taken along the border).
428. See id. at 127 (explaining that groups began to develop and organize
protests against security developments).
429. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 129 (noting that the re-opening
of the roads traversing the border was conditioned on the continuation of Northern
Ireland's peace process).
430. See id. (explaining the gradual decrease in the presence of security along
the border of Northern Ireland).
431. See id. at 123, 129 (commenting that the road closure policy contradicted
the European Community's policy of economic integration and failed to account
for national economic realities).
432. See id. at 123 (suggesting that the Irish government tolerated the IRA's
presence). But see ARWELL ELLIS OWEN, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: TilE
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Unionist leaders, closing the borders was the only way to halt the
flow of explosives and arms into Northern Ireland; security on the
border was a necessity to maintain security throughout the
province.433
It seems to be a reasonable conclusion that borders tend to be less
porous in security and policing situations than in economic
situations. In the security and policing framework, borders serve as
obstacles, while in the economic integration context they are more
like interaction areas or portals. The fortifications and road closures
on the border of Northern Ireland represent a clear expression of the
dichotomy between economic logic and security and political
indications of sovereignty.4  Ireland's paradox is that while
economic development did not appear to be a significant element in
border policy, security inspections and the closing of cross-border
roads did constitute a clear border policy, and it sharply divided the
Unionist minority and the Nationalist majority.4"At the same time,
this process on the island of Ireland seemingly contradicted both the
Maastricht Treaty language and the Single European Market effort to
eliminate internal border controls.'* ' Consequently, it allows for a
comparison to be drawn between the situation along the Ireland-
Northern Ireland border and the situation that the Israelis and
Palestinians currently face. Lest there be any doubt, however, in
other border regions throughout the world these security aspects of
territorial sovereignty have also been accorded greater prominence
than cohesive economic planning across borders"
FIRST THREE YEARS 166 (1994) (noting that the Irish government refused to
extradite those accused of committing offenses in Britain and Northern Ireland and
instead prosecuted them in Ireland). In 1987, however, the Irish Supreme Court
ruled that an IRA member could not avoid extradition to Northern Ireland for
politically-motivated crimes. See id. at 175.
433. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 123 (stating that some wanted
the border "sealed and mined").
434. See O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereigny. supra note 81, at 281;
see generally id. at 281-83 (noting that the push for sovereignty results in
increased fortifications and the push for economic integration brings them down).
435. See id. at 283.
436. See O'Dowd & Corrigan, supra note 81, at 117-18 (explaining the origins
of the British-Irish conflict).
437. See id. at 129-30 (discussing what may occur when intense
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X. ECONOMICS
In the Preamble to the Protocol on Economic Relations of the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed that the economic
realm constituted one of the cornerstones in their joint ties for the
achievement of a fair and durable peace."' Both parties consider
economic arrangements enhancing the region's socio-economic
status crucial to the success of the peace process.4"9 Further
development of economic ties between the Israelis and the
Palestinians will contribute positively to the peace process. In
similar fashion, economic events and policies played a major role in
determining whether Europe could maintain peace in the aftermath of
World War II."' At that time, observers concluded that an economic
slum is not an appropriate environment for the development of
democracy or a peaceful state; 42 a poor, resentful, and hostile country
is a clear source of problems, even if the country is weaponless.
44
'
Obviously, the character of any border between Palestinians and
Israelis will have great economic consequences and be of
considerable influence, particularly for Palestinians and on
ethnic/nationalistic fervor confronts integration in Europe).
438. See Interim Agreement, supra note 58, at Annex V.
439. See Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at I
(increasing the Palestinian standard of living is tantamount to achieving good
relations).
440. See Rouhana & Kelman, supra note 136, at 157, 176 (noting the necessary
role of economic, media, educational, and institutional links in the peace-building
process).
441. See generally Eugene Staley, The Economic Side of Stable Peace, THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 27
(Thorsten Sellin & Donald Young, eds., 1945) (positing a direct correlation
between the health of the world economy and the effectiveness of the world
security system).
442. See The German Settlement, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 1945, at 177, 178
(implying that a policy designed to carefully regulate Germany's post-war
economic recovery through deindustrialization and tight economic controls in
potential war-making industries would breed hostility in German citizens); see also
Has Labour a Foreign Policy?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 1945, at 148, 149 (pointing
out that England's Labor Party's belief in German economic reconstruction had to
include safeguards against economic power being used for aggressive purposes).
443. See The German Settlement, supra note 442, at 178.
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Palestinian economic viability."4 Following the opening of the pre-
1967 border, a high level of economic-based integration developed
between the Palestinians and Israelis with a two-directional
movement of people and goods,"5 creating two very interrelated
economies.44' Of particular significance, although it has been
diminished" due to the huge influx of foreign workers into Israel,"
444. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an "Erased" Boundary supra
note 102, at 95 (anticipating the negative impact of closed boundaries).
445. See id. at 78 (proposing market forces of supply and demand or strategic
government policy as the catalyst for economic integration).
446. See ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at I (characterizing the interrelatedness of the Israeli
and Palestinian economies); see also Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations,
supra note 347, at 2 (citing, among other statistics, that an estimated 100,000
Palestinians were employed in Israel by August 1998).
447. See, e.g., Sadan, supra note 371, at 14-15 ("'Palestinian labor in Israel is a
disappearing phenomenon").
448. See Sadan & Lowenthal, supra note 371. at 152 (explaining that Israel
issued tens of thousands of work permits to Asian farm workers and Eastern
European construction workers, which resulted in Palestinians being pushed out of
the Israeli labor market); Bahiri, supra note 371, at 93 (commenting that foreigners
are being substituted for Palestinian agriculture and construction workers); Khalili,
supra note 262, at 132; Yinon Cohen & Yitchak Haberfeld, Israelian Isic] Labor
Migration, in LABOR MIGRATION: PALESTINE, EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, supra
note 262, at 107, 109, 110; Newman, Transforning Ethnic Frontiers, supra note
66, at 29. It is as instructive as it may be interesting to draw a few comparisons
between foreign and Palestinian workers and the relative impact of each group on
Israel's economy. The Israeli economy is assisted more by Palestinians who tend
to spend much of what they earn in Israel on Israeli products than by foreign
workers who tend to send most of what they earn out of Israel. See i. Yet, in
construction, for example, it has been estimated that foreign workers cost around
50% less than their Palestinian counterparts. See Cohen and Haberfeld, supra. at
112. The economic reason proffered for this situation is that foreign workers are
less productive than Palestinian workers. See id. There are economists who argue,
however, that since foreign workers are linked to particular employers and
consequently do not function in a free market of labor, it seems more logical that
the Israeli employer is able to pay foreigners at a rate which is below their
marginal productivity. See id. This limitation does not formally exist for
Palestinians working legally in Israel. See id. In addition, the relatively expensive
cost of Palestinian workers may at least partially be attributable to the fact that the
Employment Service division of the Israel Ministry of Labor requires that
employers of legally employed Palestinians in Israel submit monthly compliance
reports detailing the wages received by each individual worker whereas employers
of foreign workers have no such restrictive obligation regarding wages paid out.
Through this manner of monitoring, the Employment Service is able to verify that
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is the integration of both legal and illegal" Palestinian workers in the
Palestinian workers' wages and fringe benefits required by law are received by
them. Interview conducted with officials of the Israel Ministry of Labor on 16
February 2000. Cf Cohen and Haberfeld, supra, at 112 (asserting that the
relatively expensive cost of Palestinian workers comes from the fact that a
government agency is responsible to collect from the employers of Palestinians
their wages and thereby pays Palestinian workers indirectly, while employers
directly pay the foreign workers, who are not as efficient as the government
agency in collecting the workers' wages and fringe benefits required under the
law). In the field of construction again, foreign workers are not directly covered by
a collective bargaining agreement according them fringe benefits, while legally
employed Palestinian workers are actually covered by it. Indeed, workers from
abroad in the construction industry are entitled under Israeli labor law to receive
benefits equal to those received by their Palestinian counterparts, however the law
is generally ignored by foreign workers' employers. See id. The role played by the
Palestinian Authority is no doubt part of the reason the Palestinian workers are
relatively protected in Israel compared to foreign workers, whose governments are
usually not as involved in protecting the rights of their citizens who work in Israel.
Be that as it may, this at least partially explains the pressure applied by Israeli
employer associations to issue work permits to foreigners irrespective of the
number of work permits issued to Palestinian workers. See id. There is also the
implication that if the cost of the Palestinian worker drops or the foreign worker's
cost rises, so that their costs are roughly equal, economically speaking, employers
will prefer less to employ foreigners than Palestinians. See id. It is important to
mention that the Government of Israel has sought to decrease the number of
foreigners working in Israel while increasing the number of legally employed
Palestinians working in Israel. See Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra
note 347, at 2; ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at I (describing the motivation for reducing the
number of foreign workers in Israel).
449. It is does not work very well, as Europe has discovered, to make border
controls and crossing regulations more stringent, as making them more stringent
rarely results in succeeding to halt the flow but rather merely increases the amount
of illegal persons in the country. See Bigo, supra note 88, at 159 (arguing that the
idea of absolute control of territorial sovereignty is obsolete in light of the high
cost and impracticality of controlling borders today). European employers
stealthily take in illegal foreign workers in answer to demands from various sectors
of the European economy like the clothing and fashion industry, public works,
restaurants and cafes, and the construction industry. See id. at 161. Rather than
prosecuting illegal workers' employers or admitting that the economy is in need of
illegal workers, official action on the part of government is limited to
pronouncements which are designed to instill a sense of security. See id. (pointing
out that governments fail to prosecute the employers of illegal workers). Similarly,
both illegal and legal Mexican workers have attempted to take advantage of
economic opportunities in the United States for generations. See Stephen J.
Randall, Introduction, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS? supra note 81, at
1, 4 (attributing economic advantages for American agriculture and industry as
incentives for the continued flow of Mexican workers into the United States). For
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410Israeli economy,45 particularly due to their geographical proximity to
large Israeli cities, which allows mass daily entrance of these
Palestinian workers into Israel.52
Income earned by Palestinian laborers in Israel significantly
contributes to Palestinian income, '" amounting to between thirty to
forty percent of the entire income of the Palestinian labor force in
19 9 8 ,45 and translated to monetary terms by the third quarter of the
year 2000 as US$1 billion annually. "55 This state of economic atairs
between the Palestinians and Israel parallels the important role
played by the repatriation of wages earned by Mexican workers in
further discussion of the Mexico-United States labor situation, see nfra notes 456,
606-607 and accompanying text.
450. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary. supra
note 102, at 78 (highlighting the fact that tens of thousands of Palestinians
comprise Israel's cheap labor supply). The European Union's single goods and
services market, for instance, also allows people from one Union Member country
to be employed in another. See Borders: Good Fences. supra note 66, at 21
(stating that European Union Members have sought ways to replace the border
control they surrendered through integration). For further discussion of the
Palestinian-Israel labor situation, see supra note 404 and accompanying text and
infra notes 756-772 and accompanying text.
451. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundarn, supra
note 102, at 78 (attributing convenient proximity as an incentive for commuting
Palestinian laborers). About five million foreign workers are within commuting
distance of the developed economy of Austria, for example. See Borders: Good
Fences, supra note 66, at 22.
452. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundar. supra
note 102, at 78. Incidentally, it is more difficult for many Palestinians to go to
Ramallah to shop or to universities in the West Bank to study than it is for them to
go to Tel-Aviv to work. See Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 49.
453. See Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at 2
(characterizing income earned in Israel by Palestinians as a pillar of the Palestinian
economy); ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at 1 (recognizing the considerable role played by
wages from labor in Israel for the Palestinian GNP).
454. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, UPDATE, MAY 25, 1998, at 1 (1999)
<hp://wv.israel-mfa.zov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0I vn0> [hereinafter ECONOMIC
RELATIONS UPDATE]. In 1992, for example, Palestinian laborers' income in Israel
amounted to 25% of the total Palestinian GNP. See Sadan and Lowenthal, supra
note 371, at 151.
455. See Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Belbre Independence, supra note
377, at 2A.
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the United States. Mexican workers provide a source of relatively
inexpensive labor for factory and agricultural employers in the
United States, which, in turn, encourages the perpetuation of labor
movement across the border. The Palestinian employment situation
in Israel benefits Israeli employers for the same reasons and in
similar industries. In addition to benefits to the Palestinian economy
brought by Palestinian labor, the Palestinian manufacturing sector
can also benefit from selling cheaply manufactured products in
Israel, which is a logical market for Palestinian goods. " Open
borders also allow Palestinian products greater access to Israeli ports,
and from there access to European, American, and even
Mediterranean markets.5 9
Moreover, permanently cordoning off the border between the two
sides would result in even more severe economic dislocation and
unemployment for the Palestinians than at present.4 65 This, in turn,
could increase the high rate of unemployment among thep • • • 461
Palestinians, further exacerbating existing internal difficulties of
456. See Randall, supra note 449, at 4 (noting the American demand for
inexpensive labor and Mexican supply of both legal and illegal workers as fueling
cross-border movements). For further discussion, see supra note 449 and
accompanying text and infra notes 606-607 and accompanying text.
457. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 180.
458. See Bahiri, supra note 371, at 93 (explaining that the Arab markets would
not provide Palestinians the same economic benefits as Israel).
459. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundary, supra note 22, at 180. But see
Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48 (commenting that the
Palestinian economy has suffered as a result of border closures).
460. See Newman, Demarcating a Boundary supra note 22, at 178 (describing
the potentially devastating effects of closing borders on an already precarious
situation); Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra
note 102, at 95 (anticipating an especially grave impact on the Palestinians due to a
lack of natural resources and a self-sustaining industrial infrastructure); Kelman,
Building a Sustainable Peace, supra note 301, at 36, 48 (stating that the border
closures have caused adverse effects on the Palestinian economy).
461. See Newman, Boundares in Flux, supra note 60, at 37; The World Bank:
The Palestinian Economy is Declining Because of the Political Situation,
HA'ARETZ, Feb. 7, 1999, at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with author) (noting that some
reports have put Palestinian unemployment in the West Bank as high as 40
percent). But see Hess: The UN, supra note 383, at 6A (estimating the Palestinian
unemployment rate to be a much lower 24.9 percent through September of 1998);
Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at 3 (noting that
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establishing the appropriate employment and industrial infrastructure
for them 62
Consequently, while open economic relations would enhance the
overall relations between the two sides, it is the Palestinians who
would be the chief economic beneficiaries of open borders with
Israel. For the Palestinians to preserve economic stability, it is
therefore paramount that they maintain a high level of economic
relations with Israel, an economic relations framework that by mid-
September 2000 was valued at some US$4 billion."' Thus, there is a
good deal of economic sense to maintaining open borders, despite
any present asymmetries
Current economic conditions between the Palestinians and Israelis,
just as those existing on the island of Ireland, would be conducive to
economic cooperation across the border." Assuming true economic
modernization and advancement is sought for the Palestinians,
Palestinian unemployment had dropped to approximately 15.5%). By mid-
September 2000, the unemployment rate in the Palestinian economy had dropped
to eleven percent. See Harel, The Chairman Preh'ers Business Belore
Independence, supra note 377, at 2A. For further discussion, see in/hr note 758.
462. See Newman, Boundaries in Flux. supra note 60, at 37 (noting the current
difficulties of creating suitable industrial and employment infrastructure); Khalili,
supra note 383, at 132-33 (discussing the obstacles imposed by high
unemployment); Ghazi, in Minutes of Conference on Labor Migration, in LABOR,
MIGRATION: PALESTINE, EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 262, at 191-92;
Ishaq Qutob, in Minutes of Conference on Labor .MIigration, in LABOR,
MIGRATION: PALESTINE, EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 262, at 181-82
discussing causes of Palestinian unemployment). Numerous problems are already
confronting Palestinian commercial establishments and these troubles are
independent of the effects closures have had on the Palestinian economy. See
Khalili, supra note 383, at 132. Some 37% of these commercial establishments
exploit only 43.5% of their capacity, only 48% of the establishments are operating
at full capacity, and about 66% of them offer no new employment opportunities.
See id.
463. See Harel, The Chairnan Prefers Business Belbre Independence, supra
note 377, at 2A.
464. See Newman, Boundaries in Fhlr, supra note 60, at 37 (presenting open
borders as the more reasonable alternative). For further discussion of the
asymmetry existing between the Israeli and the Palestinian economies, see infra
Part XII(E).
465. Cf O'Dowd et al., Borders, National Sovereigntv. supra note 81, at 275
(noting that the Irish Border contrasts the ethno-national conflict with the potential
cross-border economic integration of the region).
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cardinal requisites must be an open-door foreign investment policy
466
and trade liberalization, which are widely believed to foster
sustainable growth and promote domestic reform. 67
XI. INDUSTRIAL PARKS, JOINT VENTURE
PROJECTS, FREE/FOREIGN TRADE ZONES,
PRIVATELY FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS
Both practical and psychological advantages could be achieved for
the Israelis and the Palestinians by promoting and assisting the
establishment of industrial parks, joint venture projects, free trade
zones,468 and privately-financed infrastructure projects, which could
all be facilitated by open borders. To borrow the wise ideas of one
observer writing in the wake of World War II, barriers blocking
commerce must first be lowered for people to learn to accept and
internalize the idea of open borders. 69 Setting up new industrial
471parks 70 in the border regions, for example, would have the effect of
not only encouraging investment and trade,47 ' but also would create
466. Cf Randall, supra note 449, at 5-6 (arguing trade liberalization and
attracting foreign investment as conditions for economic modernization); see also
Sylvia Ostry, The NAFTA: Its International Economic Background, in NORTH
AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS? supra note 81, at 21, 27-28 (describing NAFTA as
an expedient to modernizing the Mexican economy).
467. See Ostry, supra note 466, at 27 (proposing Mexico's economic growth
and domestic reform as positive consequences of NAFTA).
468. See, e.g., Bahiri, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT
ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 35 (asserting that free trade
zones provide employment opportunities).
469. See Gottfried Salomon Delatour, The Problem of International
Understanding, 255 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 9 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1948) (observing that interaction
through commerce can combat ignorance and mistrust).
470. See, e.g., Ron Pundik, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 6.
471. See, e.g., Mandy Barak, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE:
PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 85.
472. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 81 (proposing industrial "border" parks
to stimulate trade and investment between Israel and the Palestinians); see also
Yossi Barnay, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES,
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 71 (suggesting the establishment of
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further employment opportunities and income for Palestinian
workers.4 7 Authorities not long ago inaugurated an industrial park at
the Karni checkpoint in the Gaza Strip, and additional parks are
envisioned in Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Nablus, Jenin, and Rafa-Kerem
Shalom.4 74 By August of 1998, approximately 3,500 people were
working at Erez, while it is anticipated that Karni eventually will
employ tens of thousands.4" Many sectors of the economy currently
promote such industrial and commercial projects .1' High-tech
industrial parks4" are planned, yet would not necessarily compete
with industrial areas like Kami, which currently cater to more
traditional heavy industries.'
Entrepreneurs could also work together to launch joint ventures"'
industrial zones).
473. See Bahiri, supra note 371, at 93: Aluf Ben, Peres Will Sign Today With
the Authority an Agreement to Open Industrial Parks in its Area, HA' ARETZ, June
21, 1999, at 2A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Industrial Parks Will Be Set Up
in the Authority, HA' ARETZ, June 22. 1999, at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with
author); Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at 3, 5 (adding
the aims to improve industrial infrastructure and promote economic cooperation).
474. See Ben, supra note 473, at 2A; hIdustrial Parks Will Be Set Up in the
Authority, supra note 473, at 5A; see also Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business
Before Idependence, supra note 377, at 2A. The income generated from the six or
seven industrial areas agreed upon by Israel and the Palestinian Authority along
the border between them is anticipated to amount to more than USSI billion
annually. See id.
475. See Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note, supra note 347, at
3, 5 (discussing the employment rates in the Karni and Erez industrial zones). The
Kami industrial area has turned out to be relatively successful, one and one-half
years following its inception, already directly employing at this early stage 1,500
workers in twenty-two factories. See The Authority Advertises the Karni Industrial
Area, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A.
476. See Aliza Arbeli, Farmers in the Negev Requested from Oron to Erport
their Produce via the Airport at Dahania, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 5, 1999, at I IA (in
Hebrew) (on file with author).
477. See id. These are to resemble the one planned for Tulkarem. See The
Authority Advertises the Karni Industrial Area, supra note 475, at 2A.
478. See, e.g., Anat Zigalman, Wertheimer will Meet with the Palestinian
Minister of Industry to Discuss the Establishment qf a High-tech Park, HA'ARETZ,
Dec. 30, 1998, at 12A (in Hebrew) (on file with author) (noting discussion
regarding a high-tech industrial area in the Kerem Shalom region, on Egyptian,
Israeli, and Palestinian ground).
479. See, e.g., David N. Goldsweig, Forwiard, INTERNATIONAL JOINT
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that would also develop additional employment opportunities. These
could be set up in "border" industrial parks or elsewhere. Such joint
ventures between Palestinians and Israelis 40 would also promote and
stimulate positive Israeli-Palestinian interaction.
In the aftermath of the establishment of the North American Free
Trade Area, an instructive example of the benefits of such joint
venture activity comes from the cooperation between large
commercial enterprises in central and northern Mexico and theirsoutem nitd Sttes . .481
southern United States counterparts. Utilizing local inputs,
manufacturers established joint ventures in Mexico, 82 such as the one
VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN
THE U.S. AND ABROAD, A CASE STUDY WITH SAMPLE DOCUMENTS vii-ix (David
N. Goldsweig & Roger H. Cummings, eds., American Bar Association 2d ed.
1990) (offering a step-by-step plan to forming a foreign joint venture); Peter D.
Ehrenhaft, International Joint Venture Basics (Part 1), 41(4) PRACTICAL LAW. 57,
58, June 1995 (identifying three strategies to access foreign markets: local
licensing, direct shipment of goods, and direct investment); Joseph F. Brodley,
Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1527-29 (1982)
(noting the advantages and disadvantages of joint ventures in the context of
antitrust law); Kathryn Rudie Harrigan, Managing Joint Ventures. Part I, MGMT.
REV. 24 (Feb. 1987) (arguing that the proliferation of joint ventures is due to
increased globalization and deregulation in the world-wide marketplace); F.
Kingston Berlew, The Joint Venture - A Way into Foreign Markets, HARV. BUS.
REV. 48 et seq. (July-Aug. 1984) (maintaining that locally administered joint
ventures benefit from preferential treatment in third world countries); Steven R.
Salbu & Richard Brahm, Planning Versus Contracting for International Joint
Venture Success: The Case for Replacing Contract with Strategy, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 283-85 (1983) (observing that international joint ventures
require innovative contracting and strategic planning); Alvin F. Lindsay Ill,
Comment, Tuning in to HDTV: Can Production Joint Ventures Improve America s
ttigh-Tech Picture?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159, 1163-69 (1990) (describing joint
ventures and their benefits, including simplifying access to new markets); Zenichi
Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint
Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 75-80 (1987) (commenting on the common
conflicts arising between a joint venture and its parent company).
480. See Pundik, supra note 470, at 6; Nasser Tahboub, in ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra
note 297, at 84.
481. See The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace, ECONOMIST, July 5,
1997, at 17, 18 (illustrating positive consequences of NAFTA); One River, One
Countty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 27-28 (describing the positive impact of
NAFTA on both American and Mexican economies in the Rio Grande Valley).
482. See The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 17,
18 (setting forth the differences between joint ventures and maquiladoras). These
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organized by Grupo Alfa of Mexico and DuPont and Guilford Mills
of the United States in the form of a "textile city" project outside
Mexico City.413 Similarly, enhanced cooperation between Palestinians
and Israelis in agriculture and industry could provide countless
mutual advantages and opportunities.4
Moreover, foreign, or "free" trade and special economic zones,
established on or near the border and elsewhere, may prove effective
in attracting foreign technology and capital, promoting international
trade and commerce, as well as providing further economic
opportunities for local workers. There are many financial benefits
joint ventures are unlike maquiladoras. Maquiladoras are located on the Mexican-
American border, operate with American equipment, take advantage of
inexpensive Mexican labor to assemble products out of duty-free materials, and
export the finished product to the United States. See One River. One C(ountrv,
supra note 481, at 51 (noting that several foreign companies, including BMW,
General Motors, and Sony, have set up maquiladoras), Gar
, 
Gerefli, Mexico's
Maquiladora Industries and North American Integration. in NORTH AMERICA
WITHOUT BORDERS? supra note 81, at 135, 137 (noting that NAFTA has led to the
proliferation of subcontracting plants on both sides of the Mexican-Amencan
border); see also The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace. supra note 48 1. at
17, 18. For further discussion of the maquiladora industry, see intro notes 488-516
and accompanying text.
483. See The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 18
(suggesting that as a result, the Mexico-United States textile and clothing industry
could one day rival that of Asia).
484. See Bahiri, supra note 371, at 93.
485. See, e.g., Thomas F. Clasen. Note, U.S. Foreign-Trade Zone
Manufacturing and Assembly: Overview and Update, 13 LAW& POL'Y I\'r'L Bus.
339, 355-66 (1981) (noting that advantages to free trade zones include limiting or
avoiding customs duties and exemptions from state and federal taxes); Peter
Herrick, Deferring and Avoiding Customs Duties: Foreign Trade Zones-Free
Trade Benefits, 56 FLA. BAR J. 416 (May 1982) (explaining that foreign free trade
zones are within United States jurisdiction and are subject to state and local laws);
Kenneth M. Horvitz & J. William McArthur, Jr., Recent Developments Favor Use
of Foreign Trade Zones as a Way to Avoid Local Tares, 63 J. TAX'N 172 et seq.
(1985) (discussing the advantages for American businesses in operating in a free
trade zone); Thomas G. Travis, Customs Classification and the Use of Foreign
Trade Zones, 11 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS, U. MIAMI J. OF IN-T'L L. 319, 328-32
(1979) (stating that there is no such thing in the United States as a free trade zone -
it is statutorily labeled a foreign trade zone).
486. See, e.g., Iran's Little Welcome Afats, ECONOMIST, October 17, 1998, at 51
(discussing the creation of free trade zones on two Iranian islands in the Persian
Gulf).
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that entice foreign investors to free trade zones, such as lengthy tax
breaks, the possibility of full foreign ownership, no customs duties
on raw materials, unlimited repatriation of capital and profit, and no
requirements to obtain a visa for entry into these special zones . For
example, the maquiladoras, primarily foreign enclaves situated on
the border between the United States and Mexico,"' have functioned
with inexpensive Mexican workers489 and equipment from America
by assembling products for exporting back into the United States out
of duty free49' imported raw materials.4' Foreign investors from
wealthy countries consider these export-geared assembly firms to be
a partnership, enhancing the manufacturers' competitiveness by
affording them the opportunity to take advantage of a country that
lacks capital, yet is able to supply much labor.4 93 The maquiladora
industry provides a comparative advantage that benefits both
Americans and Mexicans: the productivity of foreign firms increases
while Mexicans are employed. 94 The northern border area of Mexico
487. See han's Little Welcome Mats, supra note 486, at 51 (noting the
advantages and disadvantages of Iran's free trade zone); see also Clasen, supra
note 485, at 355-66 (discussing the advantages of free trade zones).
488. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 135 (commenting on the argument that
maquiladoras do not integrate into Mexico's industrial structure and merely take
advantage of the available cheap labor).
489. See One River, One Country, supra note 481, at 27 (describing the
operation of the maquiladoras); see also Randall, supra note 449, at 4
(demonstrating that the maquiladoras circumvented opposition in the United States
to exporting manufacturing abroad due to the inexpensive labor source).
490. See Deep in the Heart of NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1998, at 31
(explaining that the maquiladora assembly lines use American equipment).
491. See One River, One Country, supra note 481, at 51; Gereffi, supra note
482, at 137-38; see also The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace, supra note
481, at 18.
492. See A Greener, or Browner, Mexico? ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1999, at 26.
493. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 135-36 (maintaining that those who support
the maquiladoras consider them mutually beneficial to both foreign investors and
the Mexican workers).
494. See id. at 136. Technically, Mexican maquiladora industries cease to exist
upon creation of a North American Free Trade Area of no tariffs. The historic
purpose of the maquiladoras was to benefit from United States tariff regulations,
which permitted participating firms to acquire inputs from the United States which
were duty-free, and pay only a value added tax. See id. at 149. Thus, in a tariff-free
trade zone, the maquiladoras become economically irrelevant. See id. However,
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receives a greater amount of foreign investment than any country in
the developing world other than China."' Observers aptly describe
the economic situation that has descended upon Mexican border
cities as an "industrial invasion.""" For instance, General Motors has
built factories in the Mexican border towns of Matamoros"' and
Ciudad Juarez.49 ' Additional foreign firms, such as Matsushita, Sony,
and BMvIW, have established maquiladoras in Matamoros and
Reynosa, another Mexican border town." In addition to the
maquiladoras, smaller supply firms have also been sprouting up on
the American side of the border, in such towns as McAllen and
Harlingen, Texas, where property is less expensive." '
Just before NAFTA took effect, about 1,900 maquiladora factories
in Mexico directly employed approximately 450,000 people and
indirectly provided work for an equal number of additional people in
practically speaking, whenever political stability and sufficient infrastructure
combine with a low wage work force, assembly industries that are labor intensive
are likely to be set up. Mexico is able to provide these benefits to American firms
and thus attract investment. See id. Maquiladora exports have increased over 18%
yearly since the NAFTA came into force in 1994. See The .NIFT, Effect: When
Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 18 (noting that, economically, NAFTA has
benefited Mexico more than it has the United States).
495. See One River, One Country, supra note 481, at 27 (noting that the high
amount of in foreign investment is due to the low average cost of labor in the
maquiladoras, which is approximately USS7.00 per day). This is approximately 25
percent of the cost of labor in the United States. See Borders: Good Fences, supra
note 66, at 22. The United States, however, is not the only country investing in
Mexico; Germany and Japan also have investments there. See Gereffi, supra note
482, at 140 (noting that Germany was the number two investor followed by
Japan).
496. See A Greener, or Browner, Mexico. supral note 492, at 26 (noting
NAFTA's economic impact on Mexican border towns).
497. See One River, One Countr-, supra note 481, at 27.
498. See Deep in the Heart of NAFTA, supra note 490, at 31 (pointing out that
General Motors opened a plant as early as 1971 ).
499. See One River, One Country, supra note 482, at 27-28 (listing several
foreign conglomerates that have established factories since NAFTA).
500. See id. at 28 (describing the maquiladoras' indirect effect on the economy
on both sides of the border). Although McAllen is one of the least expensive
places to do business in the United States and is its third quickest expanding city,
the city had a 16% unemployment rate, notwithstanding a job-growth rate of 70 in
1997. See id. (explaining that NAFTA has not had an equal impact on both sides
of the border).
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supporting industries."' NAFTA unquestionably has produced the
desired outcome of bringing industries to Mexico.'02 The period
between 1994 and 1998 saw a two-fold increase in the number of
Mexican maquiladora plants"3 employing almost one million
people. 5°4 These plants contributed US$7 billion to the Mexican
economy and, after oil, constituted the nation's second largest
economic sector. 505
Jobs having some bearing on the maquiladoras, while responsible
before NAFTA came into effect for the income of over four million
people in Mexico, would be responsible, using the same analysis,
for around ten million individuals by the end of 1998. For instance,
the 187 maquiladoras in Reynosa employ 42,000 workers,5 7 while
200,000 Mexicans work in the 330 maquiladoras in Ciudad Judrez."
The economic benefits of the maquiladoras to the Mexican economy
are clear, even based on pre-NAFTA figures.9 In 1988, exports
totaled US$10.1 billion compared with US$7.8 billion in imported
inputs, resulting in a net value added figure of US$2.3 billion for
Mexico, which constituted approximately one-third of all the value
501. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 138. For further discussion of the North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), see infra notes 700-708, 715-749.
502. See A Greene, or Browner, Mexico, supra note 492, at 26 (noting that due
to NAFTA, the number of maquiladoras has doubled since 1994).
503. See id. at 26 (noting that at least 50% of the maquiladoras are located
within 100 kilometers of the United States-Mexico border).
504. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 22. This figure, according to
original forecasts, had only been projected to reach slightly more than half that
amount by the end of 1999. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 138 (noting that
original forecasts projected that the maquiladoras would employ 600,000 workers
by the year 2000).
505. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 22 (stating that many of the
factories are becoming highly technical).
506. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 138 (calculating the direct and indirect
impact of the maquiladoras on Mexican employment before NAFTA based on an
assumption of five people per family on the average).
507. See One Rivet, One Country, supra note 481, at 28.
508. See Deep in the Heart of NAFTA, supra note 490, at 31 (noting that the
maquiladoras here employ more people than any other border city).
509. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 138 (calculating the impact of the
maquiladoras on Mexican exports).
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added for all exports manufactured in Mexico."" Moreover, even
beyond the distinct economic advantages to Mexico, maquiladora
personnel frequently benefit from conditions in the maquiladora
itself that are superior to those found in their homes. '
Historically, maquiladoras constituted labor-intensive operations,
employing predominantly females at minimum wage." These
workers were primarily engaged in the garment industry and semi-
conductor and general light manufacturing.)' Recently, a second
"generation" of maquiladora firms has invested heavily in
sophisticated technology, employing an increasing number of men.
This new wave of maquiladoras shows that firms in Mexico utilizing
advanced means of production are capable of producing both high-
quality and complex exports.!'" While the original maquiladoras
consisted of basically foreign exchange-creating exporters producing
employment opportunities, the newer version has further
significantly benefited Mexico by providing the opportunity to train
and educate its workers, thereby helping it to compete more
effectively on an international scale."'
Hence, industrial parks and foreign trade zones established in
proximity to the Palestinian and Israeli border might be based, at
510. See id. (explaining that the USS2.3 billion corresponds almost entirely to
Mexican labor costs).
511. See One River, One Countr., supra note 481. at 27.
512. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 138 (describing the growth of maquiladoras.
their break-down by economic sector, and the numbers of people employed by
them).
513. See id. (noting that maquiladoras in electronic components, machinery,
transportation, and textiles employed over 300,000 people in 1989).
514. See id. at 139. Business services such as airline and bank data processing
and computer software programming have also been attracted to the maquiladora
area. See id. at 150.
515. See id. at 139 (emphasizing Mexico's capabilities to produce sophisticated
exports using advanced technology); see also Borders: Good Fences, supra note
66, at 22 (observing also that 4,000 maquiladora factories contribute USS7 billion
to the local Mexican economy).
516. See Gereffi, supra note 482, at 139 (noting that the new-style plant not
only out-performs the older type of maquiladora but also promotes enhanced
transfer of technology). This represents a clear advantage over the original
maquiladoras, which used few inputs that were locally produced and had a limited
impact on a country-wide scale. See id.
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least in part, on the economically successful maquiladora model. In
addition to the purely economic benefits that these parks and zones
can generate, a further advantage to the region would be increased
security, since it is anticipated that the parks and zones can diminish
movement of Palestinian labor into the major metropolitan centers of
Israel, ' in the sense of bringing work to the Palestinians rather than
having Palestinian workers coming to Israel.5"
Since present borders between the Palestinians and the Israelis are
so intertwined, thought might also be given to encouraging and
promoting privately-financed, trans-border infrastructure projects
that private (possibly foreign-owned) entities would maintain and
operate in exchange for the right to charge for services they render,""
and that could also employ many local people. Toll roads,
telecommunication networks, facilities for waste water treatment,
airports, and railways are some examples of possible privately-
financed infrastructure projects."52
Joint Israeli-Palestinian participation in such trans-border
infrastructure projects could contribute towards the development of
positive, beneficial relations and, at the same time, could provide
valuable assistance to the crucial and presently insufficient
development of the local Palestinian infrastructure. Regional
European Union politics, for instance, also evidences as one of its
essential factors the enhancement of infrastructure, and conformity
and integration of the infrastructure networks of communication is
one of the first aspects sought by developing cooperation across
borders.51
517. See Newman, Boundaries in Flux, supra note 60, at 45.
518. See Industrial Parks Will Be Set Up in the Authority, supra note 473, at 5A.
519. See UNCITRAL, Privately-financed Infrastructure Projects, A/CN.9/
438/Add. 1, Dec. 18, 1996, at 2 [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Privately-financed
Infrastructure Projects]. But see Francisco Letamendia et al., Astride Two States:
Cross-Border Co-operation in the Basque Country, in BORDERS, NATIONS AND
STATES, supra note 3, at 104 (contending that concentrated centers are the result of
major infrastructure internationalization rather than integrated regional
development).
520. See UNCITRAL, Privately-financed Infrastructure Projects, supra note
519, at 2 (explaining that privately funded infrastructures are complex, and their
implementation requires a strong legal framework to protect the public's interest).
521. See Letamendia et al., supra note 519, at 104 (asserting, however, that
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XII. TRANS-BORDER REGIONALISM AND
COOPERATION
A. IN GENERAL
Cross-border activities need not necessarily be undertaken by large
firms to reap advantages. For example, one scholar comments, a
prevailing trend in industrial policy is to group interdependent
firms. 2 He points out that positive economic benefits accrue from
creating economies that are regional in nature. Geographical batches
of enterprises or industrial districts can result in external advantages
to the individual producer and internal advantages for the economic
system. Additional benefits include low transaction costs that
enhance the flow of information between enterprises, making them
better equipped to more effectively and efficiently deal with
financial, production, and marketing needs. Consequently,
regionalizing economic activity may duplicate advantages gained by
large enterprises in the age of mass production. '
Applying this reasoning to Ireland, for instance, if interdependent
and intimate relations between social partners, institutions, and
commercial enterprises can occur on both sides of the border,
scholars predict a new economic atmosphere may emerge. '2 The
hope is that the system will force policy makers and social partners
to confront and work toward compromise on policy development and
issues relating to commerce and labor.52
cross-border cooperation does not enhance the local community but rather
produces large metropolitan centers).
522. See Paul Teague, Governance Structures and Economic Per/brmance: The
Case of Northern Ireland, 18(2) INT'L J. URBAN AND REGIONAL RES. 275 (1994)
(discussing the economic advantages of developing regional economies).
523. See id.
524. See id. (stating that the ultimate result is a regional cluster of small firms
connected in one way or another that have the ability to easily move in and out of
the markets, thereby reducing uncertainty and the myriad of daily problems a firm
may encounter).
525. See id. at 289 (proposing more extensive economic cooperation strategies
for the island of Ireland).
526. See id. at 290 (noting, however, that this notion may be unrealistic due to
the unstable and uncertain business environment brought about by political
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Cooperation techniques may be used to enhance complex and
awkward government structures on an inter-level, inter-functional,
and inter-regional basis.1 27 In the United States, for example, a
myriad of agencies on the local, state, and federal levels all govern
within one metropolitan area. s28 Such agencies have for many years
managed social services, employment, transportation, education, and
police on a city-region basis .12 Networking across borders between
various state branches has proliferated over the last twenty years.
As one observer, Kenichi Ohmae, comments, it is not states that are
natural engines of growth, but rather regions traversing borders.
Economists have discussed, for example, the benefits of merging
border cities in the Mexican-American lower Rio Grande Valley into
turbulence). For cluster economies to be successful, there must first be a high
degree of consensus, both politically and socially, which has not existed on the
island of Ireland. See id.
527. See James W. Fesler, The Reconciliation of Function and Area, in POLITICS
AND GEOGRAPHIC RELATIONSHIPS, TOWARD A NEW Focus 284, 285 (W.A.
Douglas Jackson & Marwyn S. Samuels, eds., 2d ed. 1971) (noting that where
there is a strong emphasis on specialization, such as in the United States,
cooperation techniques can drive specialized departments to work cohesively
while maintaining their independence). Some observers, however, have mentioned
that the merger of regions does not necessarily accrue despite their open or easily
traversed borders, since they remain borders for purposes such as legal systems,
taxation, and access to public services. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS. TERRITORY,
supra note 4, at 6. Examples of the resulting effect of the lack of region merger
despite existing requisites for border integration include the lack of interaction
between some towns located along the French-Swiss border, the lack of serious
mutual actions between some regional and local authorities of the European
Union, and the feeling of divide created by the Canadian-American border. See id.
at 6-7.
528. See Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, in POLITICS AND GEOGRAPHIC
RELATIONSHIPS, TOWARD A NEW Focus, supra note 527, at 292 (observing that
there is a duplication of functions and overlapping jurisdictions).
529. See SAUL B. COHEN, GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS IN A WORLD DIVIDED 120
(2d ed. 1973).
530. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 21 (noting that countries
around the world have joined with neighbors to battle social and economic
problems).
531. See id. at 20 (suggesting that firms develop what he terms an "Anchorage
Alaska" mentality since it is seven hours by plane from Anchorage to New York,
Tokyo, and Dfisseldorf); see also KENICHI OHMAE, TRIAD POWER, THE COMING
OF SHAPE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION 123 (1985).
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a place called the "Borderplex" which would encompass one large,
extended metropolitan area.532
Generally speaking, though, "cooperation" and "harmony" have
never been terms used as frequently as "competition" and "tension"
in describing neighboring border regions. "' The scope of cooperation
between states has often mirrored the nature of the relationships
between bordering areas,3 4 which is not surprising, since borders are
an integral part of the areas they encompass.
A significant step to bringing political stability between two sides
in conflict is to apply policies designed to enhance regional
management and cooperation.36 Although border altercations can
occur even when both sides are seeking peace, the reduction of such
altercations still remains a useful barometer for determining political
relations. What transpires culturally, socially, and economically in
these confrontational regions of the border may constitute an
important factor in determining whether the implementation of peace
agreements will provide long-term stability."_ Accordingly, since the
degree and nature of, and importance attached to, cooperation across
borders is a significant gauge of reconciliation,"' border regions are
viewed by some observers as "laboratories" for the rest of the
532. See One River, One Countrv
" 
supra note 481. at 52.
533. See Niles Hansen, Iternational Cooperation in Border Regions: An
Overview and Research Agenda, 8(3) INT'L REGIONAL SCIENCE REV. 255, 265
(1983); see also Richard R. Fagen, The Politics of the United States-Mexico
Relationship, in U.S. MEXICO RELATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPEc-rs 331,
341 (Clark W. Reynolds & Carlos Tello, eds. 1983) (noting that many academics
continued to view Mexico-United States relations in terms of"we/they").
534. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 255. A border is a shifting area where
people of diverse cultural backgrounds and identities come together and interact
with one another. See Henk Driessen. At the Edge of Europe: Crossing and
Marking the Mediterranean Divide, in BORDERS, NATIONS AND STATES, supra
note 3, at 179, 181 (contending that a society's identity is reflected by shifts and
changes in the border areas). See generally. Wilson, supra note 81, at 200
(describing borders as a place for integration and cultural encounters).
535. See Anderson, European Frontiers. supra note 5, at 6 (describing the
territorial border as a European invention).
536. See Newman, Transforning Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 32.
537. See id. at 17.
538. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 255.
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world53 9 These border regions are the place where selective images
first give way, eventually reaching the centers and economic cores of
the state.
40
In some border regions, the likelihood for regional cooperation is
evidenced by the fact that the inhabitants on both sides are ethnically
similar, such as those in the respective Spanish and French Basque
• 541
regions. Many other border regions, however, such as along the
Mexico-United States border, and in many areas of Europe, are
replete with differences in administrative organization and economic
systems, cultures, histories, and languages.5 42 Conflicts often broke
out due to these dissimilarities. 4 ' The common history of Mexico and
the United States has been one of hostility.' 4 For instance, in the
nineteenth century, Mexicans and Americans battled fiercely over
territory in the American-Mexican war.5 ' The long-standing conflict
between Catholics and Protestants, as well as the battles between the
Germanic and Latin people of Europe, also may be recalled.' 6 In
addition, now kindred Denmark and Sweden also had a long, violent
history of warfare, particularly in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and1 47
nineteenth centuries. It eventually took the calamity of a World
539. See Foucher, supra note 81, at 237 (defining borderlands as areas where
free movement of goods occur).
540. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 28
(discussing the important elements in the process of transforming a conflict
situation into one of peace: the degree of economic cooperation across the border,
patterns of geographic ethnicity in the abutting border regions; and the character of
the border's military presence).
541. See Letamendia et al., supra note 519, at 103 (discussing the new political
ties that have emerged in the Basque country, an area located on the French-
Spanish border); see also Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 65 (noting that an
integrated region emerges due to ethnic similarities).
542. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 256; see also Strassoldo, supra note 81, at
88 (noting that the same factors, such as culture and ethnicity that may give rise to
integration may also give rise to conflict).
543. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 256.
544. See The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 48 1, at 18.
545. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 256. For further discussion, see infra notes
878-903 and accompanying text.
546. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 258.
547. See Hogg, supra note 81, at 11 A.
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War II for the European nations to realize that economic integration
is a prerequisite for maintaining peace.
B. EUROPE
Despite Europe's turbulent history, local and regional cooperation
across borders has transpired on the continent.' Differences
remained and border disputes still ensued due to cultural,
administrative, and legal differences that constituted obstacles to
cooperation involving matters such as transportation infrastructure,
industrial competition, commuting workers' status, nuclear power
plant locations, and environmental pollution."" However, the
expansion of commerce and industry, together with the ever-
increasing amount of transactions and traffic between European
border areas, made it clear that these border areas could not
effectively function without increased cooperation between bordering
states.5 ' Some of the major issues that exemplified the point that
external factors did not cease at a border separating a region merely
because they were located in different states "  were: planning with
respect to land use,"' commuting workers crossing borders,"4 public
health,"' transportation, 56 pollution of the environment, "" and
548. See McKinney, Lessons from the Western European Evperience. supra
note 397, at 31, 60 (juxtaposing Western European economic integration against
North American efforts). For further discussion, see supra notes 397-398 and
accompanying text and infra notes 959-964 and accompanying text.
549. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 256.
550. See id. at 266.
551. Seeid.at260-61.
552. See Letamendia et. al, supra note 519, at 93 (examining the close
relationship between the Spanish Navarra and Basque Autonomous Community
and the French Basques in Aquitaine).
553. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261; see also James W. Scott, Transborder
Cooperation, Regional Initiatives, and Sovereigntv Coiy:licts in Western Europe:
The Case of the Upper Rhine Valley, 19 (1) PUBLIUS THE JOURNAL OF
FEDERALISM 139, 143 (Winter 1989) [hereinafter Scott, Transhorder
Cooperation].
554. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 62; Scott, Transborder Cooperation,
supra note 553, at 143; Hansen, supra note 553. at 261.
555. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261.
556. See Scott, Transborder Cooperation. supra note 553, at 143 (discussing
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differences concerning education and legal systems.ix In the 1970s,
as a response to such trans-border issues, initiatives were undertaken
to broaden local and regional cooperation.5-9 Ministers in charge of
regional planning, in conjunction with regional and local authorities
in border areas, created, under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
a European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation
between Territorial Communities or Authorities. In 1979, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe endorsed the
Outline Convention and opened it for signatures the following year."4,
This Outline Convention set forth new judicial principles and models
for trans-border linkages. 6' In Europe, cooperation across borders
had been considered implicitly as developing interaction. Such
interaction generally evolves from an informal network of contacts
into increasingly complex solidified arrangements. Based on the
then-existing cooperation schemes which traversed borders, sixteen
fields of possible cooperative relationships were suggested, which
included tourism, development of industry, energy, communications
and transport, culture, commuting workers, disaster relief,
environmental protection, health, development of regional and urban
areas, and education.562 It appears probable that efforts to improve
economic infrastructure in border areas will remain strong while
cross-border planning in the creation of communications and transportation
infrastructures which are integrated tri-nationally); Hansen, supra note 533, at 26 1.
557. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 62; Letamendia et al., supra note 519, at
93; Scott, Transborder Cooperation, supra note 553, at 143; Hansen, supra note
533, at 261; see also Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 2 1.
558. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261.
559. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at I (pointing out that at
this time, cross-border exchanges of people, goods, and information increased).
560. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 264.
561. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 12 (detailing the cross-border
regional cooperation). However, the Outline Convention, practically speaking, did
not have a significant effect, since Western Europe was still divided as to the exact
character of linkage between national sovereignty and economic integration. See
id.
562. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265. Even though the initiatives had to be
locally developed, it seemed apparent, nonetheless, that national governments
would have to lend their support and become involved in matters such as long term
planning, environmental protection, and infrastructure integration. See Scott,
Transborder Cooperation, supra note 553, at 155.
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significant border region investment plans have been considered
between neighboring European countries."
European Union Member States have committed themselves to
common policies regarding health and safety matters, competition,
state aid, trade, professional qualification, protection of the
environment, and other areas.5 As an example, in order to preserve
naturally beautiful and untouched areas from industrialization and
modernization and maintain them, joint border crossing projects have
been developed to protect the landscape. ' The Rhine River region,
an area where borders reflect not so much natural physical and
geographic features as they do diplomatic schemes and conquests of
the past,566 has generated international cooperation between bordering
states: Along the Rhine, on the borders of Switzerland, Belgium,
Germany, Holland, and France from the 1950s.'" cooperation has
turned into a tradition. 6" Local authorities have established
cooperation methods for river regulation, protection, and economic
utilization. 70 Trans-border labor markets, for example, emerged at
the Swiss borders at Basel and Geneva.' 1 Economic and political
cooperation is also prevalent in the Scandinavian and Alpine
vicinities, 72 while both formal and informal cooperation is occurring
563. See Letamendia et al., supra note 519, at 105 (noting examples of such
plans pertaining to waste disposal, environmental protection, communications,
transportation, and tourism).
564. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY. supra note 4. at 188 (noting that
other improvements have occurred in the regulatory. judicial, and legislative
areas).
565. See Bort, supra note 81, at 99 (listing recycling, sewage treatment, and
refuse clean up as some of these projects).
566. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261.
567. See Scott, Transborder Cooperation. supra note 553. at 143.
568. See O'Dowd and Wilson, supra note 3. at 12.
569. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 52 (noting how European nations have
employed concerted action, collaboration, and exchanges of information to
achieve mutually beneficial goals); see also Anderson, European Frontiers, -upra
note 5, at 1.
570. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 52.
571. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5. at 1 (providing a general
context within which trans-border cooperation has taken place).
572. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 52 (discussing prncipal aspects of
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in Eastern and Central Europe as well."73 For instance, the Friuli-
Venezia Giulia autonomous area, which is the interface between the
Slav, Latin, and German culture areas, wants to serve as a bridge
between Italy and the countries bordering it to the east, starting with
Croatia and Slovenia. Partners in cooperation across the border also
included Styria and Carinthia, Austria. An interregional, though
informal, policy evolved for the Friuli-Venezia Giulia area." ' First,
Trigon appeared, which was an informal, private regional planning
group made up of these members. Trigon's objective was to agree on
joint economic and infrastructure ideas for regional development.
From this entity evolved Alpe Adria, which local and regional
European border area authorities created as a "working
committee. 5 75 Alpe Adria added to its existing members Veneto,
Italy, Upper Austria and Salzburg, Austria and provided a forum for
members to consider and discuss issues related to the management of
the environment, regional planning, agriculture, sports, science,
culture, transportation, social affairs, forestry, tourism, and health.5
71
The Friuli-Venezia Giulia situation may be particularly instructive
for Israelis and Palestinians, since it, too, has been a very complex
issue, and cooperation across the borders there has grown out of
circumstances which were extremely tragic and unfortunate. Friuli-
Venezia Giulia has been the point of contention between the powers
of the Mediterranean Sea (particularly Venice and later Italy) and the
powers of Central Europe (specifically the Hapsburg Empire). Thus,
disputes regarding the borders abounded between these powers and
wars succeeded in drastically altering them. Although the borders
had divided the same populations for over four hundred years, the
cooperation in the Alps-Adria Working Committee).
573. See id. at 56 (discussing the renewed relations between Central and Eastern
Europe).
574. See Strassoldo, supra note 81, at 77-78 (discussing the position of the
region of Fruili-Venezia in the field of cross-border cooperation).
575. See id. at 79 (explaining that the primary purpose of the Alpe-Adria
working committee is to provide a forum for discussion with few executive
functions, however, the committee is responsible for organizing support and
fostering participation in events).
576. See id. at 80 (describing the make up of the working program at Alpe
Adria); Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 53 (citing the six Standing Commissions
created by the Alps-Adria Working Committee).
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two World Wars exacerbated the existing national minorities
problem, with various territorial claims resulting in violent conflictf'
Coercive minority cultural absorption and severe suppression erupted
into "ethnic cleansing," massacres, and genocide." Hundreds of
thousands of civilians were forced to escape from their occupied
homelands while the festering border dispute and mutual
apprehensions and animosity continued to rage.' ' It was not until the
1960s that a new generation, not having experienced the atrocities of
war and Fascism themselves, began to grow up with changed
feelings to their neighbors across the border. Since these altered
attitudes were also those of individuals holding important political
positions, cross-border interaction eventually resumed again between
local authorities. Joint economic interests, cultural values, and social
contacts were considered, and relations across the border once more
turned cordial *
577. See Strassoldo, supra note 81, at 76 (specifying the border region of Italy
between Tarvis and Gorizia as a particularly contentious spot for territorial
disputes).
578. See id. at 76-77 (explaining that Yugoslavia Marshall Tito's claims to
portions of Italy late in World War II resulted in raging internal warfare amidst
various factions of anti-Nazi partisans).
579. See id. at 77 (noting that approximately 350,000 people fled Yugoslav-
occupied lands between 1945 and 1953).
580. See id. (explaining that the generation that came of age in the 1960s had
not experienced the war first-hand and thus had a cooperative attitude towards
their border neighbors). Another divided area that has known much conflict and
animosity on both sides of a divide is Cyprus, located an hour flying time from
Israel and the Palestinians. One of the most tightly kept of all secrets there was the
occurrence of regular trade meetings on the island's Greco-Turkish partition line
between farmers from each side to buy and sell animals. See Borders: Good
Fences, supra note 66, at 20 (discussing the fact that borders have not always been
favored by everybody). Moreover, during his visit to Greece earlier this year, the
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that the Greek Prime Minister had
accepted his invitation to visit Turkey. This visit had been preceded by a visit of
the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey one month earlier. The Prime Minister of
Greece Will Visit Turkey, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 6, 2000, at 9A (in Hebrew) (on file with
author). The mutual good feelings that have developed between Greece and
Turkey have led to discussions regarding the over-all improvement of relations
between the two, and in particular the extension of Greek support for acceptance
of its long-time enemy, Turkey, as a member of the European Union. See Greece
Supports Accepting Turkey into the European Union, HA'ARETZ September 14,
1999, at 9A (in Hebrew) (on file with author). For further discussion concerning
the relations between Greece and Turkey with regard to Cyprus, see supra note
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Even though the basic catalyst for cooperation across borders is
considered to be economic development, such cooperation may
frequently be enhanced by similar ethnic or language groups located
on either side of the border."8 ' This principle is well demonstrated in
Europe in places such as the Swiss, Austrian, and German-speaking
region, the French-speaking region of Belgium along the French
border, and Scandinavia.12 Likewise, several Eastern Europe nations
380 and accompanying text.
581. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (discussing cooperation activities in
border areas).
582. See id. at 261 (discussing how similar ethnicities have generated
cooperation in this area). The herding of reindeer in the Scandinavian nations
illustrates this point. Swedish Laplanders were allowed during particular times of
the year to cross Finnish territory when moving with their reindeer herds for the
purpose of exercising their grazing rights in Norway along specified tracks, in
accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Convention Between Finland and Sweden
Concerning Reindeer in Frontier Districts of May 9, 1925. See 47 L.N.T.S. 301
[hereinafter Finland-Sweden Convention]; see also BOGGS, supra note 21, at 100
(noting that concerns over weather and usable pastures necessitate cooperation
between these countries). The specified tracks were normally three kilometers
wide. See Finland-Sweden Convention, supra, paragraph 2, at 301.. Similarly,
Norwegian nomadic Lapps migrating with their reindeer herds at appointed places
and times were permitted to cross Finnish territory, and migrating Finnish Lapps
were to be allowed, in accordance with detailed rules, to use roads crossing
Norwegian territory, pursuant to Article 29 of the Convention Between Finland
and Norway Regarding Measures to be Taken in Order to Prevent Reindeer from
Crossing the Frontier Between the Two Countries of Nov. 5, 1935. See 169
L.N.T.S. 57, 69 [hereinafter Finland-Norway Convention of 1935]; see also
BOGGS, supra note 21, at 100-01 (discussing provisions of the Convention that
relate to reindeer migration and grazing). According to a treaty between Sweden
and Norway, Swedish Lapps had special rights in a long piece of territory along
the border for their herds to graze. See id. at 101 (highlighting the grazing rights
provided for Swedish Lapps as a result of the treaty between Norway and
Sweden). North of the Arctic Circle, the Finnish-Norwegian border is largely
uninhabited. See id. at 103. Residents dwelling on the shores of specified rivers in
Norway and Finland had permission to cross into the territory of the other state in
the vicinity of the frontier without unnecessary hindrance under Article V of the
Convention between Finland and Norway, Concerning the Passage of Travelers
Over the Pasvik (Patsjoki) and the Jakobselv (Vuoremajoki) of Apr. 28, 1924. See
30 L.N.T.S. 46, 47 [hereinafter Passage Convention]; see also BOGGS, supra note
21, at 104 (discussing the lack of unnecessary formalities for cross-border travelers
in that region). Furthermore, Finnish and Norwegian travelers had use of the rivers
in the territory of both states as necessary for their journey. See Passage
Convention, supra, Article I, at 46; see also BOGGS, supra note 2 1, at 103.
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reached agreements allowing trans-border traffic. ' "
Border regions tend to advance slower than interior regions or
those with sea access. Cross-border cooperation and integration are
therefore more in accordance with the functioning and organization
of modem business than with conflict and isolation." As a result, the
European Union's eastern border members, for instance, may be in
favor of cross-border cooperation in order to receive assistance to
their own economies, which were seriously handicapped
economically due to their many years under the influence of the Iron
Curtain. '85 By sharing resources across borders, states are able to
utilize their joint potential in information, research, and education
and thus partially mitigate a border's negative effects by developing
583. See BOGGS, supra note 21, at 101-02. For example, Frontier traffic between
Yugoslavia and Hungary, consisting of specified articles and products, received
special privileges under Article 2, Annex A of the Treaty of Commerce Between
the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of
July 24, 1926. See 97 L.N.T.S. 103, 117 [hereinafter Yugoslav-Hungarian
Commerce Treaty]; see also BOGGS, supra note 21, at 101-02 (stating the articles
and products enumerated by the Treaty). Additionally, livestock driven to pasture
across the border from one frontier zone to the other were exempt from import and
export duty charges, provided they return to their country of origin at the end of
each day. See Yugoslav-Hungarian Commerce Treaty, supra, Article 5(a), Annex
A, at 121; see also BOGGS, supra note 21, at 102 (describing the terms of the
treaty, including that the exemption duties applied to any young born or products
derived from the pastured animals while they were in the neighboring temtory).
The frontier zones established on both sides of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border
were approximately ten to fifteen kilometers in width. See Yugoslav-Hungarian
Commerce Treaty, supra, Article 1, Annex A, at 117; see also BOGGS. supra note
21, at 101.
584. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 257 (comparing the evolution of modern-
day business with border region relations). Some observers, however, have
mentioned that the merger of regions does not necessarily accrue despite their
open or easily traversed borders, since they remain borders for purposes such as
legal systems, taxation, and access to public services. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS.
TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 6. Examples of the resulting effect of the lack of
region merger despite existing requisites for border integration include the the lack
of interaction between some towns located along the French-Swiss border, the lack
of serious mutual actions between some regional and local authorities of the
European Union, and the feeling of divide created by the Canadian-American
border. See id. at 6-7.
585. See Bort, supra note 81, at 99, 101 (explaining how Eastern European
countries may benefit from cross-border cooperation with their Central and
Western European economic partners by receiving economic assistance to their
economies that suffered as a result of Communist domination).
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innovation and transfers of technology, and creating regional
businesses. 86 Accordingly, European border regions have benefited
through cross-border cooperation operating in conjunction with
interaction and joint interest zones. 87 European border cooperation,
moreover, facilitates the integration of civil society... and the
elimination of controls on the border has prompted the development
of further European cooperation along the borders 9
Although regional and local cooperation across borders is a central
tenet of Western European integration, it extends beyond the
boundaries of the European Union:" Not only has the European
Parliament consistently emphasized the importance of cooperation
among internal border areas for European Union development, but
also the importance of interacting with the Eastern European states
bordering the EU. Regional and local projects are the foundation for
"Euregios" created on the eastern border of the European Union.
Working and living close to half a century in the Iron Curtain's
proximity with "dead-end" transportation systems, the populations of
these regions developed a mutual peripheral experience.9
Cooperation between economic and social organizations, local
officials, municipalities, and regions is now abundant across the
European Union's borders. 92 Regional cooperation across borders
with Eastern Europe may, as a matter of fact, be the most productive
way to promote the establishment of democratic systems.59 ' Yet,
586. See Scott, Transborder Cooperation, supra note 553, at 149.
587. See id. at 140.
588. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 52 (setting forth additional benefits to
inter-regional cooperation, such as the effect of bringing societies closer together).
589. See O'Dowd & Wilson, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing the positive effect
of the EU borders program and the abolition of border controls).
590. See Bort, supra note 81, at 98 (explaining that the institutionalization of
regional and local cooperation across borders was viewed as important along the
eastern EU border, as well).
591. See id. at 99 (describing the increased opportunities to interact with
neighboring countries that Eastern European states behind the Iron Curtain were
unable to experience over a fifty-year period).
592. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 190.
593. See Bort, supra note 81, at 103 (suggesting that democratic systems in
Eastern Europe stand the best chance of of being set up through cross-border
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cross-border cooperation is not only a potentially useful tool for
encouraging the Eastern European's struggling democracies. It may
also ensure that human resource development, the enhancement of
which is essential to the development of Eastern and Central
European economic and societal change, occurs through an exchange
of experiences and information.
Moreover, the way to diminish, if not resolve, ethnic troubles is by
regional cooperation across borders.: Regionalism across borders
demonstrates that a regional framework may be more appropriate for
handling national minority issues and finding solutions for
international disputes of a regional character.' Various types of such
cooperation have been shown to reduce both current and potential
disputes between different national and ethnic groups over
territory."'
C. MEXICO-UNITED STATES
In similar fashion to that of adjacent European border areas, the
border between Mexico and the United States, which spans the
continent of North America for approximately two thousand miles,'
also has witnessed more competition, strife, and tension than
cooperation, integration, or harmony.! While at times this border
cooperation in developing a "bottom-up" approach and directly addressing
problems with infrastructure).
594. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 66 (arguing why more trans-border
cooperation is needed).
595. See id. at 65 (observing that in regions of Italy, the lack of tension among
ethnic minorities stems from the presence of trans-border cooperation). Many
ethnic minority populations are located on the borders of states. See hi.
596. See Bort, supra note 81, at 100 (describing the potential benefits of cross-
border cooperation in a regional context).
597. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 68 (suggesting that cooperation helps
adjust cultural and economic imbalances).
598. See, e.g., Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Ties That Bind: "Silent Integration"
and Conflict Regulation in U.S.-Mexican Relations, 26(2) LATIN AM. RES. REV.
261, 261 (1991) (discussing divisions between Mexico and the United States).
599. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265 (comparing how differing priorities
between the United States and Mexico have led to conflict between them); see also
JOHN W. HOUSE, FRONTIER ON THE RIO GRANDE, A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL DEPRIVATION 255 (1982) (establishing that diffenng
positions between the United States and Mexico have caused the countries to be
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600
acts as a barrier, it nevertheless functions more frequently as a
membrane through which people, goods, and services pass,',' both
for good and for bad. That is, between towns situated on the
Mexican-American border it is porous for traffic and trade, 60 2 yet also
allows a seemingly endless flow of illegal workers, illicit narcotics,
and contraband goods.6 °3
As an initial matter, each of the two countries tends to view border
issues in a divergent light, applying different levels of importance to
mutual border issues.' For instance, the United States loathes the
smuggling of narcotics over the Mexican-American border, °' the
hesitant in their interactions with one another); Middlebrook, supra note 598, at
261 (providing various sources of strife between Mexico and the United States);
Olga Pellicer de Brody, A Mexican Perspective, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES
RELATIONS, supra note 50 at 4, 12 (citing the negative effects of United States'
direct foreign investment in Mexico resulting from their geographical proximity).
600. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 24 (describing a variety of uses
for borders in countries around the world).
601. See John W. Sloan & Jonathan P. West, Community Integration and
Policies Among Elites in Two Border Cities, Los dos Laredo, 18 J.
INTERAMERICAN STUD. WORLD AFF. 451 (Nov. 1976); see also Wilson & Donnan,
supra note 81, at 22 (citing various reasons for crossing borders in countries
throughout the world); CLINE, supra note 51, at 10 (establishing that the border
allows for the travel of people, goods, and ideas). There are annually some 280
million legal crossings of the Mexico-United States border, which makes it one of
the world's most traveled-over borders. See Embassy of Mexico, Relations with
the U.S.: Continuing Dialogue and Cooperation 4 (December 1998)
<www.embassyofmexico.ory/> [hereinafter Relations with the U.S.].
602. See One River, One Country, supra note 481, at 51 (describing the relative
ease with which traffic and trade cross between towns along the Mexican-
American border).
603. See id.; see also Middlebrook, supra note 598, at 261 (describing the
bilateral dilemmas between the United States and Mexico).
604. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265 (comparing the way that differing
priorities between the United States and Mexico have led to conflict between
them); see also HOUSE, supra note 599, at 254-55 (observing the different
priorities attached to various border-related matters); Middlebrook, supra note
598, at 261 (explaining that differences in language, culture, and perspective lead
each country to place on border issues different levels of importance); Pellicer de
Brody, supra note 599, at 12 (arguing that mutual understanding of each country's
perspective will foster mutual respect).
605. See, e.g., Excelentisimo Clinton, ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997, at 30
(describing drugs as a security threat and pointing out that most of the illicit
narcotics coming into the US go through Mexico); see also Mexico " Drug
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economically deleterious effects of undocumented workers from
Mexico working in the United States,'' " placed at more than 2.5
million undocumented workers from Mexico working in the United
States,67 and the harmful effects of cross-border pollution to the
United States' environment." Mexico, for its part, has been more
preoccupied with such issues as the border area's reliance on the
United States' more powerful economy," " Mexican workers' access
Menace: Poison Across the Rio Grande, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15. 1997, at 36 (noting
that 14,000 people die annually in the United States from drugs, that the United
States has spent USS100 billion since the 1980's in attempting to control the flow
of illicit narcotics, and that the indirect cost of drugs amounts to USS67 billion
annually); Hansen, supra note 533, at 265: HOtSL. siqra note 599, at 255
(explaining that the United States regards drug trafficking from Mexico as an issue
of utmost importance); The NAFTA Effect. 1i'hen Neighhors Embrcwe supra note
481, at 19 (citing Congress' concerns over approval of NAFTA due to a past
history of drug trafficking across the border), Borders: Good P:ences, supra note
66, at 22 (noting the ineffectiveness of the 100-kilometer "tortilla curtain" erected
by the United States along the Rio Grande, the growth of the United States' Border
Patrol which by the end of 1998 was 7,000 agents strong, which is double the
number as in the past, and the tripling of the Border Patrol's budget between 1993
and 1999 to USS4.2 billion).
606. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265 (explaining that the consequences of
Mexican immigration are detrimental to the United States): see ailso HOtUSi, supra
note 599, at 255 (stating that the United States is concerned about undocumented
worker inflow from Mexico); The NAFTA Effect. When Veighbors Embrace, supra
note 481, at 21 (discussing the sentiments of NAFTA's critics), Bruce M. Bagley,
A United States Perspective, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELAT IONS, supra note
50, at 13, 16 (reporting sociological findings, however, that undocumented
workers fill jobs that American workers are unwilling to take due to such factors as
poor working conditions, cyclical seasonal employment, and low salaries).
607. See Excelentisino Clinton, supra note 605, at 30 (describing illegal
immigration as a security threat while pointing out that more than I UU,00U) legal
immigrants annually enter America). Observers have suggested that it may be
difficult for Mexico to take action to reduce illegal immigration. See Sydney
Weintraub, U.S. Foreign Policy and Mexican Imnnigration, in AT THE
CROSSROADS: MEXICO AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 28.3, 288 (Frank D. Bean
et al., eds. 1997). Yet, NAFTA may help to create enough economic incentive in
Mexico to discourage illegal immigration into the United States.
608. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265 (stating that the United States' close
geographical proximity to Mexico has made cross-border pollution a problem); see
also HOUSE, supra note 599, at 255; Excelentisinio Clinton, supra note 605, at 30
(establishing that Mexico's pollution problem along the common American-
Mexican border inevitably affects the United States and has turned into a security
threat).
609. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265 (explaining that Mexico attaches
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to the United States1 ° and exploitation there,61' national and borderregin baa ceof •611
region balance of payments, United States goods being smuggled
into Mexico, 63 Gulf of Mexico fishing rights regulation for
Americans,614 and water resource control and access, including
control of and access to supplies of groundwater.
Unruly issues consequently surface out of the intense economic
and social dichotomy existing between an extremely wealthy country
bordering an extremely poor country.6  Given the tremendously
different levels of affluence between the two countries, the United
different priorities to border problems than the United States); see also HOUSE,
supra note 599, at 255 (describing one category of Mexican-American border
problems as arising from the interaction between a rich country and a poor one,
including the migration of Mexicans northward, commodity smuggling in both
directions, and polarization of trade and retailing).
610. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 255 (observing that Mexicans prioritize
issues such as access of Mexican workers, including "border commuters," to the
United States).
611. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265.
612. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 255.
613. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 265 (discussing Mexico's concerns over
border issues with the United States); see also HOUSE, supra note 599, at 255
(explaining that preventing smuggling is a priority for Mexico). NAFTA's
implementation, however, may have an effect on Mexico's concern about
smuggling.
614. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 255.
615. See id. Disputes revolving around the quality and equitable distribution of
limited water resources unquestionably will intensify and be aggravated due to
progressive development in the dry border region. See Hansen, supra note 533, at
265-66); see also HOUSE, supra note 599, at 131-32 (remarking on an older study
revealing that half of the summer water consumed in a United States border city
was for lawn irrigation, while Mexicans on the other side suffered shortages in
both domestic and industrial water supplies).
616. See HOUSE, supra note 599 at 255 (describing mass migration, labor
market disparity, smuggling, and price and quality disparity of goods and services
resulting from unequal economic conditions of the United States and Mexico); see
also ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 127
(noting the divergence in living standards between the United States and Mexico,
and the attractiveness of the United States for criminal activity because of the
opportunities it offers to reap large profits). For further discussion on the general
impact of asymmetrical economic relationships, see infra Part XII(E).
617. See Fagen, supra note 533, at 341 (commenting on the great difference in
wealth between the United States and Mexico). A store attendant in Brownsville,
Texas, for example, earns more than a graduate engineer just over the border in
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States has a much greater effect on the Mexican economy and society
than does Mexico on that of the United States."'" The unavoidable
consequence of this fact is that the United States will always be more
important for Mexico than the Mexico will be for the United States."
An additional result of this divergent economic situation has been the
quality and price differential in retailing and trade, smuggling of
goods, labor market distortions, and migration to the north."
Cultural, legal, and administrative differences regarding all these
issues have not only resulted in obstacles to cooperation, as in
Europe,"' but also to conflict -
Yet, along the Mexican-American border, with its over 300
percent population increase since 1980,'23 there has been a common
appreciation6 24 of the two countries' mutual dependence on one
another.62 This mutual dependence has developed considerably since
Matamoros, Mexico. See One River, One Countrv. supra note 481, at 27
(explaining that the difference in wages remains the primary distinction between
Mexicans and Americans in border cities in the lower Rio Grande Valley).
618. See Fagen, supra note 533, at 332 (discussing the impact the United States
has on the Mexican economy, culture, and society).
619. Seeid. at331.
620. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 255 (listing problems arising from
interaction between the Mexican and American economies).
621. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 266 (comparing barriers to cross-border
cooperation in Europe, the United States, and Mexico). Interestingly, as significant
as differences in culture may be, variances have in fact created unique cooperation
opportunities. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 133 (relating that in the area of solid
waste disposal, Americans create much more waste per capita than Mexicans, and
that Mexicans on both sides of the border have gathered discarded materials such
as tires, cardboard, used appliances, and lumber to use in small manufacturing
firms and homes, making for informal recycling).
622. See Fagen, supra note 533, at 341 (discussing the existence of conflicts and
tensions arising from conflicting interests).
623. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 22 (stating that the number of
people living on the Mexican-American border has increased from 3.5 million
people in 1980 to 12 million by the end of 1998).
624. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (observing the acknowledgement of the
necessity to handle trans-border problems jointly).
625. See Purcell, supra note 50, at 1 (noting that in the late 1970s, United States
commentators spoke of interdependence, but that Mexicans questioned whether
that was truly possible given the two countries' asymmetrical relationship),
Bagley, supra note 606, at 17 (highlighting differences between Mexican and
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the 1970s, especially in the border region, expanding in technology,
migration of labor, trade, and investment. Cooperation across the
border also has taken place between regions extending to economic
and social organizations, local authorities, and municipalities,'27
creating opportunities for advantageous and necessary
628interrelationships between the countries. A mutual awareness has
developed concerning the importance of handling issues which
transcend the border, such as law enforcement, sewage and flood
control, management of water resources, public health, transportation
system planning, commuting and migration, and industrial
development. 629 Joint needs are the clear impetus to cross-border
cooperation,6 0 and similar to authorities in Europe's states, American
and Mexican authorities have conducted countless friendly and often
complicated arrangements for interaction. These connections
frequently have resulted in informal understandings and agreements
pertaining to cooperation6 2 in matters like health care63 and public
American views on interdependence).
626. See Clark W. Reynolds, The Strtcture of the Economic Relationship, ill
MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, supra note 50, at 125 (observing the growth
of interdependence between Mexico and the United States).
627. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 190 (comparing
similarities between cooperation across the Mexican-American border and
cooperation in the border regions of the European Union).
628. See Reynolds, supra note 626, at 125 (arguing that Mexico and the United
States can complement each other to their mutual advantage).
629. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (listing border-related problems that
border cities are attempting to address cooperatively).
630. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (describing the kinds of cross-border
cooperation that mutual necessity has generated).
631. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261; see also HOUSE, supra note 599, at
252 (discussing social, professional, and business contacts facilitating exchange).
632. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 464-65; Hansen, supra note 533, at
261 (finding that contacts have resulted in informal agreements in several areas).
633. See Sloan & West, supra note 601 at 465 (observing that local government
officials from the border cities of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo most often cited the
subject of health care, among others, as subjects of informal agreements between
them); Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (noting cross-border cooperative
agreements, including in the field of health care, between Mexican and United
States officials in border cities). Cooperation in border health matters is needed, as
the spread of both animal and human diseases are not subject to international
borders. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 135. And clearly, open borders promotes
[16:1
2000] PERMEABLE FENCES A14KE GOOD NEIGiiBORS 115
health,64 public transport;35 fire control,"" education,"" and law
better border health. See id. at 137. Health conditions in Mexican border cities are
generally better than elsewhere in Mexico. yet cannot compare with the far
superior conditions in the American border cities, which % hen compared to the
rest of the United States is generally comparatively lower. See id. (describing and
comparing health conditions on both sides of the border). The market for medical
services along the border flows in two directions as Mexicans in the upper and
middle class have often crossed the border to benefit from the better hospital
treatment, consultations, and diagnosis available in the United States, while less
wealthy Hispanic Americans have crossed to Mexico to take advantage of lower
medical costs. See id; see also Gereffi, supra note 482, at 150; Deep in the Heart
of NAFTA, supra note 490, at 32 (stating that Texans in El Paso seek low-priced
dental work across the border in Judrez, Mexico). In 1976, commentators
estimated that more than half of the physicians in Laredo wvere Mexican-trained
and that around ten percent of their patients were from their Mexican sister-city,
Nuevo Laredo. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 466. Furthermore, they found
that physicians in one city referred both medicine and patients to physicians in the
other. See id. at 467.
634. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (describing areas of cooperation based
on mutual needs). Close cooperation has existed regarding the control of rabies,
venereal disease, tuberculosis, and mosquitoes. See id. Mexican and American city
officials have freely shared information about communicable diseases and there
has also been dental and medical facility sharing. See i. Laredo public health
authorities have even assisted Mexican women from Nuevo Laredo to give birth in
Laredo to obtain United States citizenship for the child. See Sloan & West, supra
note 601, at 467.
635. See Good Fences and Good Neighbors, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1998, at 32
(describing agreements between the border towns of Columbus, New ,Mexico and
Palomas, Mexico).
636. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 465: Hansen, supra note 533. at 261
(describing informal cooperative agreements between Mexico and United States
officials); Good Fences and Good Neighbors, supra note 635, at 32 (stating that
border towns along the Mexican-American border have always made agreements
with respect to fire-fighting and public transportation). Joint fire prevention efforts
have resulted in regular border crossings by both Mexican and United States fire
engines to assist in putting out fires. See HOUSE, supra note 602, at 253. For
instance, Sloan and West's 1976 study noted that when the fire department in
Nuevo Laredo, Mexico asked for assistance from its counterpart over the border in
Laredo, United States fire fighters were sent forthwith, and the same held true for
fire protection assistance from the opposite direction. See Sloan & West, supra
note 601, at 465. Mutual fire protection assistance involved, in addition to
emergency help, training courses dealing with preventing fires, first aid, handling
dangerous chemicals, and fire-fighting techniques. See . Both Mexican and
American fire departments stressed that their counterparts had never denied them
assistance. See id. Forest fire fighting cooperation also takes place between
Mexico and the United States. See Relations with the U.S., supra note 601, at 6.
637. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 465 (mentioning joint agreements
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enforcement."' An additional significant area of cooperation includes
environmental pollution control and monitoring.639 The main
outcome of this cooperative relationship is that influential people in
the border cities have learned to cooperate among themselves in
these areas as well as others,40 and generally speaking, local
authorities have acted on the conviction that their efforts in one city
will benefit the sister-city as well. 64'
across the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo border); Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (pointing
to education as a general subject of informal cross-border agreements along the
Mexican-American border). Cooperative educational agreements in the Laredo-
Nuevo Laredo area have included exchange programs for public school teachers
and students and course offerings designed to meet the needs of Mexican students
attending Laredo Junior College. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 467-68.
Moreover, many Nuevo Laredo parents have used fictitious addresses of friends or
relatives to register their children in the Laredo public school system. See id. at
467. Pupils in other border towns in Mexico have legally been able to take
advantage of educational cooperation between cities on the border; until foreign
school children education in the United States was halted by Congress in 1997,
Chihuahua, Mexico, pupils by the hundreds or maybe even thousands had
benefited from an American education in Columbus, New Mexico. See Good
Fences and Good Neighbors, supra note 635, at 32.
638. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 465 (providing examples of informal
agreements between American and Mexican officials regarding law enforcement);
Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (mentioning law enforcement as a subject of
informal cross-border agreements between Mexican and American city officials).
For further discussion concerning cross-border law enforcement cooperation
between Mexico and the United States, see infra notes 793-803 and accompanying
text.
639. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (describing civic cooperation in many
fields). Environmental and ecological cooperation occurs between the United
States and Mexico regarding such matters as protected nature reserves, climate
alteration, and protection of border-crossing migrating birds. See Relations with
the U.S., supra note 601, at 6. Sharing in the cost of setting up sewage plants on
the Mexican-American border is also another environmental cooperative effort.
See Clinton Visit, 43 KEESINGS I (May 1997), (visited July 12, 2000)
<wysiwyg://doc. 1 6/http://keesings.gvpi ... ORCEMENT%20COOPERATION&x =
Advanced&2>.
640. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 472 (noting that social and political
cooperation among Mexican and American elites leads to cooperation in other
areas). For example, in the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo case, additional agreements have
included the intergovernmental exchange of information, interlibrary lending,
administration of the international bridge, and the transfer of used equipment. See
id. at 468.
641. See id. at 472 (concluding that Laredo and Nuevo Laredo elites have
helped create a single community spanning an international border); see also
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Accordingly, a pervasive acknowledgement of the
interrelationship between sister-cities that share a border has
developede 2 since they have mutual problems such as industrial
stagnation, high unemployment, a low tax base, poverty, and poor
public servicesM3  The economies of the sister-cities have
interdependently evolved, with the Mexican cities extending to
American cities numerous professional'" and lower-scale retail
services, tourist related activities, and accommodations for "in bond"
factories,"" while the American counterparts have extended to
Mexicans many specialized services, employment opportunities, and
general retailing facilities." For instance, as between Nuevo Laredo
Hansen, supra note 533, at 261 (indicating the facts motivating cooperation
between Mexican and American city officials).
642. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 251 (describing the interdependence and
shared problems of border "twin cities"): see also Sloan & West. supra note 601,
at 469 (noting that city official in Laredo and Nuevo Laredo have recognized
similar policy goals to address common problems, and believed that cooperation
was both necessary and likely).
643. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 251 (discussing shared problems of border
cities).
644. See id. For further discussion, see supra notes 633-639.
645. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 251. "In bond" relates to foreign
components entering Mexico without duty. See. e.g., Sylvia Tiuersten, Mexican
Maquiladora Plants Present a Catch-22, (visited Aug. 3, 2000) <http: iwwxv.web-
cottage.com/eb.htm>. Thus "in bond" factories is just another way to refer to
maquiladoras. See, e.g., Break for the Border, The LS1M1exico Crossing, (visited
Aug. 3, 2000) <http:/\vvwv.love2travel.co.uk/tijuana.htm>. For further discussion
of the maquiladora industry, see supra notes 488-516 and accompanying text.
646. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 251. One of the factors accounting for the
relative ease of cooperation across the border in the Texas-Mexico vicinity has to
do with language and ethnicity. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261-62. Already by
1982, more than fifty percent of the people living in every one of the Texan cities
on the border were Mexican-Americans. See id. at 262. As of 1990, the percentage
of Eagle Pass, Texas' population of Hispanic origin wvas well over 95% of the
total, the percentage of Hispanics in Laredo's population stood at almost 94%,
Brownsville's percentage of those of Hispanic origin vas over 900, the
percentage of Hispanics in McAllen's and Del Rio's population was about 77%
each, and El Paso's Hispanics accounted for 690/ of the total population. See
Texas 1990 Census, (visited Aug. 3, 2000) <http: 'govinfo.library.orst.edu'cgi-
binlpost2>, for the Eagle Pass figures: Cit" of Laredo - 1990 Census, (visited Aug.
3, 2000) <http://govinfo.library.orst.edwcgi-bin buildit2?filenam= I a-
41464.txp&mfil=130859>, for the Laredo figures: Cit
" 
of Brownsville - 1990
Census, (visited Aug. 3, 2000) <http: govinf6.library.orst.edu, cgi-
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and Laredo, there has been more social and economic integration
than each with its own country. 7 Notwithstanding that Americans
and Mexicans each have a distinct political system, policy
cooperation and interaction has been one of the cordial personal ties
between the general population and the authorities on each side of
the border. 648 Thus, particularly in the border regions, both Mexicans
and Americans of Mexican origin share a mutual culture, and a
generally open border has commonly been viewed favorably."*
bin/buildit2?filenam=la-10768.txp&mfil=132557>, for the Brownsville figures;
1990 Census of Population and Housing, McAllen citY, Texas.
<http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/post2>, for the McAllen figures; 1990
Census of Population and Housing, Del Rio city Texas,
<http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/post2>, for the Del Rio figures; and 1990
Census of Population and Housing, El Paso city, Texas.
<http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/post2>, for the El Paso figures.
Understandably, Spanish was spoken freely in public and in the home. See Hansen,
supra note 533, at 262. On the other hand, attempts at cooperation between San
Diego, California, where only 13% of the people by 1982 were Mexican-
Americans and its Mexican neighbor Tijuana, had not been as fruitful. See id. As
of 1990, the percentage of San Diego County's population of Hispanic origin was
still only 20% and by July of 1997 had risen to 24%. See Race/Ethnic Population
Estimates: Components of Change for California Counties, April 1990 to July
1997 [Race Ethnic Report (April 1999)], (visited Aug. 3, 2000)
<http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/Demograp/race-eth.htm> Incidentally, thirty percent
of California's entire population is Latino. See A New Republican Heartland,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at 29. Other factors besides shared ethnicity and
language influence the amount of cross-border cooperation, such as economic
integration, professional and social interaction, economic integration, local
customs and culture, and geographic proximity. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253
(comparing the levels of interdependence in the border cities Laredo and Nuevo
Laredo, Brownsville and Matamoros, and Del Rio and Ciudad Acuifia). The
tenacity of cooperation between sister cities was revealed in local opposition some
twenty years ago, on both sides of the border, to the design of the so-called
"tortilla curtain," a fence erected to prevent illegal immigration and smuggling into
the United States. See id. at 254; see also Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at
22 (pointing out that this "tortilla curtain" border fence, which extends 100
kilometers along the Rio Grande river, is not very effective in preventing illegal
border crossings). For further discussion of the "tortilla curtain," see supra note
605.
647. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 471.
648. See id. at 472.
649. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 263-64 (observing that border residents are
prepared for a relationship of more harmony, prosperity, and stability); see also
Good Fences and Good Neighbors, supra note 635, at 32 (noting that border
authorities in Columbus, New Mexico used to keep border gates open during the
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Policy-makers at the federal level in Mexico and the United States
frequently have not been aware of the reality that surrounds the
border regions, nor with the integration and informal networks
integrative systems, which make-up local daily life."' As a result,
authorities on the border, in an attempt to maximize local cooperative
endeavors, have interpreted broadly and loosely both countries'
policies, regulations, and rules.' Consequently, this is one of the
reasons that border sister-cities' relationships have been cultivated
through informal agreements between their respective elites."2 Thus,
night to permit late returnees back across the border). Even the American and
Mexican ranchers have developed close contacts, communicating through "the
common language of cattle." See id. at 32.
650. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 256 (commenting on the lack of
understanding federal governments generally have for border issues). CI.
Letamendia et al., supra note 519, at 103 (discussing similar European problems
relating to the location of border areas on state peripheries, isolated from decision-
making and economic centers).
651. See HOUSE, supra note 599. at 251 (explaining the strategies used by both
border officials and border city elites to achieve much needed local cooperation).
Living in Laredo can be risky, quipped a former city attorney, because "[w]e are
subjected to floods, drought, the Mexican government and the US government."
Id.
652. See id. at 251-52. Yet, while Mexican and American elites have tackled
mutual problems in a pragmatic fashion, they often differed in their approach and
understanding of the issues. See id. at 252 (discussing differences in priority given
to problems and the manners proposed to solve them). Mexican elites addressed
problems more broadly, while their American counterparts concentrated on public
safety, physical planning, tourism, and commerce. See id. The elites from the
sister-cities of El Paso-Ciudad Juirez illustrated the contrasting characteristics of
the Mexican and American elites. See id. Ciudad Juirez's influential community
members generally understood the functioning of the United States system, knew
English, had an American education, sought to establish social contacts in the
United States, and viewed it favorably - strove to emulate American values, ideas,
and ideals. In contrast, the elites of El Paso, although they realized the advantages
of developing good neighborly relations and wanted to assist their sister-city
evolve into a more dynamic community, nevertheless did not consider the
Mexicans as a good source for new ideas, friendships, intellectual challenges, or
values, and that there was nothing worthy to be gained from their counterparts and
thus understood little about Mexican culture. See id. As one observer noted, "'vhen
successful bicultural relations occur ... it is because the Mexican influentials have
deferred to the values and informal demands of the American influentials on a near
unilateral basis." Id. Unquestionably, then, Americans know substantially less
about Mexico than Mexicans know about the United States. See Purcell, supra
note 50, at 1.
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many friendly, yet complicated, interactions have comprised the Rio
Grande system of communications in the border cities,"' and various
business, social, and professional interactions have existed alongside
official relations. 4 Authorities from either side of the border have
been able to meet in a social environment and work to solve
problems relating to municipal business matters. 6' ' Thus, typically
within the border communities, a good deal of social interchange has
taken place, especially during public holidays, conventions, fairs,
ceremonial activities, and parades.656 The festivities have encouraged
beneficial relationships among influential community members."'7
Expanding one's personal network across the border has been
beneficial not only for personal relationships,"'58 but for business as
wellY.
The United States and Mexico enjoy a unique cultural mix. For
example, many Americans enjoy Mexican food, such as fajitas, and
many Mexicans play baseball, America's "national pastime." In the
lower Rio Grande Valley, Mexican firms construct warehouses in
Texas, while Mexicans shop in American supermarkets without
653. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 252 (discussing the nature of
communications among Rio Grande cities).
654. See id. (discussing the significance of social networking).
655. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 460 (emphasizing the crucial role of
social and personal relationships for resolving business matters); HOUSE, supra
note 599, at 252 (discussing the role of social interactions for policy makers). The
increasing number of Hispanics holding local or federal office has frequently
promoted stronger and more comprehensive cross border
interactions/relationships. See id. at 252-53.
656. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (commenting on the types of
interactions and cooperation that take place within border communities).
657. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 461 (noting the importance of social
functions for networking purposes).
658. See id. at 460 (stating that simply knowing the names of relevant people
across the border may not be enough to obtain the needed assistance). Moreover, it
is essential to understand the other side's "rules" and to be able to work within its
cultural framework. See id.
659. See id. at 461, 468 (concluding that in the areas of tourism promotion,
celebration of holidays of the other, and banking, the cooperation between the
cities Nuevo Laredo and Laredo has been a result of "mutual necessity" and has
proven beneficial for both).
120 [16:1
PERMEABLE FENCES IAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS
leaving their towns.6' For example, just over the border from Ciudad
Jufrez, forty percent of all El Paso retail sales are to Mexicans." '
Unsurprisingly, as middle and upper income class Mexicans share
similar tastes with Americans, Mexican production patterns mirror
technology from the United StatesP :
Local exchanges between the border communities along and
across the Rio Grande border between Mexico and the United States
have informally sought to improve the border's permeability, while
minimizing deleterious effects of distant federal capital decisions. '
The population located in the forbidding and distant border regions
throughout the area of the Rio Grande see tremendous advantages
and benefits in cooperating closely via specifically designed informal
mechanisms.6 6 By facing the same day-to-day issues, cross-border
neighbors may, in essence, have more in common with each other
than with their compatriots in their respective states.'" As a result,
border populations sharing common interests often wish to maintain
cordial relations and open borders, despite the suspicions their own
660. See One River, One Countrv, supra note 481, at 27 (remarking on how the
border regions are culturally similar, yet distinguished by the extreme income
disparity).
661. See Borders: Good Fences. supra note 66, at 22 (noting that while El Paso
is an American city, it has a Latino flavor).
662. See Reynolds, supra note 626, at 125 (discussing how intertwined the
markets of Mexico and the United States have become).
663. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 254 (explaining the community impact of
local interaction). Federal offices have differed in their approach to border issues -
some strive to enhance border permeability for commerce and trade purposes, yet
others, through immigration and customs surveillance, work to block the border.
See id. Consequently, the use of informal networks and understandings seems
inevitable for the effective survival of the Mexican and American communities
along the Rio Grande. See id. at 256.
664. See id. at 264 (commenting on how cross-border communities have united
to fight the same problems). Likewise, residents of Canada and the United States
along their border, through common interests and cooperative efforts, have also
become both economically and socially integrated. See Konrad, supra note 81, at
199.
665. See Konrad, supra note 81, at 191. Cf Letamendia et al., supra note 519, at
103 (highlighting the example of the Basque country, whose people share more in
common with each other than with either the French or the Spanish).
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governments raise about the other side. 6
D. JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN EFFORTS
Similar examples of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation abound.6 ' For
instance, in addition to cooperative security efforts, "68 both sides have
often assisted each other with road accidents, Palestinian and Israeli
firefighters and rescue units have worked together in extinguishing
fires, and specialized Israeli army units have, at the request of
Palestinian authorities, cooperated with Palestinian rescue teams and
Palestinian Red Crescent units in rescuing Palestinians trapped under
fallen buildings in the Palestinian Authority.6 '0 Also, Palestinian and
Israeli police have cooperated in criminal investigations, control of
666. See Good Fences and Good Neighbors, supra note 635, at 50 (contrasting
local sentiments about border issues with nationally-voiced opinions).
667. Even despite the slow progress of the peace process throughout the years of
former Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's government, cooperative activities
between Israelis and Palestinians nevertheless continued during its reign in the mid
to later 1990's. See Galili, supra note 179, at 3B.
668. See, e. g., Amos Harel et al., In the Security Services it is Assessed: Hlamas
is Planning A Number of Parallel Attacks, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 4, 1998, at 2A (in
Hebrew) (on file with author); see also Amos Harel, Arafat: The Period Close at
Hand is Especially Sensitive, I Will Work to Prevent Attacks, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 24,
1999, at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Israel and the Palestine Authorit',
Memorandum of Security Understandings, 17 December 1997, 27(3) J. PALESTINE
STUD. 147-148 (1998) (presenting the example of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation
in the struggle against violence and terrorism).
669. See Margot Dudkevitch, Palestinian Firemen Fight Blaze at Settlement,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 14, 1998, at 4 (recounting the cooperative efforts of
Palestinian firemen from Qalqilya and Nablus who worked alongside their Israeli
counterparts in successfully extinguishing a fire in the Israeli settlement of Ginot
Shomron). Palestinian firefighters from Nablus assisted in putting out a big fire
that threatened to harm the Elon Moreh settlement in May of 1999. Later that
evening, Israeli Air Force helicopters and firemen assisted in extinguishing a fire
that had broken out near the Askar Palestinian refugee camp. See Amos Harel,
Firefighters From the Palestinian Authority Extinguished a Blaze That Threatened
Elon Moreh, HA'ARETZ, May 24, 1999, at 7A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
670. See Amira Hess, Two Construction Workers Were Killed and 7 Were
Injured in a Roof Collapse in El Bireh, HA'ARETZ, July 9, 1999, at 6A (in
Hebrew) (on file with author).
671. See, e.g,, Shimon Azulai, Israeli Palestinian Cooperation in the
Investigation of Counteifeiting, KOL HA'IR, Sept. 17, 1999, at 25 (in Hebrew) (on
file with author); Anat Zigalman, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority Will
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agricultural disease has been jointly handled,"' and cooperative
commercial relations are abundant."" For example, Israeli
agricultural products grown in agricultural settlements located near
the Palestinian Authority Airport at Dahania (the Gaza International
Airport) can be transported quickly and directly from the farms to the
planes without the need for cooling devices."" In the health field
alone, Israelis and Palestinians cooperated in 148 joint projects
between 1994 and 1998,171 with the participation of over 4,000 people
and sixty-eight organizations from both sides. Among these
cooperative efforts are projects such as training courses in large
Israeli hospitals for Palestinian doctors, occupational medicine
courses provided through Israeli health funds, a project for the
development of mental health services for Palestinians, joint clinical
research in schizophrenic disorders, and the first extensive research
of its kind on health behavioral patterns of Israeli and Palestinian
youths conducted jointly by Israelis and Palestinians'" Fifty-one
joint projects between A1-Quds University and all the academic
institutions in Israel either have taken place or are currently being
Cooperate in the War Against Drug Trqffickers. HA'ARETZ, Feb. 18, 1999, at 9A
(in Hebrew) (on file with author); Amira Hess. The Body of a Palestinian Wtoman
Who Was Murdered by Stone Hits Was Found Near the Settlement Elezar,
HA'ARETZ, Nov. 24, 1998, at 4A (in Hebrew) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Hess, The Body of a Palestinian Woman]. For further discussion on cooperative
law enforcement activities between Israelis and Palestinians, see infra notes 790-
792 and accompanying text.
672. See, e.g., Adiri, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT
ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 20 (commenting on a recent
import issue pertaining to Jordanian apples that did not measure up to Israeli
sanitary standards).
673. See, e.g., Hazboun, supra note 383, at 88 (noting that 600 tons of flour
required daily by Gaza and the West Bank amount to 37O6 of Israel's milling
output and that the Palestinian territories receive veal from Israeli kibbutzim and a
million liters of milk every day).
674. See Arbeli, supra note 476, at I IA.
675. See Galili, supra note 179, at 3B. It should be recalled that the Israelis and
Palestinians suffered from many turbulent events during these years, including
vicious terrorist attacks, radical alterations in the peace process. periodic border
closures, and events such as the opening of the tunnel of the Holy Wall in
Jerusalem. See id.
676. See id.
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implemented.677
The prevalence of commercial interaction in the Israeli-Palestinian
"border" region678 is demonstrated further by the tremendous flow of
business profits. In particular, Israeli citizens679 typically have spent
on average some ten million New Israeli Shekels in shopping sprees
on a normal Saturday in the Palestinian "border" cities of Nablus,
Jenin, and Qalqilya, which is equivalent to more than US$100
million annually on Saturdays alone.68 0 A total of 100,000 Israelis
ordinarily shop on the other side of the green line each week,
translating to a yearly income for Palestinians of half a billion
dollars, from which 10,000 Palestinians directly have been earning a
living, while the Palestinian Authority itself has been purchasing
annually US$1.8 billion of goods from Israel.6" Palestinian and
Israeli executives and business persons also have been meeting to
promote doing business in times of peace.8 2 Economic cooperation is
seen as essential for advancing industry and technology, for without
it, the Palestinian standard of living will never approach that of
Israel.6 3
677. See id.
678. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A.
679. They are for the most part Israeli Arabs. See Harel, The Closure Was
Lifted, supra note 387, at 5A.
680. See id. Israelis also seek out local Palestinian dentists whose work won't
force them to break into their personal savings accounts. See Harel, The Israeli-
Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A. For further discussion
detailing a similar phenomenon occurring in the Mexican-American border
regions, see supra, notes 633, 660-61 and accompanying text.
681. See Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, supra
note 377, at 2A. It was anticipated that one and one-half million tourists would
visit Bethlehem and Jerusalem and spend hundreds of millions of dollars in these
two cities alone. See id.
682. See, e.g., HA'ARETZ, June 21, 1999, at 10A (on file with author).
(publicizing in a newpaper advertisement a conference to be held six days later for
Israeli and Palestinian business persons and executives on the subject of "Doing
Business in Peace"); HA'ARETZ, Sept. 25, 2000, at I IA (in Hebrew) (on file with
author) ( advertising a "Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the
Palestinian Authority" sponsored by the Israel Ministry of Regional Cooperation).
683. See Omar Salah, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT
ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 8-10 (noting that economic
cooperation would raise living standards).
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It also would be beneficial for Palestinians and Israelis to seek to
increase cooperation in areas outside of trade and commerce,
particularly in matters pertaining to water, industry, agriculture, and
infrastructure.6 m Accordingly, border-spanning research-oriented
proposals in this regard have highlighted regional cooperation and
economic development between Israel and its neighbors.'" Areas in
which cooperation that spans borders is crucial for regional
development are environment, water, and tourism."' Cooperative
regional water resource management likely will allow for more
efficient water consumption based on regional demand, instead of
individual entities' needs. Furthermore, these cooperation schemes
can create tremendous advantages that flow, not only to the
Palestinians and Israel, but also to Jordan."'" Likewise, regional
tourism cooperation may provide mutual advantages." ' The Red
Sea's winter sun, archaeological and historical attractions, and holy
sites are excellent tourism opportunities that could be developed
jointly. The border regions could act as zones for tourist passage due
to the short travel times from the country's center into one of the
neighboring entities, which may help these areas abandon their
peripheral nature." 9 Finally, it is critical that the Palestinians and
684. See Bahiri, supra note 371, at 93. It must be realized, however, that large
infrastructure projects require a significant amount of time to finance and develop.
See Geoffrey Haley, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 16. For further
discussion on privately financed infrastructure projects. see supra notes 519-521
and accompanying text.
685. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 32-33
(suggesting that such cooperative relationships force neighbors to rely on each
other, thereby reducing the potential for fresh outbreaks of violence between
them).
686. See id. at 33.
687. See id. A Jordanian canal water diversion project, for instance, has been
very beneficial to agricultural development, and has brought about cross-border
agricultural cooperation between Israel and Jordan. See id. at 27. These and similar
cooperative projects help create an easier conflict-to-peace transition. See id.
688. See Arbeli, supra note 476, at I IA.
689. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 34 (noting
that while such cross-border tourism can facilitate peaceful relations by helping to
break down common stereotypes, regional tourism development ironically might
not actually assist the economic advancement of the border regions).
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Israelis develop environmental management cooperation projects
with one another, as well as with Jordan and Egypt, to ensure
protection of the entire region's "i690
The creation of an interdependent Israeli-Palestinian relationship
may develop, not so much out of governmental intervention, but
more naturally through the realization of the benefits of cooperative
development and economic investments. This, in turn, will help
create the desire for greater cross-border interdependence and border
permeability. Moreover, if political relations were to deteriorate, the
existence of such an economic interrelationship may also help deter
conflict.69' Economic resource interdependence in areas such as
water, tourism, and the environment should cause regional
actors-confronted with a potential conflict-to seriously reconsider
the potential destruction of a beneficial and well-functioning
peacetime interdependent infrastructure.692
Finally, as in the Mexican-American example, the proximity of
large portions of the Arab population in Israel to portions of the West
Bank Palestinian population could result in increased cultural affinity
between people on opposite sides of the border to an extent greater
than to the bulk of the population located in the respective centers.69
Thus, just as neighbors in ethnically homogenous border regions in
both the United States and Mexico have been cooperating peacefully
and successfully for many years, so too, ethnically homogenous
690. See id. at 35 (observing the importance of cooperation on a regional scale
to protect the area's ecological balance). A recent example of cooperative action to
preserve the environment was contained in an agreement signed in September
2000 between Israel and the Palestinians to build the Gaza seaport. See Tsafrira
Rinat, The Palestinians Will Transfer the Sea Sands North, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 26,
2000, at 3A (in Hebrew) (on file with author). The agreement called for, among
other things, the transfer north to Israel of tons of sand situated south of the new
seaport in Gaza. See id. It is anticipated that the construction of the port will
further intensify the current depletion of sand from Israeli beaches since the new
port will essentially disturb the natural flow and movement of sand with the water
currents up the Gaza and Israel coasts from Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. See id. This
movement of sand normally replenishes the beach sand that has been dragged out
to sea by waves and preserves the stability of beaches. See id.
691. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 32.
692. See id.
693. See id. at 31. Cf Konrad, supra note 81, at 191. For further discussion of
the Mexican-American example, see supra notes 648-666 and accompanying text.
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interface regions between Israel and the Palestinians can develop into
key places for economic cooperation across borders.""
E. ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONS IN A COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT
The marked asymmetry of economic relations between the
Palestinians and Israel is also similar to that of Mexico and the
United States, to that of Portugal with EFTA, as well as to the
relationship of both Portugal and Spain with the European
Community!" Each of these cases is illustrative of economic
interaction between developing countries and the developed world
generally.696 The lack of symmetry in the United States-Mexico
relationship, for example, has coexisted with cross-border suspicions
and apprehensions concerning "dependency, domination,
exploitation, and neocolonialism, ' " and still exists today.""
Comparable fears also exist in the similarly asymmetrical
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Nonetheless, the
benefits of interaction between economically strong and weak
countries are apparent and may be greater and more focused across
694. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 32.
695. Cf McKinney, Lessons from the Western European Eltlerience, supra note
397, at 34-36 (emphasizing that Spain and Portugal's decision to become a part of
the EEC lead to substantial economic development within these two countries,
which did not come at a detriment to other EEC members).
696. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 264 (relating to the general problems facing
the development of border areas between wealthy and poor nations); Purcell, supra
note 50, at 1 (acknowledging the United States' marked interest in Mexico as a
potential source for petroleum and natural gas, and noting that Mexico is both
suspicious and desirous of American investment); see also Reynolds, supra note
626, at 125 (observing the disparity between and the interdependence of Mexico
and the United States); Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 6 (noting the Mexico-
US asymmetric economic relationship).
697. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 264 (suggesting that such fears create
unnecessary cultural and ideological boundaries that prevent the South from being
able to profit from any commitment the North may make to help it); see also Susan
Kaufman Purcell, The Changing Nature of LS-Mexican Relations, 391) J. OF
INTERAMER. STU. AND WORLD AFF. 137. 151 (1997).
698. See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 697. at 142: see also Bagley, supra note 606,
at 16-17 (stating that Mexican policymakers and intellectuals believe that the
United States is willing to sacrifice Mexico's national interests to further its own
interests). Cf Mimi Hall, Merico s Fox seeks more open borders, USA TODAY,
Aug. 25, 2000, at IA.
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permeable borders. 99
In the period leading up to the North American Free-Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)" between the economically weak Mexico and
699. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 264 (pointing to the relationship between
the US and Mexico as an example in which border people view closer cooperation
between them in a very positive light).
700. See NAFTA, supra note 55. While we are drawing a comparison at this
point in our article to a "free-trade area" as such, our object is neither to promote
nor detract from the value of a free-trade agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. Rather, our intent is to consider fears and suspicions pertaining to the
free-trade agreement, which all NAFTA partners experienced to some extent, and
to examine how they were confronted, how they have basically been overcome,
and how this analysis may be analogously applied to the Israelis and Palestinians
concerning their mutual economic interdependency. Yet, perhaps it may be useful
nevertheless to consider generally some of the economic advantages and
disadvantages of a free trade area as opposed to a customs union with a common
external tariff. See, e.g., McKinney, Lessons from the Western European
Experience, supra note 397, at 38 (examining the advantages and disadvantages of
the EFTA model of free trade and concluding that it is likely more beneficial than
the EC customs union model for North American states). In a free trade area,
generally, tariffs and other trade restrictions (sometimes applied only to specific
relevant sectors) between the members are abolished (possibly in a gradual fashion
pursuant to a mutually agreed-upon schedule), while each member maintains the
right to implement its own trade policy. Generally speaking, a customs union,
however, is actually a free trade area agreement extension comprising an external
trade policy that is shared by all partners. No borders need to be established since
no intra-customs union trade is subject to inspection, which represents
compensation for giving up external trade policy independence. See Bahiri, supra
note 468, at 31, 32. Many experts believe that a customs union is the most
desirable economic arrangement for integration from Israel's standpoint. See id. at
35, 39, 40. The Palestinian and Israeli economies are already so closely
interrelated, a customs union would help avert the creation of economic borders
and allow for the continuing free flow of products. See ECONOMIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at I.
Without a physical border, a customs union is viewed by many as the sole
available alternative. See Alisah Odenheimer and Orah Koren, Finance: The
Authority May Institute an Independent Currency, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 18, 1999, at
2A (in Hebrew) (on file with author). Currently, a customs union arrangement
exists between the West Bank and Gaza and Israel. See Hanspeter Tschaeni, in
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE
POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 3, 5; Orah Koren, The Industrialists O/er the
Palestinian Authority Customs Harmonization, VAT, Sales Tax, and
Standardization, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 19, 2000, at 3C (in Hebrew) (on file with
author); see also Sadan, supra note 371, at 43. But see Tahboub, in supra note 480,
at 49. A basically common currency is used in the customs union. See Bahiri,
supra note 468, at 32 (remarking that the hybrid currency shared between Israel
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and the Palestinians is not the norm). Free trade has not even existed between
Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan, for instance. See Mahmoud Abu Samra, in
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FLTURE
POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 17. The fact that no physical barrier is necessary
anywhere in the Palestinian-Israeli union represents an advantage. In Israel, for
example, the overwhelming majority of the population refuses to consider physical
barriers for Jerusalem. See Sadan and Lowenthal, supra note 371, at 153.
Furthermore, some observers deem a customs union preferable for wholly
economic reasons. See Noman Kanafani, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. supra note 375, at 8, 9; see
also Ishac Diwan, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 12. They
consider a customs union as frequently advantageous in situations where highly
industrialized and developed economies, like in Israel, border smaller, more
limited markets, like that of the Palestinians. See Kanafani, supra, at 9. Some view
a custom union's exchange of preferences as economically beneficial for the
Palestinians, since they offer both labor-intensive products, like shoes and clothes,
and agricultural products, which are among the most protected sectors in the Israeli
economy. According to some experts, the customs union is therefore economically
ideal. See Diwan, supra, at 12. A customs union also will allow the Palestinians to
contemporaneously enter agreements that Israel enjoys with the West. See Michael
Jungreis, in ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE
POSSIBILITIES, supra note 297, at 49. For further discussion regarding taking
advantage of trade ties with the West, see supra note 459 and accompanying text.
The direct and indirect deflection of trade, which may result from differing tariff
rates on various sides of the border is, moreover, one of the disadvantages of a free
trade area. See McKinney, Lessons from the Western European Erperience, supra
note 397, at 38. Indirectly deflected trade is inputs entering a lower tariff state,
which gives a cost advantage to local industries, and thus provides an impetus for
businesses in lower tariff countries to increase production at the expense of higher-
tariff free trade members' producers. See id. at 38 n. 10. Direct deflection of trade
simply means rerouting products through another country w ith lower tariff rates
before the products are ultimately sold in a high tariff rate state. See id. at 38.
While the direct deflection of trade can be averted by enforcing requirements
concerning rules of origin, it also increases trade's transaction costs. See hi. If the
objectives of participating countries' trade policies are not identical, which is often
the case, harmonizing tariffs is not an easy task. See McKinney, Lessons fronI the
Western European Experience, supra note 397, at 38. The adoption of a free trade
policy by the Palestinians and Israel may also involve certain risks. First, the
customs tariffs of the Palestinians would need to be so low, compared to Israel's
customs tariffs, that they would approach the zero mark. Yet, the heavy fiscal and
budgetary pressures affecting the Palestinian Authority would likely make this
quite difficult. As a result, the Palestinians would not only lose custom union
advantages, but would also pay free trade area costs. Second, a free trade area
would reduce the potentially significant benefits of associating with Israel. It is less
likely that the Palestinians would enjoy the benefits of their association with Israel
with a free trade area than with a customs union. See Kanafani, supra. at 9.
Furthermore, since a free trade area would need to be administered and would
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its stronger northern neighbors, Canada and the United States,'('
some worried that investments and employment opportunities would
be drawn into Mexico from Canada and the United States.":
Furthermore, there was apprehension concerning the fact that
American workers may have been forced to compete with Mexican
workers who would work for much less03 and tolerate unhealthy and
unsafe work conditions.70 It was thus felt that workers in the United
States did not stand a chance in relation to their Mexican
counterparts. '05 For their part, many analysts in Mexico, like their
Canadian counterparts earlier, were concerned with the notion of a
formalized arrangement with the economically powerful UnitedS 706 fer
States. They feared that a free trade agreement would solidify
Mexico's dependence on the United States because of the economic
have to have certificates of origins and a border, it would also be expensive. In
addition, Israel's economy has a value-added content that is high, in comparison to
that of the economy of the Palestinians, accounting for an inherent asymmetry
between the two. See Diwan, supra, at 13. The European Union is an example of a
customs union, whereas NAFTA and EFTA are free trade areas. See McKinney,
Lessons fiom the Western European Experience, supra note 397, at 38.
Independent pursuit of a country's own trade policy is an advantage maintained by
a free trade area over a customs union. See id. Prime Minister Ehud Barak has
supported setting up a trade agreement between Israel and the Palestinians based
on the principle of an independent Palestinian economic entity, or, in other words,
a Free Trade Area Agreement. See Koren, supra, at 3C.
701. See Neil Nevitte, et. al., Directions of Value Change in North America, in
NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS?, supra note 81, at 245, 248 (stating that in
absolute terms, Mexico's economic level is much lower than that of the United
States or Canada). On the eve of the signing of NAFTA, Mexico's per capita Gross
National Product was only about one-tenth of that of Canada and less than one-
eleventh of that of the United States. See id. at 248.
702. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 21
(stating, however, that thus far NAFTA has benefited Mexico's economy without
hurting the United States).
703. See id. at 23. Workers in Mexico cost roughly twenty-five percent of what
workers cost in the United States. See Borders: Good Fences, supra note 66, at 22.
704. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 48 1, at 23
(describing arguments by NAFTA's opponents). In 1993, one Texas slogan
proclaimed: "Free trade equals slave trade." See id. at 21.
705. See id.
706. See Lorraine Eden & Maureen Appel Molot, The View from the Spokes:
Canada and Mexico Face the United States, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT
BORDERS?, supra note 81, at 67, 77.
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asymmetry between the two countries.-"- They believed that NAFTA
would place the Mexicans "at the mercy of rapacious capitalists
pouring filth into Mexico's air and rivers," rather than assisting
them.0 8
In the framework of a free-trade agreement, such as EFTA or
NAFTA, the differences in levels of economic development between
a weak partner, like Portugal (in EFTA) or Mexico (in NAFTA), and
its stronger partners, or Spain and Portugal compared to the other
European Community countries at the time they became members in
1986,' o are similar to the difference between the Palestinian level of
economic development and that of Israel. At the time EFTA was
formed, for example, the per capita income in Portugal was
extremely low compared to that in the Scandinavian countries or
Switzerland, as were Portuguese wage levels."" Despite this,
Portugal's economic situation had no apparent negative effect on
wages or unemployment in the other EFTA countries." Rather,
Portugal and the other EFTA countries benefited from EFTA's
creation, as demonstrated by the positive growth rates.": Although
Portugal's experience is instructive, the integration of Portugal and
Spain into the European Community actually may be a closer parallel
to the Israel-Palestinian situation.'" This is because, unlike Mexico's
geographic contiguity to the United States and Palestinian contiguity
to Israel, Portugal had no geographic contiguity to any of the EFTA
partners. T
While many warned that NAFTA would lead to a deleterious
outcome for both Mexico and the United States, others expected
707. See id.
708. The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace. supra note 48 1, at 21.
709. See McKinney, Lessons fiom the Western European Erperience, supra
note 397, at 34-35 (stating that the static effects, trade creation and diversion, of
European economic integration have as a whole been positive).
710. See id. at 35 (stating that Portugal's per capita income was only about
twventy percent of those countries' per capita income).
711. See id.
712. See id.
713. Cf id.
714. Cf McKinney, Lessons from the Western European Iirpertence, supra note
397, at 35.
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NAFTA to guarantee Mexico's entrance into the American market, '
which would affect the flow of Mexican trade,7 6 to develop urgently
required jobs in the Mexican market place by enhancing economic
stability through enticing foreign direct investment 71 ' and to raise the
Mexican standard of living. 78 The idea was to encourage American
multinational companies, along with firms from other countries, to
invest in Mexico, and thus take advantage of both inexpensive
Mexican labor and Mexico's geographic proximity to the lucrative
United States markets.7 '9 An economic framework that solidified
Mexico's relationship as a major partner in trade with the United•• 720
States was considered the best available option. Proponents
considered NAFTA a means to strengthen the economic stability of
Mexico, and an overall benefit to all three partners. 2 In a global
economy that has become increasingly more interdependent and
open, NAFTA joins other similar agreements that are meant to help
place Mexico in a competitive position.7 Indeed, the flood of
715. See Eden & Molot, supra note 706, at 76 (discussing Mexico's desire for a
free trade agreement with the United States); see also Juan Jose Moreno Sada,
Mexican Trade Policy and the North American Free Trade Agreement, in NORTII
AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS?, supra note 81, at 105, 108 (discussing Mexico's
commitment to trade).
716. See Sada, supra note 715, at 108 (arguing that NAFTA will strengthen
Mexico's economic stability).
717. See Eden & Molot, supra note 706, at 76 (listing Mexico's motives for
desiring a Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement); see also Wilson &
Donnan, supra note 81, at 22.
718. See Sada, supra note 715, at 109 (stating that Mexico's standard of living
will only be raised through trade and international investment).
719. See Eden & Molot, supra note 706, at 76. Mexico welcomed enhanced
foreign direct investment from Canada, as well. See id. at 77. The two nations,
however, have engaged in very little trade. See A Question of Preferences,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1998, at 62.
720. See Sada, supra note 715, at 108 (arguing that for Mexico the free trade
initiative was a logical step).
721. See id. at 106 (stating that NAFTA will serve to strengthen Mexico's
economy and will facilitate social advancement for Mexican citizens).
722. See id. at 107 (noting that Mexican President Carlos Salinas expressed his
belief that the three NAFTA trading partners have much to gain from the
agreement).
723. See id. at 108 (discussing how the free trade initiative will help Mexico
establish a "competitive presence" in the global economy).
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investment from trade with Canada and the United States was seen as
something that would bolster Mexico's economy. 2" Although
disputes regarding NAFTA continue, there is no serious threat that it
will be dismantled725
For the United States, NAFTA's comprehensive economic effect,
in and of itself, is not terribly consequential.' Its overall impact on
Mexico's economy, which is not even five percent of the size of the
724. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 21
(describing the economic effects of free trade in Mexico). Increasing Canadian
concerns regarding protectionism in the United States and the dependence of
Canadian trade on the United States were two of the motives behind Canada's
decision to join the United States in a free trade agreement. See Eden & Molot,
supra note 706, at 72. Increased opportunities for Canadian producers to export
their products and guarantee access to the United States market were considered
good reasons for a free trade agreement. See Eden & Molot. supra note 706, at 72.
Furthermore, many analysts viewed increased competition as a means to enhance
the competitiveness of Canadian firms. See id. Goods and services are trading
across the United States-Canada border in the amount of approximately USSI
billion a day. See Borders: Good Fences. supra note 66, at 22 (stating that people
use the Canadian-American border as a "model of compatibility"). In addition,
exports from Canada to the United States increased to 300o of Canada's GDP in
1998, from 15% in 1989. See A New Realism, in A Sur'vey of 'anada, ECONOMIST,
July 24, 1999, at 4, 6 (explaining NAFTA's positive effect on the Canadian
economy). The economies of Quebec and Ontario alone have experienced similar
increases: exports from Quebec to the United States reached about 24 % of the
GDP, which is double what it was ten years ago. See id. at 6. Ontario also doubled
its exports to the United States to 40% of its GDP over the same timeframe. See id.
Both Canada and the United States have recognized the economic opportunity
provided by the opening of Mexico's economy. See The NAFTA Elfect, When
Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 21.
725. See The NAFTA Effect, When Nei hbors Embrace. supra note 481, at 21
(observing that despite the fact that quarrels between the countries persist, no one
really is discussing its demise seriously). For instance, to Mexicans, migration is
one of the most troublesome issues. See Weintraub. supra note 607, at 289.
Although the contradiction inherent in erecting border fences while promoting free
investment and trade exists, official declarations concerning this inconsistency are
rare and typically unobtrusive. See id.
726. See Ostry, supra note 466, at 27 (explaining the three partners' different
motives to implement NAFTA); see also The NAFTA El fet. When Neighbors
Embrace, supra note 481, at 21, 23 (discussing the impact of free trade on the
Mexican economy). Although the need to compete worldwide indeed served as a
catalyst for America to buttress and improve its economic relationship with
Mexico. See Purcell, supra note 697, at 147.
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United States' economy, is much more clear."' NAFTA, however,
has indeed benefited all three partners. After Japan and Canada,
Mexico has been the United States' third-largest trading partner for
quite some time."' Even preceding NAFTA's implementation, the
United States accounted for approximately two-thirds of Mexico's
imports and exports.72 9 Likewise, Israel has been the Palestinian
Authority's major trading partner.73 ° Within just three years of
NAFTA's implementation in 1994, exports from the United States to
Mexico had risen by thirty-six percent and imports from Mexico had
skyrocketed by eighty percent.3 Moreover, by the end of 1997,
annual trade between Mexico and the United States amounted to
approximately US$190 billion.7  Economics experts do not hesitate
727. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 48 1, at 2 1.
728. See Excelentisimo Clinton, supra note 605, at 30 (arguing that America has
made possible the development of successful economic links between the two
countries).
729. See Purcell, supra note 50, at 1 (discussing the involvement of the United
States in Mexican imports and exports); Pellicer de Brody, supra note 599, at 6
(stating that not only does the United States dominate Mexico's foreign trade, but
Mexico is becoming increasingly dependent on the United States for capital goods
and technology); Reynolds, supra note 626, at 125 (discussing the growth of
economic links between Mexico and the United States).
730. For further discussion see infra notes 773-784 and accompanying text
(discussing Israel's role as the Palestinian Authority's leading trading partner).
731. See Excelentisimo Clinton, supra note 605, at 30 (discussing the flourishing
economic relationship between Mexico and the United States).
732. See The Trucks That Hold Back NAFTA, supra note 364, at 23. In the first
three years alone following NAFTA's implementation, trade between Mexico, the
United States, and Canada reached more than US$470 billion, which represented a
sixty percent increase between 1994 and 1997. See Relations with the United
States, supra note 601, at 5. In order to prepare themselves for supplying a
consolidated market in North America, manufacturers located in Mexico, foreign
and local alike, have been streamlining their production, sales, and distribution
procedures. See id. NAFTA has been instrumental in Mexican automobile
production, with one million units manufactured, representing a 100% increase in
truck and car exports between 1994 and 1997. See id. Local networks of suppliers
in Mexico that have been supplying low quality materials are now being financed
and trained by Mexican enterprises. See id. Big name retailers from the United
States, like Sears and Wal-Mart, have been increasing their Mexican presence and
have accordingly begun purchasing their brand clothes from factories located in
Mexico. These factories now supply the Mexican market, instead of only exporting
their products. See id. These important retail outlets have even begun boosting
products manufactured in Mexico via their networks throughout North America.
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to point out that typical Mexicans may gain the most from this
increased regional integration and investment, since they are now
able to buy a larger variety of goods at less expense; until recently,
this was not an option because of Mexican manufacturers' practice of
tacking high prices on low quality merchandise. " Clearly, both
Mexico and the United States are benefiting from NAFTA. "
The successes of NAFTA are instructive for both Israelis and
Palestinians, despite lack of a free trade agreement between them.
The short history of NAFTA demonstrates that for developing
countries, free trade is a beneficial economic choice.'" Over the
course of time, as the developing countries' middle class demands a
better style of life, its environment and work conditions will become
better.7 11 Moreover, economically well-off countries like the United
States need not worry about trading with the developing world,
because economically weak countries will become stronger and, in
turn, will be able to buy more products from the more developed
ones.737 Mexicans can now share the American expectation of an
improved lifestyle and a durable and dynamic economy,' due in
large part to NAFTA, while United States authorities understand that
their efforts to curb the entrance of illegal immigrants and narcotics
from their southern neighbor would be more successful if Mexico
See The NAFTA Effect, Whlen Neighbors Embrace. suqyra note 481, at 22
(discussing how foreign and local manufacturers in Mexico have been improving
their sales, production, and distribution methods in order to compete better in
North America).
733. See The NAFTA Effect. When Neijhbors Embrace. supra note 481, at 22
Now there are manufacturers of pesticide, for instance, that deliver from Texas
warehouses directly to northern Mexico customers, while concerns operating in
other businesses deliver from Mexican warehouses directly to American
customers. See id. Products are, therefore, reaching their destination more quickly,
which is advantageous for the firms as well as for their customers. See i.
734. See id. (describing the advantages for customers on both sides from trading
goods more efficiently).
735. See id. at 23 (stating that both the United States and Mexico have gained
from an economic perspective by participating in NAFTA).
736. See id.
737. See id. (stating that the United States has much to gain from freer trade).
738. Cf HOUSE, supra note 599, at 208 (explaining how the Mexican
government instituted commercial development policies in order to benefit from
the United States' expanding economy).
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had a stronger economy.7 9 Thus, NAFTA benefits both nations,
because Mexico's resulting prosperity should provide an incentive
for young Mexicans to remain in Mexico, rather than illegally
immigrating to the United States or engaging in illegal narcotics
S• 740
smuggling.
The inextricable, intertwined relationship between Mexico and the
United States, which NAFTA personifies, is especially noteworthy in
light of the historical hostility between them. 4 Mexican officials
have diminished their former anti-American language, while
American presidents have shown a willingness to protect Mexico
from a frequently antagonistic Congress.
42
The Palestinians, much like the Mexicans, are contiguously
located next to a more advanced neighbor. The Palestinians,
however, are in an especially favorable position, as they also can
produce specialty goods that their economically stronger neighbor,
Israel, wants to purchase, while at the same time they can duplicate
Israeli technologies. 43
The positive results produced by Portugal's participation in EFTA,
and later, Portugal and Spain's participation in the European
Economic Community/European Union T4 similarly may be
instructive for Israel and the Palestinians. Portugal and Spain both
witnessed tremendous economic growth following their entrance into
739. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 22,
23 (observing that Mexico's future economic prospects look promising because of
NAFTA).
740. See id. at 23 (discussing the benefits of NAFTA for residents on each side
of the border).
741. See id. For further discussion of the history of conflict and hostility
between the United States and Mexico, see infra notes 877-903.
742. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 22.
(mentioning that NAFTA has resulted in a stronger alliance between the United
States and Mexico).
743. See Chris Pissarides, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 10, 11.
744. See McKinney, Lessons from the Western European Experience, supra
note 397, at 35-36 (discussing the effects of regional economic integration in
Western Europe).
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the European Community.4 5 Meanwhile, neither the European
Community's economic growth nor that of any specific Member
State has suffered due to their participation. Moreover, none of the
participating European Economic Community countries experienced
a perceptible increase in unemployment attributable to their entrance
into the Community. Rather, all participating countries appear to
have benefited from trade liberalization. ""' The European Union's
open internal market thus appears to be a valuable economic
commodity for all concerned. 47 Indeed, it is economic development
that provides the basic incentive for cooperation across borders,"'
while in turn, positive interaction, mutual trust, appreciation, and
friendship are fostered by cooperation between regions. "
F. INTERDEPENDENCY OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ISRAELIS
In the same way that essential Mexico-United States interests
require political stability and a viable and flourishing Mexican750,
economy, or that essential global interests required economic
prosperity and political stability in a post-World War II Western
Europe,7 1' the vital interests between the Palestinians and Israel
require not only national goals serving as the framework for
745. See id. (arguing that Spain and Portugal have expanded their economic
growth because of their participation in the European Community).
746. See id. at 36 (stating that the positive-sum game of trade liberalization has
been advantageous for the countries involved in the European Community).
747. See John Benyon et al., Understanding Police Cooperation in Europe:
Setting a Franework for Analysis, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
46, 50 (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer, eds. 1994) (arguing that an open
market in the European Community is important because economic interests serve
as promoters of change in Europe).
748. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 261, 267 (stressing the importance of
border region economic development based on trans-border cooperative efforts).
749. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 54, 66 (discussing intergovernmental
cooperation and its effects in the Alps-Adria region).
750. See Bagley, supra note 606, at 13 (noting Mexico's importance to the
United States economy).
751. For further discussion on the need for Western European political stability
and economic prosperity following World War II, see supra notes 441-443 and
accompanying text and infra notes 906-907 and accompanying text.
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economically interdependent relationships, 72 but also that both of
them will be sound and secure from a political standpoint and
thriving and flourishing from an economic perspective.
Economic and social development may also help create popular
support for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process5 3 since, and it bears
repetition, trade, employment, and investment in industry should
increase trust between Israelis and Palestinians, and the resulting
potential risk of loss should make it all the more difficult for the two
sides to engage in a confrontation with one another.5
For instance, the general accessibility of the Israeli labor market to
Palestinians has been one of the strongest benefits that they have
derived from economic connections to Israel, which are vital to the
752. Cf Reynolds, supra note 626, at 134 (discussing the requirements of
cooperative development between Mexico and the United States).
753. See Rick Hooper, in NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 15; see also
Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A; Israeli-
Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at I (stating that in order for the
peace process to improve socio-economic conditions in the region, it needs to be
supported by economic agreements).
754. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A.
For further discussion, see supra note 376 and accompanying text and infra note
766. Conventional wisdom maintained that economics ensures security and that
"people with full pockets do not throw stones." In 1999 and throughout most of
2000, all the security branches in Israel spoke with one voice in support of this
maxim. See Amos Harel, Relying on the Economic Interest of the Palestinians,
supra note 404, at 2A. What was once the minority view in Israel of the people
working in the apparatus of the Coordinator of Activities in the Territories had
developed into the consensus in the general security forces, the Central Army
Command, and even to a certain extent also in the Israel Police. See id. The
obsolete ideas regarding separation between Israel and the West Bank (at least
during the period of the interim agreement) had been abandoned. See id. The Israel
army even desisted from attempting to prevent West Bank Palestinians without
security permits from crossing from the West Bank into Israel to work. See id. The
security barriers between Israel and the West Bank were termed "doors in a house
without walls", and the soldiers manning them were prohibited from detaining
Palestinians crossing through them on foot to Israel. See id. Even Prime Minister
Ehud Barak appeared to have changed his mind and was no longer in favor of
separation schemes between Israelis and Palestinians. See Harel, The Chairman
Prefers Business Before Independence, supra note 377, at 2A. For further
discussion regarding separation schemes, see supra note 377 and accompanying
text.
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Palestinian economy. '"As previously indicated, 30-40 percent of the
Palestinian labor force's income was earned in Israel. ""'
The economic tide of the Palestinians now appears to have
improved.' The April 1998 report of the Special United Nations
755. See Sadan and Lowenthal, supra note 371, at 151; see also Israeli-
Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at 2 (stating that Israel is
cooperating with the Palestinians to create more jobs); ECONOMIC RELATIONS
UPDATE, supra note 454, at 1 (noting the positive trend in Palestinian
employment); ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at I (observing that Israel is accepting more
Palestinian workers which correspondingly reduces the number of foreign
workers).
756. See ECONOMIC RELATIONS UPDATE, supra note 454, at 1. In 1992, there
were approximately 120,000 Palestinians working regularly in Israel. See Keeping
People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48. By September 2000, the annual
income of Palestinians workers in Israel had reached some USSI billion. See
Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, supra note 377, at
2A. For further discussion, see supra notes 450454 and accompanying text and
infra notes 759-772 and accompanying text.
757. See Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at 1, 8;
ECONOMIC RELATIONS UPDATE, supra note 454, at 1. In principle, the per capita
GNP of the Palestinians increased by 2.5% per year from 1968 to 1976, while the
per capita GDP increased at a rate of 2.35% per year between 1977 and 1986.
After that, an epoch of intifada, closures, and war set in and the Palestinian per
capita GNP between 1987 and 1996 dropped to almost zero, while the per capita
GDP increased at only 0.2% per year. See Sadan and Lowenthal, supra note 371,
at 156. Cf The Euro-Economies, Growing Apart, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1999, at
49 (noting that the GDP of Germany for the first quarter of 1999 only increased at
a yearly rate of 0.4 percent). Between 1993 and 1998, the GNP had diminished by
35%. See Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48. By 1995,
Palestinian income from employment in Israel had diminished to under 30% of the
1992 amounts. For further discussion, see infra notes 759-772 and accompanying
text. Industrial trade relations were similarly affected and the value added to
Palestinian trade with Israel had decreased by 35%. See Sadan and Lowenthal,
supra note 371, at 152. In 1993, as a result of security considerations, Israel began
implementing a method called closures to forbid and restrict West Bank and Gaza
Palestinian access into Israel in order to curb Israeli and Palestinian tension. See
Nakhal, supra note 339, at 118; Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra
note 66, at 29; see also Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at
1. A total closure separates Israel from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West
Bank. See Nakhal, supra note 339, at 118-19. During closures, Palestinians are
denied access into Israel proper, while inter-village/town passage within Gaza and
the West Bank is not prohibited. See id. An internal closure does not allow inter-
village/town passage. See Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48;
Nakhal, supra note 339, at 119. Closures which prevent their departure to work
influence the entire Palestinian economy within days: purchasing in the territories
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Coordinator to the territories cited positive growth trends in the
private sector as well as in employment.7 8
According to some observers, approximately one-third of the
Palestinians have been employed in Israel, 719 with both legal and
drops immediately, which harms anyone who sells any goods other than food. See
Hess, Netanyahu: The Closure, supra note 383, at 5A. Cf. Keeping People in Their
Place, supra note 372, at 48 (noting that the government of former Prime Minister
Benyamin Netanyahu did not generally favor closures, yet it did use them at times
as a form of punishment). Throughout the entire year of 1998, which was the last
full year of former Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's government, closures
were only implemented six times. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common
Market, supra note 357, at 6A. Since then and at least until September 2000,
according to one recent source, the policy of closures was not used at all. See
Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, supra note 377, at
2A.
758. See ECONOMIC RELATIONS UPDATE, supra note 454, at 1. (citing a United
Nations report detailing that in 1997, the number of Palestinians working in Israel
increased 14.4% from the previous year). By March of 1999, the United States
Under-Secretary of State for Economic Matters praised the economic improvement
that had taken place in the territories over the last two years of former Prime
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's administration. See Harel, The Closure was
Lifted, supra note 387, at 5A. Additional United Nations reports have also
indicated that the Palestinian economy was enjoying signs of moderate
improvement. Overall unemployment, for instance, had dropped by 5% in 1998.
See Hess, The UN, supra note 383, at 6A; see also Keeping People in Their Place,
supra note 372, at 48 (citing a 3% drop in the unemployment rate of Palestinians,
from 24 % to 2 1%). Israeli sources placed the Palestinian unemployment rate at an
even lower 15.5% average. See Israel-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note
347, at 3. On the other hand, a World Bank report, published in February of 1999,
indicated a declining West Bank and Gaza Strip economy since the Oslo Accords,
citing diminishing income and rampant unemployment. See The World Bank: The
Palestinian Economy is Declining Because of the Political Situation, supra note
461, at 5A (indicating that this report put unemployment at forty percent). Other
reports have shown a twenty-five percent drop in the standard of living among
residents in the territories. See Aluf Ben, Gives a Chance to Barak, HA'ARETZ,
Aug. 25, 1999, at 10A (in Hebrew) (on file with author). Recent statistics,
however, from September 2000, demonstrated a significant plunge in Palestinian
unemployment, to an eleven percent level. See Harel, The Chairman Prefers
Business Before Independence, supra note 377, at 2A. For further discussion, see
supra note 461.
759. See Samir Huleileh, it NEW VISIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, supra note 375, at 7. They have
been enticed to work in Israel by relatively high wages. See Hazboun, supra note
383, at 89 (describing how the Palestinian agricultural sector has lost workers
because of the higher wages offered in Israel). For further discussion on
Palestinians employed in Israel, see supra note 404 and accompanying text.
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illegal workers currently constituting an important component of the
Palestinian workforce, as previously mentioned.' The number of
Palestinians employed in Israel steadily has increased since the late
1960s, comprising, according to other observers, some forty percent
of the Palestinian labor force by the late 1980s."" Specifically, the
seventeen percent of the Gaza Strip residents who worked in Israel in
the first part of 1998, for instance, supported approximately forty
percent of all Gazans, according to the Israel Coordinator of
Activities in the Territories.7 62 As of August 1999, the figures showed
that forty-eight percent of all Gaza income was received from work
in Israel, by eighteen percent of Gaza residents who were working
763there. More generally speaking, in early 1998, approximately
50,000 workers from the territories were legally working in Israel7
and up to 40,000 were working illegally.7' By September 1998, the
number of Palestinian workers in Israel had thus increased
significantly over the past.7" More recently, the Palestinian Authority
760. See Hess, Netanyahu: The Closure, supra note 383, at 5A. For further
discussion of illegal Palestinian workers, see supra notes 404, 449, 766 and
accompanying text.
761. See Cohen & Haberfeld, supra note 448. at 109; see also Khalili, supra
note 383, at 131. The Palestinian laborers in Israel were basically employed in a
number of specific industries: agriculture (approximately fifteen percent),
unskilled manufacturing positions (approximately twenty percent), and
construction (approximately fifty percent). See Cohen & Haberfeld, supra, at 109.
Palestinians were eventually employed in other branches of the economy, but in
similarly low-end jobs. The notion of opening up the Israeli labor market to
Palestinians while denying them advancement opportunities was similar to the
practice employed in European countries where foreign workers were also
working. See id.
762. See Harel & Sheri, supra note 347, at 9A.
763. See Palestinian Workers in Israel-Facts and Figures, HA'ARETz, Aug.
30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
764. See Harel & Sheri, supra note 347, at 9A; ECONOMIC RELATIONS UPDATE,
supra note 454, at 1; ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTNIAN AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at 2.
765. See ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at 2; ECONOMIC RELATIONS UPDATE, supra note 454,
at 1.
766. See Hess, Netanyahu: The Closure. supra note 383, at 6A (stating that at
this time, a general closure was imposed on the territories). According to The
ECONOMIST'S statistics, 38,000 Palestinians were working in Israel in 1997 and by
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and Israel had agreed to work together to employ 140,000
documented workers,"' a significant improvement from the
the first quarter of 1998, 45,000 Palestinians were legally employed there. See
Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48. However, 25% fewer
Palestinians worked in Israel in June 1997, for instance, than the number of
permits issued that month to work. See Cohen & Haberfeld, supra note 448, at
109. In August of 1998, Israeli sources indicated that approximately 60,000
Palestinians were legally employed in Israel, including about 13,000 working in
the settlements and in industrial zones. See Israeli-Palestinian Economic
Relations, supra note 347, at 2. Also, the number of Palestinians permitted to work
in the settlements and the industrial parks in the territories has increased to 20,000.
See Palestinian Workers in Israel - Facts and Figures, supra note 763, at 6A. The
increase in the number of Palestinian workers in Israel by 1998 resulted from the
fact that Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's government had a more relaxed
attitude on the issue of Palestinian labor than did his predecessor. See Keeping
People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48, 49.
As previously indicated, the number of undocumented Palestinian workers in
Israel is at least equal to the amount legally working there. See Keeping People in
Their Place, supra note 372, at 48. The number of illegal Palestinian workers was
placed last year at between 40,000 to 60,000. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian
Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A; ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at 2; see also ECONOMIC
RELATIONS UPDATE, supra note 454, at 1. Most of these undocumented workers
are from the West Bank. See Harel, The Israeli- Palestinian Common Market,
supra note 357, at 6A; see also Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at
48. For further discussion, see supra notes 404, 449-450 and accompanying text.
In fact, Israeli security authorities are now openly discussing the benefits of
"laundering" illegal Palestinian work. Senior officers of the Israel Defense Force
are now claiming that "economics is security" and that the more employment for
Palestinians, the lower the risk of terror attacks. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian
Coinmon Market, supra note 357, at 6A (noting that such declarations are a
relatively new phenomenon for the Israeli Army). For further discussion, see supra
notes 376, 754 and accompanying text.
Israel has also allowed Palestinian workers to move freely between employers
inside Israel, and issued an extra 15,000 permits to Palestinian businessmen in
1998. See Keeping People in Their Place, supra note 372, at 48. By August of
1998, the total number stood at 21,000 businessmen permits. See Amos Hare,
More Workers from the Territories, HA'ARETZ, Aug. 24, 1999, at IA (in Hebrew)
(on file with author). Some 30,000 Palestinian merchants and businessmen were
crossing the green line daily into Israel as of September 2000. See Harel, The
Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, supra note 377, at 2A.
Approximately 5,000 businessmen were permitted to travel between Gaza and the
West Bank by August 1999. See Harel, More Workers fiom the Territories, supra,
at IA. This latter figure, of course, reflects the situation during the period
preceding the opening of the road through Israel for direct Palestinian traffic
between the West Bank and Gaza.
767. See Amos Harel, Israel and the Authority Agreed to Increase the Number
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approximately 60,000 documented Palestinian workers employed in
Israel in November 1998.7" As of September 2000, 120,000
Palestinians were coming daily to work in Israel. " ' One of the
objectives of increasing the number of Palestinian workers was likely
the diminishing of the number of documented and undocumented
foreign workers in Israel.' Another goal, which both Israel and the
Palestinian Authority shared, was to decrease the number of
undocumented Palestinian workers in Israel, since the Israelis have a
security interest and the Palestinians have tax collection interests.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that even during normal closures,
some 100,000 Palestinian workers, merchants, drivers, and students
in Israel, as well as Palestinian Authority workers from the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, have been permitted to enter Israel. By
comparison, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 laborers without
permits, particularly from the West Bank, have entered Israel during
normal closures.7
Palestinians trade preponderantly with Israel.- ' According to the
of Documented Palestinian Workers to 140 Thousand. HA'ARTz, Nov. 11). 1998,
at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harel, Israel and the
Authorit,] (noting that many of these laborers were to be employed in the
construction industry). The agreement falls within the framework of the Joint
Employment Committee, and with the participation of the Deputy Director of the
Israel Ministry of Labor and Welfare, the Coordinator of Activities in the
Territories, and the Head of the Palestinian Civil Committee. See id.
768. See id; see also Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relattonm, supra note 347 at
2 (noting that there were an additional 40,000 undocumented workers in Israel in
1998 as well).
769. See Harel, The Chairmnan Prefers Business Belore Independence, supra
note 377, at 2A.
770. See Harel, Israel and the Authority. supra note 767, at 5A; see also Hard,
The Israeli-Palestinian Comnon Market. supra note 357. at 6A; Israeli-
Palestinian Economic Relations, supra note 347, at 2; ECONOMIc RELANTIONS
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at 1. For
further discussion of foreign workers in Israel, see supra note 448.
771. See Harel, Israel and the AuthoritY, supra note 767. at 5A.
772. See Hess, Netanvahu: The Closure, supra note 383, at 5A; see also Hard,
The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A (citing the figure
of 30,000 Palestinians who were permitted into Israel even during normal closures,
under the "continuing work plan"); Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, supra
note 347, at 2, 3.
773. See Tschaeni, supra note 700, at 4; Keeping People in Their Place. supra
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United Nations Commission for Trade and Development in 1996,
Israel was the destination of for 88.3 percent of all Palestinian
exports and the origin of 89.9 percent of all Palestinian imports.7
Understandably, the Palestinian economy is thus highly dependent
on Israel.7 7s Yet, although Israel is the most obvious market for
Palestinian products,7 Israeli trade with the Palestinians accounts for
only about eight percent of Israel's foreign trade. Because Israel is
a much larger developed economy,7 8 it has a much greater impact on
the Palestinians' economy than the Palestinians have on Israel's. 7
Nevertheless, the two economies are more interdependent now than
they have been since 1993 .
Therefore, most Palestinian economists appreciate the
interdependency of Palestine's economic relationship with Israel,
7
11
note 372, at 49.
774. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: ISRAEL, TIlE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 3"D QUARTER 1999, at 27.
775. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A.
This is similar to the Mexican economy which is highly dependent on that of the
United States. See Purcell, supra note 50, at 1 (describing the increasing
interdependence between the economies of Mexico and the United States, and the
resentment by many Mexicans of the "asymmetry" of the relationship). For further
discussion on Mexico's dependency on the United States, see supra notes 624-666
and accompanying text.
776. See Bahiri, supra note 371, at 92-93.
777. See Tschaeni, supra note 700, at 3; see also Israeli Exports, in ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN TRADE: PRESENT ISSUES, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, supra
note 297, at 25 (indicating that exports from Israel to Gaza and the West Bank in
1996 constituted 8% of all Israel's exports).
778. See Tahboub, supra note 480, at 65.
779. See Bahiri, supra note 468, at 34; see also Baskin, supra note 297, at 38-
39.
780. See Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, supra note 357, at 6A
(pointing out that the trade between the two reached US$2.5 billion annually by
early 1998); see also ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, supra note 404, at 1; Israeli-Palestinian Economic
Relations, supra note 347, at 1 (noting that because of the interrelated economies,
Israel has a vested interest in encouraging the Palestinian economy). As previously
mentioned, the economic value of the relationship between the Palestinians and the
Israelis by the middle of September 2000 stood at US$4 billion. See Harel, The
Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, supra note 377, at 2A.
781. See Shtayyeh, supra note 297, at 187; Manuel Hassassian, in Minutes of
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particularly in respect to labor and trade. "2 It is vital that the
Palestinian work force continue to be employed in Israel. " A viable
Palestinian economy and closed borders between Israel and Palestine
cannot coexist/8 Open borders will provide economic benefits to the
Palestinians, in particular, as they will be able to take advantage of
Israel's advanced consumer economy and trade ties with Europe, the
United States, and the rest of the world. Open economic relations
will enhance overall relations between the two sides.'"
XIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT
Palestinian and Israeli criminal elements have cooperated quite
successfully and profitably.16 They have collaborated to engage in
such diverse activities as the cross-border traffic of tens of thousands
of stolen cars annually'87 and the sale of counterfeit pharmaceutical
Conference on Labor Migration, in LABOR, MIGRATION: PALESTINE, EGYPT,
JORDAN AND ISRAEL, supra note 262, at 127, 188-189.
782. See Shtayyeh, supra note 297, at 187.
783. See Hassassian, supra note 781, at 186 (stating that Palestinian workers in
Israel foster economic prosperity for the Palestinians).
784. See id. at 188-89 (arguing that walls and boundaries between the
Palestinians and Israel are not feasible).
785. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased" Boundary, supra
note 102, at 95 (observing that political boundaries will negatively impact the
Israeli and Palestinian economy).
786. See Amos Harel, Contrar
" 
to the Agreements, The Authority is Arresting
Israelis, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 1, 1999, at 5A (in Hebrew) (on file with author). It is not
an unusual phenomenon that some people living in border regions engage in
smuggling activites. See Wilson & Donnan, supra note 81, at 10, 21. Efficient
smuggling relations has been apparent in the border region of Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland. See id. at 11. Such illicit relations have resulted in the
creation of an economy of localized smuggling, founded on a multitude of
informal connections on both sides of the border. See O'Dowd, et. al., Borders,
National Sovereignty, supra note 81, at 275, 277; see also Wilson & Donnan,
supra note 81, at 11. The booming informal economy of smuggling in Ireland
functioned inside the two states' official economies and was a part of the creation
of a particular border culture. See O'Dowd and Corrigan, supra note 81, at 120.
787. See, e.g., Nicole Karo, A Border Patrolman is Suspected of Rendering
Assistance in the Transfer of Stolen Cars to the Area of the A uthoriny, HA'ARETZ,
Oct. 22, 1998, at 7A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); see also 48 Suspects Were
Arrested for Selling Vehicles and Defrauding Insurance, HA'ARETZ, June 27,
1999, at 10A (in Hebrew) (on file with author); Nina Pinto, The Police Raided
Garages that Traded in Stolen Spare Parts, HA'ARETZ, June 30, 1999, at 9A (in
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prescriptions to Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority. ' In light of
these flourishing and lucrative cooperative efforts of Israeli and
Palestinian criminals, there is no reason, therefore, why legal cross-
border activities designed to thwart their sinister intentions, such as
between Palestinians and Israelis law enforcement personnel, should
not be equally successful. 7 9 In fact, Israeli and Palestinian law
enforcement officials indeed have successfully cooperated, for
example, in the fight against counterfeit currency,79 ° illegal drug
trafficking, and in murder investigations.792
Cross-border cooperation in the form of law enforcement
agreements or understandings relating to mutual assistance between
law enforcement officials at different government levels plays an
important role in satisfying mutual public safety objectives also
along the border between Mexico and the United States.7 1' For
example, when a fugitive from the United States flees to Mexico,
American and Mexican law enforcement authorities have cooperated
to see that the fugitive is apprehended and extradited to the United
Hebrew) (on file with author); Aliza Arbeli, Dozens of Arrests of Suspects in
Vehicle Thefts to the Territory of the Authority, HA'ARETZ, June 6, 2000, at 13A
(in Hebrew) (on file with author); Aliza Arbeli, Two Settlers Suspected of"
Smuggling Car-s to the Territory of the Palestinian Authority, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 5,
2000, at 12A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
788. See Iris Krauz and Nicole Karo, Sick Fund Doctors Suspected of Selling to
Criminals Fictive Prescriptions, HA'ARETZ, June 18, 1999, at I IA (in Hebrew)
(on file with author).
789. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 77 (noting the high rate of cross-border
traffic in stolen cars).
790. See Azulai, supra note 671, at 25.
791. See, e.g., Zigalman, supra note 671, at 9A. Around the same time, the
United States and Mexico were in the process of agreeing on further measures to
fight drug traffickers who use Mexico as a base from which to supply the
American drug market. See Clinton in Mexico: Hillar' Will Be 'Great' in the
Senate, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 16, 1999, at 16A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
792. See, e.g., Hess, The Body of a Palestinian Woman, supra note 671, at 4A.
However, joint law enforcement activities do not always turn out as desired. See
Anat Zigalman, Jabril Rajub: Israel Thwarted Joint Combat of Car Thefts,
HA'ARETZ, July 28, 1999, at 1 A (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
793. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 465 (illustrating by way of example
how law enforcement mutual aid "understandings" along the Texas-Mexico border
frequently take place); HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (describing cooperative
policing activities between the United States and Mexico).
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States for trial.794 Also, the United States has provided intelligence
information to Mexican officials so they may prevent crime in
Mexico.9 -
The confiscation and return of property stolen from the United
States and taken to Mexico has also been quite problematic. It
extends to everything from cars stolen by sophisticated auto theft
rings to trifling articles shoplifted by individual juveniles."
American insurance companies, with the cooperation of the Laredo,
Texas police, have informally arranged for the assistance of the
police in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico to help them locate and get back
stolen property. In return, the Mexicans have received firearms,
which are considerably more costly in Mexico, or cash. " ' In addition,
informers have worked undercover in Mexico for the United States to
collect intelligence information regarding stolen property and
•• 791
smuggling. Moreover, police from Mexico have trained in the
United States, and American police have loaned equipment to
Mexican authorities.'o Americans have also assisted in the search for
fugitives or accident victims using airplanes and helicopters from the
794. See Sloan & West, supra note 602, at 465.
795. See id. at 465-66 (detailing cooperative intelligence gathenng efforts).
796. See id. at 466.
797. See id. (describing the system of exchange that has developed between the
United States and Mexican law enforcement authorities).
798. See id. (detailing stolen property recovery efforts conducted across the
United States-Mexico border).
799. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (delineating various examples of cross-
border civic cooperation based upon mutual necessities). see also Sloan & West,
supra note 601, at 466 (noting that American police loan Mexican law
enforcement officials items such as radios, tear gas, two-way radios, automobiles,
weapons, and binoculars). In an attempt to enhance anti-drug cooperation between
the two countries, Mexican military personnel have trained on United States bases
for counter-drug operations. Other examples of military cooperative efforts
between the United States and Mexico have centered on joint programs for disaster
relief and force training, modernization, and education. See Linda D. Kozaryn,
U.S. and Mexico to Increase Cooperation, in .lmerican Forces Inibrmation
Service News Articles, (visited July 24, 2000)
<http://vww.defenselink.mil/news/May 1996 /n05081996_9605086.htm>; see also
Stanley Meisler, U.S. Bolstering Mexican Militarv. Report Says; Latin America:
Washington Group Compiles Dossier on Assistance to Region, LOS ANiELES
TIMES (July 15, 1998), (visited July 27, 2000 <http:, web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/d...md5=dda7834f7t7e7e I 259b971 1 8e40d9 01 >.
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United States,' °0 and have provided experts specializing in
photography and fingerprinting 0 ' to assist crime-fighting efforts in
neighboring Mexican cities.8°2 These, then, are only a few examples
of the procedures and informal understandings that impact law
enforcement relationships across the Mexico-United States border;
law enforcement personnel on both sides have developed an informal
relationship, so that they know who to contact when they need
help.
80 3
A catalyst for the increased proclivity of traffickers of illicit
narcotics, terrorists, and other criminals to ignore borders between
states is the drive to integrate Western Europe; the development of a
market which is free in people, services, goods, and capital " allows
800. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 466.
801. See id.
802. See HOUSE, supra note 599, at 253 (citing other examples of cross-border
civic cooperation in which American and Mexican border towns frequently share
fire engines when necessary, as well as public health control measures, pollution
monitoring, information on communicable diseases, and, at times, medical and
dental facilities, on a paid basis). A U.S.-Mexico Bi-national Drug Control
Strategy, published in 1998, contained cooperative effort proposals dealing with
such issues as processing extradition and fugitives requests, fighting organized
crime and the illicit trade in weapons, combating money laundering and the
production of drugs, the destruction of illicit crops, and the seizure of drugs. See
Relations with the U.S., supra note 601, at 2.
803. See Sloan & West, supra note 601, at 460, 466 (demonstrating how the
network of personal and social relationships on both sides of the border is critical
to the achievement of public cooperation).
804. See Neil Walker, European Integration and European Policing: A
Complex Relationship, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note
747, at 22, 27 [hereinafter Walker, European Integration] (contrasting the
historical approach, which confuses the consequences with the causes, with the
counterfactual approach, which focuses more closely upon the contemporary
relevance of policing institutions); see also, ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 125 (contrasting the opening of frontiers and
its liberation implications with the closing of frontiers for the protection of
community and social identities and interests); Bigo, supra note 88, at 153
(arguing that firmness is necessary now to avoid the need to be repressive later);
Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 2, 3 (stating that the 1985 Single
European Act and the European Commission's white paper accelerated the process
of border dismantling); ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 186-
87 (noting how security threats have evolved from massive military offensives to a
lesser, but more widespread prevalence of disorder including organized crime).
For example, between 1990-1991, crime across the Germany-Poland border
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criminals to roam Europe unimpeded. " ' This results in a lack of
control over the criminal element," leading to the creation of a
single European market for crime, without regard to national
borders. °7 Accordingly, the enhanced mobility of crime and
criminals is evidence of the need for cooperation among European
law enforcement authorities," ' since European Union security is
clearly threatened by cross-border crime requires international
action.'°9
The trafficking of illegal narcotics is an example of the need for
collaboration efforts for European law enforcement purposes. The
combined wealth of the EU's Member States provides a valuable
increased by 400%, while border-crossings increased by only 40%. See Bort,
supra note 81, at 91 (demonstrating the nature of this change from an "alienated"
sealed border to an open one). German borders are consequently viewed as being
quite porous. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 187
(noting, for example, how the 420 kilometers of its border with Switzerland is only
policed minimally, and that in 1992, more than one million people entered
Germany with the intention of permanent residency there).
805. See John Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 48 (discussing the argument that
relaxed border controls foretells a great rise in crime). see also, ANDERSON ET AL.
POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 125 (describing how many
Europeans believed that a sudden relaxation of police and customs activity along
the border would encourage criminals interested in expanding their activities).
806. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at
154 (explaining how the level of security at the internal borders was dependent on
the extent of external border policing rules and standards).
807. See Europe's Borders: A Single Market in Crimne. ECONOMIST, Oct. 16,
1999, at 23-24 (contending that the result would push border controls to the outer
rim of the Union, as well as drive certain cross-border activities underground).
808. See John Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 49 (noting the importance of
further in-depth analyses regarding European police cooperation). ANDERSON,
FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that a ripple effect would
involve all borders, not only the borders of Europe); World: Europe Euro-cops
take on Organised Crime, BBC ONLINE NETWORK. BBC NEWS, October 1, 1998,
at 1, (visited June 22, 2000) <http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english world/
europe/newsid%5F184000/184690.stm>; see also World: Europe EU drive
against organised crime, BBC ONLINE NETWORK, BBC NEWS, October 15, 1999,
at 2, (visited June 22, 2000) <http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.ukihi/english world/
urope/newsid%5F475000/475420.stm>.
809. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at
73 (noting the significance of EU Member States' admission that transnational
crime poses a genuine threat to internal security).
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illicit drug market and money laundering infrastructure.""' In this
respect, Western Europe is similar to the United States, as they both
attract criminal activity due to the immense profits that can be
illegally made.8 ' Furthermore, the United States, like Western
Europe, is located nearby states with much different social and living
standards."' In addition, the EU's permeable borders themselves
facilitate the trafficking of illicit narcotics."' Law enforcement
agencies may accomplish a great deal in intercepting or disrupting
the profitability of the trafficking in illicit narcotics and
psychotropics.' Indeed, there have been efforts since the 1970s to
foster a mutual way to repress illicit drug use.
The quickly expanding illegal trafficking of human beings, which
has become almost as lucrative as the traffic of illegal drugs, is a
recent addition to the more traditional list of illicit European cross-
border trade in stolen automobiles, weapons, and narcotics."' The
permeability of EU borders particularly has been helpful to the
810. See id. at 38 (pointing out how these factors combine to establish an
opportune structure within the international drug trade).
811. See id. at 127 (comparing the EU drug market with that in the United
States).
812. See id. (describing the United States' relationship with its neighbors to the
South); see also Russell King, The Mediterranean: Europe's Rio Grande, in TIlE
FRONTIERS OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 109; Fortress Europe, ECONOMIST, Oct.
16. 1999, at 19, 20 (describing how the millions of people who illegally slip across
the EU's borders in search of a better life undermine the freedom to move within
the various states of the EU). The former border between China and I-long Kong is
another analogy. At the time, that border divided two tremendously varied social
and economic societies, which facilitated considerable illegal immigration and
smuggling, as well as armed robbery, over the border. Although this border has
been eliminated, the economic and social differences have not been erased. See
ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 127.
813. See King, supra note 812, at 131 (noting that this also presents a problem
for policymakers).
814. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 8 1, at
38-39 (explaining that there is much to be gained through cooperative efforts).
815. See id. at 283 (noting that although success has been limited, harmonized
attempts to foster a common approach to the repression of illegal drugs among EU
states have been taking place since the 1970's); see also Borders: Good Fences,
supra note 66, at 21.
816. See Europe's Borders: A Single Market in Crime, supra note 807, at 23
(describing the disturbing increase in the illegal trafficking in human beings).
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roughly half million "illegals" who annually have been attracted to
the economically strong European Union.' Statistics reporting the
number of people illegally smuggled into Europe provide a
conservative annual estimate of 400,000."
While experts are of the opinion that law enforcement cooperation
is critical and must be improved in order for the integration of
Europe to proceed,"' more advanced manners of police cooperation
in Europe are viewed as possible due to increasing political
cooperation with the EU.2"
Over the course of European integration, different approaches have
developed concerning law enforcement cooperation,''
817. See Fortress Europe, supra note 812, at 20 (suggesting that as long as there
is an economic disparity this large, "illegals" will continue to slip across borders).
818. See id. at 23 (noting that since 1993, the increase has been five fold).
819. See Malcolm Anderson. The Agenda ,br Police Cooperation, in POLICING
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 747, at 3 [hereinafter Anderson, The
Agenda for Police Cooperation]; see also Fortress Europe, supra note 812, at 19.
In Western Europe, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation in
criminal matters is rather new. See ANDERSON ET AL.. POLICI\ THE EUROPL-XN
UNION, supra note 81, at 44 (listing various obstacles to a clear policy regarding
European police cooperation). Such cooperation has also been ineffective. See id.
at 247. Nor was it set up as an official part of the original structure of the European
Union. See Anderson, The Agenda for Police Cooperation, supra, at 3 (explaining
that despite the remarkable development of European integration, no dominant
conceptual framework has emerged). Moreover, some experts have stressed the
importance of harmonizing criminal justice and mutual judicial assistance, rather
than institutionalizing or coordinating policing across the border. See ANDERSO\
ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION. supra note 81. at 84, 248. Thus by as late
as the mid-1990's, law enforcement cooperation had not yet been formalized. See
id. at 84. Conventional mechanisms have accordingly not been a major factor in
the Europe-without internal-border's crime combating effort, due to their terribly
complex nature and variability. See ANDERSON ET AL.. POLICING THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 81, at 247 (noting factors that characterize the current
arrangements for mutual assistance in administration of justice among European
Union states). Modem European policing has consequently progressed in an
uneven manner, and its future is thus uncertain. See Walker, The New Frontiers Of
European Policing, supra note 52, at 165.
820. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION. supra note 81, at
84 (noting that even former critics of such a system have begun to acknowledge its
benefits).
821. See id. at 38 (discussing these various approaches). It is not our objective to
discuss herein all the various viewpoints relating to the political theory of
European integration and its effect on police cooperation. We intend to
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notwithstanding similar professional experience, political consensus,
mutual material interests and cultural practices, and considerations of
costs and advantages to the effect that criminal investigations and
prosecutions become less expensive and more effectual with
enhanced cooperation among police forces.822 It has often been said
that closer cross-border cooperation among law enforcement
authorities is needed because contemporary mass transportation and
communications systems have succeeded in disabling customary
border controls."' Commentators argue that intensified law
enforcement cooperation is a direct outcome of necessity and
changing circumstances. Clearly, internal European police
coordination is seen as necessary to effectively deter crime.
Since law enforcement cooperation is therefore required to curb
the increase in the level of crime,825 the elimination of EU internal
border controls, which were frequently viewed as crime stoppers, has
consequently stimulated new ideas regarding enhanced cross-border
cooperation among police forces to offset the negative effects that
demonstrate, through the use of selected European examples and analogies, how
Palestinian and Israeli law enforcement officials might work better with one
another and what the advantages and disadvantages of such cooperation may be. It
bears mention at this point, nonetheless, that among the reasons that some
observers do not even believe that a European police cooperation theory as such
actually exists are the following: (1) Most police matters are neither international
nor regional, but local, and therefore, law enforcement practice maintains a
distinctively national concentration; and (2) since there are numerous levels and
spheres of law enforcement cooperation across borders, its practice is hard to
determine. See id. at 40.
822. See id. at 38 (citing numerous arguments in favor of increased EU
cooperation to reconcile national interests and to resolve the lack of coordination
between various national law enforcement agencies).
823. But see Anderson, The Agenda for Police Cooperation, supra note 819, at
4 (criticizing this frequently made assertion as based on crude functionalist
premises).
824. See id. at 5 (discussing the political theory of European integration).
825. See Bigo, supra note 88, at 154, 161 (noting that controls can only be
effective if they are based on an accurate understanding of realities); see also
Walker, European Integration, supra note 804, at 27. This is notwithstanding the
contention that apparently not much seems to be known about crime across
European borders. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 48 (noting that diverse
criminal justice systems as well as the variety of bilateral and multilateral
agreements complicate the issues of cooperative law enforcement).
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have consequently arisen.'2
Governments, security forces, and police in Europe have made
great efforts to create effective measures of cooperation to combat
criminal activity,2' which has resulted in significant advancements in
the realm of cross-border police work and law enforcement
cooperation. 2 1 Informal networks, secret arrangements, bilateral
826. See Monica den Boer, The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and
Justification in a Disorderly Debate, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL
BOUNDARIES, supra note 747, at 174 (contrasting the experts' views with the
assertion that there may be serious implications with finance, democracy, and civil
liberties if the experts' views remain unchallenged); see also Fortress Europe,
supra note 812, at 19.
827. See Charles D. Raab, Police Cooperation: The Prospects Jbr Privacy, in
POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 747, at 121 (listing drug
trafficking, financial fraud, terrorism, art and antique theft, and large scale
movements of people across borders as the most prevalent of crimes).
828. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 46 (theorizing that any such
advancement resulted as a response to changes in the political, economic, and
social context of the European Community and Europe as a whole). The path to
effective law enforcement cooperation in Europe has been an arduous one. See id.
at 46 (explaining that progress has been intermittent and incremental).
Advancement towards cooperation has been uneven. See Walker, The New
Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52, at 168 (pointing out the variable
progress in the cooperation among police in the EU). Thus, according to some
observers, little has been accomplished in enhancing law enforcement cooperation
across borders from an operational standpoint, and what minor progress has been
made remains limited to the territorial principle of enforcement jurisdiction. See
ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 218. Law
enforcement is therefore still fundamentally a state concern and suspicions are
accordingly aroused regarding suggestions aimed at promoting law enforcement
activity on an international scale when they border delicate political sovereignty
issues. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 47. The multifariousness of specific
state rules pertaining to criminal procedures and offenses, and the authority of
police, obstructs cross-border EU police cooperation. See ANDERSON ET AL.,
POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 181; Europe's Borders: A
Single Market in Crime, supra note 807, at 26. Moreover, achieving worthwhile
cooperation among national forces all functioning within the one state, and
sometimes also within the same unit, is frequently complicated enough. See
Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 49 (emphasizing that a high level of effective
cooperation is often difficult to achieve between forces operating within the same
country). Effective cooperation among multiple police forces in multiple states is
all that more complex. See id. at 48. The complicated nature of the problem is
astonishing. See id. at 48, 54. In addition to the fifteen different Members of the
European Union with various judicial traditions, there are countless individual
legal jurisdictions and around 120 police forces. See Europe's Borders: A Single
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agreements, and formal frameworks all function to further law
enforcement activities across borders and foster cooperation." For
Market in Crime, supra note 807, at 26. European police forces differ considerably
from one other. In some states, single national forces operate, while others contain
state and federal divisions of police responsibility. See Benyon et al., supra note
747, at 48. Some jurisdictions operate a national force together with many regional
forces, run semi-autonomous forces by the dozens, have a police force set up on
different planes with jurisdictional and authority disputes, have mutually
integrated forces, and have two statewide or very centralized forces. See id. at 48,
54. Police forces in Europe are not organized according to any specific pattern and
have no basic uniformity. See id. at 48, 54. Therefore, procedures and practices
can be quite diverse. See id. at 54. Legislative, linguistic, and cultural differences
further hinder effective police cooperation. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING TIll
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 85. Police forces within the EU are also
frequently unaware of other police force organization, structure, and crime
handling methods. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 48. Moreover, police
forces function in the framework of various criminal justice systems. See id. The
differing procedures, communications, and varied organizational and legal
frameworks, together with the different traditions and cultures, make it even more
complicated to achieve cross-border law enforcement authority cooperation than
internal law enforcement cooperation. See id. Obstacles to EU crime control
continue to exist in Member States with varied legal systems, criminal justice
procedures, and police organization. This consequently represents another area in
which borders continue to function as barriers. Disagreement, conflict, expense,
misunderstandings, and delay are among the outcomes of the complexities
involved in matters such as crime definition, differing law enforcement policies,
witness subpoenaing, inter-jurisdictional transfer of evidence, and arrests. The
unification of criminal law and procedure are not simple tasks, and there is little
political desire to harmonize them. See ANDERSON, FRONTIERS, TERRITORY, supra
note 4, at 188-89. In light of these seemingly insurmountable differences and
difficulties, some are surprised that cooperation among European law enforcement
authorities has progressed as far as it has, especially given the diversity of agencies
involved. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 54. There are, nonetheless, some
indications of progress. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 81, at 72. For instance, the decentralized nature of law enforcement
cooperation in Europe is slowly giving way to a more centralized and coordinated
approach. See id. at 73. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative improvements in
law enforcement activity across borders have also been taking place. See 0. While
cooperation among law enforcement authorities concentrated on data exchanges
until the late 1980's, currently more dynamic types of police cooperation, which
take advantage of new technologies like electronic surveillance,
telecommunications, computerized data banks, smart cards, DNA profiling, and
mutual intelligence and information analysis, are becoming important. See id. at
73.
829. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 46, 48, 53 (arguing that while there
have been attempts at cooperation, there has been little coordination of the policies
involved). The cooperation agreements, which have various origins and have taken
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instance, some of these formal frameworks give police cross-border
authority with respect to interrogation, detention, arrest, and
investigation matters,"" while close personal contact between various
countries' mid-level police officials represents a significant aspect of
informal arrangements.'
Cooperation on a practical level among administrators and policy
professionals was put in place before formal political frameworks,
and it continues to endure.*"2 Perhaps the most venerable and oldest
arrangement for fostering cooperation among law enforcement
authorities is the International Criminal Police Organization, or
Interpol. That organization furthers cooperation among police forces
through aid and collaboration in particular investigations.
X11
The Schengen Agreement, originally signed by five states' in
1985 and later joined by other states," ' represents a rather
shape gradually, are quite intricate. See id. at 46.
830. See id. at 53 (noting that discussions on these agreements can only take
place at the highest level).
831. See id. at 54, 55 (providing, as an example of such face-to-face
cooperation, the preparation for policing the English Channel tunnel). The
importance of informal ties lies in the fact that they allow officers closest to the
policing activity to work together. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING rlE
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 75. More formal cooperation among police
forces in Europe will involve giving officials and civil servants most, if not all, of
police business, thereby reducing the role played by practical and professional
knowledge. See id. at 287. One risk involved in this scheme is that informal,
unaccountable cooperation frameworks might be created if EU law enforcement
personnel become disillusioned. According to police experts, the evolution of
unsuitable strategies for criminal justice may be another risk. See i. Yet, most
realize that due to disadvantages inherent in informal structures, formalized
cooperation among police in Europe is nevertheless a necessity. See id. at 84. For
further discussion, see infra notes 837, 842 and accompanying text.
832. See Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52, at
175 (placing cooperation on a practical level in an historical context and
explaining that the legacy has remained strong).
833. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 56 (indicating that Interpol's role
exists primarily as a communications network, allowing for discussions of
European crime trends). Interpol's history began in the period between the two
world wars. The organization is situated in Lyon, France, and today has more than
169 members. See id.
834. See, e.g., Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52,
at 166.
835. See id. (recounting the formation and growth of the Schengen Agreement).
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enterprising step towards the formalization of European law
enforcement cooperation. The 1990 Schengen Implementing
Convention continued this trend by way of an all-inclusive effort to
facilitate cross-border law enforcement cooperation. 37  Some
observers believe it is a forerunner to future cooperation structures.""
Arrangements that that allow police to function beyond their border
also enhance cooperation, such as those where law enforcement
authority is extended up to ten kilometers beyond a state's internal
borders in cases of hot pursuit. "9
The Trevi group is an important European law enforcement
cooperation forum, which includes, among other associates,
Switzerland, Canada, and the United States. The group was
established in 1975 to coordinate anti-terrorism action, assess threats,
and exchange ideas, information, and data regarding issues of private
security, public order, equipment, and training. ° It later assumed the
added responsibility of handling information exchanges for more
serious crimes, such as environmental and computer crime, money
laundering, stolen artworks and antiques, trafficking of illicit
narcotics, and organized crime. 4' The meetings of the Trevi ministers
836. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 57; see also Driessen, supra note 534,
at 182 (focusing on the immigration aspect of the Schengen Agreement).
837. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 57-58 (describing key
implementations, including measures on visa regime harmonization, hot pursuit,
and the establishment of a computerized data exchange system); see also Walker,
The New Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52, at 166. In 1995, the
Schengen framework began operating. It is interesting to note that some experts
worried that informal structures, which are crucial in border region cooperation,
might be at risk due to the Schengen Agreement's formalization of law
enforcement cooperation. See ANDERSON ET. AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 81, at 75 (noting that despite the concern that the formalization
of police cooperation will endanger informal arrangements, informal cooperation
will not be halted because it is essential in policing the border regions). For further
discussion, see supra note 831 and accompanying text and infra note 842 and
accompanying text.
838. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 58-59 (suggesting that improvements
will be implemented based on this prototype's successes and failures).
839. See id. at 58.
840. See id. at 59.
841. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 59-60 (outlining the objectives of
"Working Group III" of the four working groups designed under the Trevi group);
see also Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52, at 166
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promote cooperation among law enforcement authorities, which is
further facilitated by the discussions and meetings that provide a
convenient opportunity for the personnel of various police forces to
meet on a very informal basis. Although not officially part of the
structure, personal ties often facilitate cooperation.i "
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union also provided
some direction for law enforcement cooperation in Europe, including
the institution of the European Police Office ("Europol"), which was
to serve as an information exchange framework for the entire
European Union.4 '  Initially coordinating drug-related crime
information exchanges,8" Europol was considered the most aspiring
and lofty effort at the time in the fight against crime in Europe."4 The
information exchange apparatus was also designed to combat and
prevent serious crimes like terrorism and furnish assistance
cooperation for criminal analyses and investigations in the European
Union. Eventually, Europol also began to deal with international
vehicle crime, networks of illegal immigration, and nuclear crime. "
The Council of Europe's attempts to encourage modernization of
law and facilitate more intimate member cooperation have resulted in
(contrasting the Trevi Group with Europol).
842. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 60 (suggesting that the TreNl group
has made the most substantial contributions at the micro level). For further
discussion, see supra notes 831, 837 and accompanying text.
843. See id. at 61; see also Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing,
supra note 52, at 167.
844. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 61 (noting the strong likelihood that
the Europol will evolve into a full-fledged European police agency).
845. See Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52, at
166.
846. See id. at 167 (explaining that as time progressed, the scope of the
"fledgling organization had been extended beyond drug-trafficking and associated
criminal organizations and money laundering activities"). Europol is expected to
gain a special perspective on particular international patterns of crime that will
place it in a better position than other police elements to coordinate intelligence.
See id. at 178. In addition, the creation of international task forces on an ad hoc
basis will enable it to orchestrate case-specific criminal investigations in various
states. See id.;. Philip Johnston, Britain powerless to arrest arrival of Eurocop,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 16, 2000, at 24 (explaining that Europol has now
included among its priorities "to gradually steer the work from strategic to
operational-related activities").
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numerous international agreements, including many in the area of
criminality. 47 The Council of Europe is well aware of the importance
of improved justice administration cooperation.. and encourages
cooperation between states through procedural regimes. The
Council's mutual legal assistance and extradition instruments aid
cooperation regarding law enforcement matters, while its efforts in
the areas of sentencing and criminal proceedings transfers have also
been helpful.8 49 Enhanced law enforcement agency cooperation,
cooperation in anti-terrorist matters, coordination of external border
checks, cooperation in judicial matters, and combating illicit drug
trafficking were included in the "Palma Document" submitted at a
European Council meeting in 1989.850
The Treaty of Amsterdam brought with it in 1997 far-reaching
alterations to the legal mechanism of police cooperation in Europe!"
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which took effect in May 1999,"' covers
criminal judicial cooperation as well as cooperation in customs and
police matters 3Eurojust, another border-transcending law
enforcement organization that is soon to be set up, is designed to
"facilitate the proper co-ordination of national prosecuting authorities
847. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at
220 (stating, for instance, that by March 31, 1994, twelve EU Member States had
signed and ten had ratified the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances).
848. See id. at 239 (stating that the Council of Europe has sought to
acknowledge the need for flexibility in promoting cooperation in the
administration of justice).
849. See id. at 221-22.
850. See Cullen, supra note 359, at 194 (noting that the "Palma Document" set
areas of priority for Member State action in respect to external and internal
borders).
851. See Europe's Borders: A Single Market in Crime, supra note 807, at 26.
852. See id.
853. See Walker, The New Frontiers of European Policing, supra note 52, at
182 (stating that there is a debate as to whether these new structures foretell an
approach to European internal security that will be more detached, threatening to
blur the lines of accountability and answerability). One of the four main objectives
of the Treaty of Amsterdam is "to sweep away the last remaining obstacles to
freedom of movement and to strengthen security." M.B. McGeever, Widening and
Deepening of the European Union: Economic and Political Challenges, 36(3)
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 237, 240 (1999).
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and of supporting criminal investigations in organised crime
cases."8 "
Many of the less formal and comprehensive European law
enforcement cooperation understandings continue to function
alongside the more structured arrangements. These arrangements
encourage cooperation regarding specific areas of crime. As a whole,
both the formal and informal systems constitute a complicated and
interrelated network serviced by a wide variety of systems of
information.8"'
XIV. CONCLUSION
The European Union, as the European Economic Community,
originated in political reaction to incessant conflicts between
Western European states, and the structure designed to eliminate the
roots of these conflicts regarding sovereignty and territorial borders
was that of free trade and intertwined economic relationships. '
These methods by which the conflicts were to be quelled eventually
evolved into the objectives of the European Union, the institutions of
which continued to be generally limited to integration in the
economic sphere and symbolized by the development of the Single
European Market and it's "Europe without Frontiers.""' " In the
Maastricht Treaty, economic integration led to an effort to achieve
integration on a political level, in addition to considerations of issues
related to European Union external border police activity and ties
854. See Johnston, supra note 846, at 24 (explaining that Eurojust is to consist
of police, magistrates, and national prosecutors of Member States). Additional
European Union efforts also include Member States posting police liaison
personnel to one another. See ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 81, at 130-31 (explaining that Member States have also posted police
liaison officers in the United States, South America, Africa. and Asia).
855. See Benyon et al., supra note 747, at 62 (finding that the netwyork is
complex and intricate, and the systems of information are frequently incongruous).
Cross-border policing is thus in essence a "mosaic of activities" that involve many
organizations and entities performing countless functions. See ANDERSON ET AL.,
POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 81, at 38.
856. See O'Dowd et. al., supra note 81, at 272 (highlighting the interconnected
nature of economic and political integration in the European Union).
857. See id.
2000]
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
with states that are not members of the Union.""'
As the result of a protracted and bitter dispute between Israelis and
Palestinians, relations between the two sides obviously will not be
normalized instantaneously. Yet more economic dependency-two-
way trade, rather than a basically unidirectional economic
movement,859  and a higher level of economically equitable
• 860
cooperation --could help nurture and promote more positive
contact between the two sides,"' leading eventually to much
improved relations. 6 ' Economic cooperation must be viable for both
Israelis and Palestinians, and each side's interests must be addressed
appropriately by the other. 63 The possibilities for successful
economic cooperation increase when each side is able to view the
potentials and problems of the other,"6' since these possibilities are of
an objective nature and will be better accommodated with the
existing relations between them, which are characterized by their
political and social limitations, which are subjective.8 61
858. See id. at 273.
859. See Newman, Boundaries in Flux, supra note 60, at 37. In the Mexican-
American case, for example, a body of rules was created to structure relations of
economic interdependence in the form of national objectives, which would
connote a two-directional movement of tastes and values instead of a one-
directional pattern of behavior and consumption. See Reynolds, supra note 626, at
134.
860. See Bahiri, supra note 371, at 93-94.
861. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra
note 102, at 96.
862. See Bahiri, supra note 468, at 33; see also Israeli-Palestinian Econonic
Relations, supra note 347, at 1. Likewise, Mexico participated in NAFTA to
transform more distant interaction into a closer relationship with the United States.
See Weintraub, supra note 607, at 288-89. The United States favored free-trade
with Mexico for its potential political and economic advantages. Ruling politicians
in Mexico stopped much of their anti-American rhetoric, and the Mexican press
afforded considerably less emphasis to news items which were unfavorable to the
United States. See id. at 289. For further discussion, see supra notes 726-734, 742
and accompanying text.
863. See Amon & Spivak, supra note 387, at 52. Cf Bagley, supra note 606,
atl7; Reynolds, supra note 626, at 134-35 (highlighting the need for mutual
tolerance between Mexico and the United States).
864. See Reynolds, supra note 626, at 135 (noting the need for the United States
and Mexico to maintain realistic expectations of the relationship between them).
865. See id. (commenting that there is great potential for the Mexico-United
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International relations, however, involve more than free cross-
border movement of goods." International cooperation on a regional
basis where participants officially take part on equal footing and
benefit from its development might serve as a formula for
imitation.867 Central and Western European participants making up
the Central European Initiative " created an intermediary pattern that
helped develop equality among members cooperating symmetrically.
Yet, the Western participants, having bought the economic resources
for the projects' realization, functioned as development promoters,
resulting initially in a comparatively asymmetric situation.
Participants could contribute and exchange intuitions, solutions, and
experiences that confirmed each participant's equal dignity and
value.869
Durable normalization and an increase in mutual assurance and
confidence between Palestinians and Israelis is more readily
obtainable with an open border than a closed one."' " Functional
border characteristics should move toward more positive contact,
which should contribute to the normalization process."" Successful
allaying of suspicions between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and
the porousness of borders to the movement of products and
individuals significantly will influence the extent to which the
borders become less confrontational. Cross-border patterns of
States relationship with increased communication).
866. See Randall, supra note 449, at 6 (suggesting that a cross-disciplinary
approach to international relations provides for a more comprehensive discussion).
867. See Delli Zotti, supra note 53, at 67 (describing the regional international
model).
868. See id. at 55 (suggesting that the changes in political regimes helped create
the Central Europe Initiative).
869. See id. at 67 (noting how the unique characteristics of nations contnbute to
cooperation).
870. See Newman, Denarcating a Boundar, supra note 22, at 178. Efforts to
close off the border between Mexico and the United States, for example, have
demonstrated the minimal influence on illegal immigration and have caused
immediate economic damage as well as inter-social group tension. See Bigo, supra
note 88, at 161 (explaining how many attributes of society transcend borders).
871. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra
note 102, at 96.
872. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 17.
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respect for and recognition of non-territorial international
circumstances, experiences, and events73 are among the basic
ingredients for success. Western Europe's example of "erasing"
borders, which has resulted in a gradual process of political
normalization and stabilization, brought about by economic
integration,874 illustrates this positive outcome. 7 It is complicated for
parties intimately involved in unending conflicts to disentangle
themselves because of the complex emotional and social causes;
however, exchanges of a technological, cultural, and economic
nature between the conflicting parties may be beneficial in enhancing
social unity of purpose, interest, and feeling. 76
Former attitudes reflecting conflict mentality between current
friends and allies are reminiscent of prior (and frequently not even
yet outdated) attitudes between Israelis and Palestinians. As
illustrated very well along the border between Mexico and the United
States and within Europe, adjacent border areas reflect extremely
varied cultures, histories, administrative and economic structural
systems, and languages. Such differences often augment conflict.
7
873. See Bigo, supra note 88, at 161 (recognizing that many characteristics of
society transcend borders).
874. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundary, supra
note 102, at 96. The Treaty of Rome's four freedoms-freedom of movement of
capital, services, labor, and goods-impliedly constitute an elimination of border
controls. See Anderson, European Frontiers, supra note 5, at 1-2.
875. See Newman, The Functional Presence of an 'Erased' Boundar, supra
note 102, at 96. Some believe that the states of Western Europe may have
mistakenly progressed too cautiously in the direction of liberalization. As support
for this proposition, they cite the fact that the process of economic integration has
continued for half a century and is not yet complete. See McKinney, Lessons from
the Western European Experience, supra note 397, at 36.
876. See THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BLOODY REVENGE, EMOTIONS, NATIONALISM,
AND WAR 141, 142 (1994) (highlighting the benefits of a more open relationship
between nations). This does not mean that increasing interaction will always
enhance cooperation. Foreign worker and immigration tension in Europe indicates
that interaction may frequently result in the development of hostility and
competition. See id. at 142.
877. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 256 (discussing differences between the
United States and Mexico that instigate possible border tensions); Middlebrook,
sup-a note 598, at 261 (asserting that the relationship between Mexico and the
United States is the most complex between two nations); de Brody, supra note
599, at 12 (opining that the differing backgrounds of Mexico and the United States
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Mexico and the United States, for example, historically have been
fiercely hostile to one another."' Texas was an integral part of
Mexico until 1836, when it gained its independence," and in 1845 it
was annexed by the United States.' t Chroniclers of the war between
the Republic of Texas and Mexico in the 1830s and 1840s published
narrations of cruelty by Mexicans toward captured prisoners, which
strengthened the characterization of Mexicans as barbaric." ' Later,
between 1846 and 1848,*'2 a vicious war raged between the United
States and Mexico."' Over its course, acts of violence and retaliation
rarely were punished9"
During the mid-1800s, many Americans characterized Mexicans
by their "wretched appearance" and could only think "of their abject
poverty and ignorance. ' " They viewed Mexicans as belonging to a
"miserable ignorant, filthy race""" and qualified them as the most
"ignorant and degraded" individuals. Many Americans strongly
will permanently affect their views on political and economic issues).
878. See The NAFTA Effect, When Neighbors Embrace, supra note 481, at 18
(describing United States-Mexico relations as "prickly").
879. See Randall, supra note 449, at 1 (explaining that Texas was much later
instrumental in pushing for the inclusion of Mexico in the Canadian-United States
Free Trade Agreement due to its shared background with Mexico).
880. See, e.g., Johannsen, supra note 51, at 98 (noting how the annexation of
Texas contributed to the rapid breakdown of relations between the United States
and Mexico).
881. See RICHARD BRUCE WINDERS, POLK'S ARMY, THE AMERICAN MILITARY
EXPERIENCE IN THE MEXICAN WAR 168 (1997) (commenting on how early
publications concerning Mexico helped establish Americans' impressions of
Mexicans).
882. See White, supra note 51, at 169 (describing the impetus for territorial
expansion).
883. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 257.
884. See Johannsen, supra note 51, at 101 (discussing how acts of violence
often erupted during the slow periods of the war).
885. WINDERS, supra note 881, at 174 (quoting Private Scribner); see also id. at
181, 183 (outlining the thoughts of many Americans at that time, including those
of Lieutenant Kirkham, who believed that Catholic idolatrous practices bred
"ignorance" and "superstition" in Mexico), Johannsen, supra note 51, at 104
(describing American literature around the time of the Mexican War, which
promoted the idea that Mexico was a backwards nation).
886. See WINDERS, supra note 881, at 174 (quoting Col. Wilham B. Campbell).
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believed that Mexicans were inferior people, "lazy," and "cruel. ' " 7
They could only see "the evils of Mexico," '888 and they described
Mexicans as "poor... unfortunate beings."'88 Some felt Mexicans
trailed by two hundred years, at least, in every aspect of life, while
others claimed the lag to be more like a thousand years. Still others
contended that the Mexicans' implements were identical to those
employed 5,000 years ago by the Egyptians,"' and considered
Mexico a backward country. 9'
The contentious relationship between the United States and
Mexico continued after the signing of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, which officially brought the war between them to a close. 92
Mutual complaints and suspicions between the countries persisted
during the decades following the war. Mexicans alleged that
Americans discriminated against them even though they became
United States citizens.9 For instance, in order to work in the
887. See id. at 175 (outlining the range of judgments made by American
soldiers).
888. Johannsen, supra note 51, at 106 (relying on the popular perception that
America had a duty to fight those evils).
889. See WINDERS, supra note 881, at 180 (noting the comments of an
American volunteer soldier from Pennsylvania).
890. See id. at 181 (describing how many Americans viewed the Mexicans'
simple tools and methodologies as uncivilized).
891. See id. at 180-81 (observing that many Americans viewed Mexicans as
uncivilized in many respects).
892. See Weintraub, supra note 607, at 288 (discussing the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo that allowed for the seizure of half the territory of Mexico).
Under the Treaty of Gaudalupe-Hidalgo, New Mexico and California were
transferred to the United States. See White, supra note 51, at 169; Johannsen,
supra note 51, at 103 (outlining the treaty's provisions). Roughly half of the entire
territory of Mexico was lost to the United States due to the war, a fact which
Mexicans have not forgotten over time. Even after 150 years, this fact continues to
generate concern over the United States' true intentions. See Purcell, supra note
50, at 1 (describing Mexico's present-day apprehensions).
893. See JOSEPHINE ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ & LORENZO MEYER, THE UNITED
STATES AND MEXICO, 58 (1985). Article 8 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
stipulated that Mexicans choosing to remain in territory that had been ceded to the
United States were permitted to become citizens of the United States. See id. That
treaty also guaranteed respect for Mexican property while Mexicans living in the
territories, who had not declared an intent to retain their Mexican nationality
within a year following the ratification of the agreement, were deemed to have
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goldmines in California, Mexicans had to acquire special
authorization, just like foreigners, and they experienced a great deal
of abuse.8"
In April 1848, United States President James Polk pushed to
intervene in Yucatan, Mexico in order "to rescue the white race from
extermination or expulsion from their country" at the hands of
Indians who were deceitful and uncivilizedY" President Polk's racial
connotations indicate the widespread racial bias that evolved from
the mid-1830s in the United States' political and intellectual
circles. 96 Politicians and intellectuals were contending by the 1840s
that "non-white races were immutably inferior to a more vibrant
Anglo-Saxon race, and incapable of participating in democratic
republicanism." '897
One of the outcomes of this contentious history was that Mexicans
maintained a deeply ingrained suspicion and lack of trust towards
United States.89 Even 130 years after the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, writers continued to use negative language to
explain the relationship between the United States and Mexico.""
Perceived dissimilarities intensified existing pressures on the
decided to become United States citizens. See id.; see generally Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex. 9 U.S.T. 922.
894. See VAZQUEZ & MEYER, supra note 893, at 58 (discussing the numerous
claims made by Mexicans under Article 8 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).
895. White, supra note 51, at 176-77.
896. See id. at 177.
897. Id.
898. See Weintraub, supra note 607, at 288 (discussing the "deep-seated
mistrust" on the part of Mexican intellectuals and media towards the United
States). Bitter resentment and prejudice also abounded in the United States after
the Civil War, for example. See Helen Peak, Some Psychological ProblemIs in the
Re-education of Germany, J. OF SOC. ISSUES, Aug. 1946, at 26, 27 n.2. These
feelings reflected in the tense relations between individuals and interests of the
losing Confederate side and those of the victorious Union. See Lowell Julliard
Carr, A Situational Approach to Conflict and JJ'ar, 24 Soc. FORCES 300, 302-03
(1946).
899. See de Brody, supra note 599, at 7; see also id. at 4-7 (characterizing
Mexico's relationship with the United States as "mistrust engendered by closer ties
with the United States," "misunderstandings and tension." "conflict in political
relations," and "political friction"); Bagley, supra note 606, at 17 (providing
examples of economic tensions between Mexico and the United States).
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fundamental structural plane. An acute nationalistic feeling in
Mexico, coupled with anti-American sentiments, evoked a deep-
rooted sense of suspicion and distrust for United States objectives
and extreme touchiness to the slightest suggestion of control by the
United States." The majority of intellectuals and policymakers in
Mexico dismissed all proposals of Mexican cooperation in the
establishment of a common market for North America, having
defined the relationship between the United States and Mexico as
one of dependence or, at best, as one of asymmetrical
interdependence.9°' Mexico's northern neighbor, the United States,
historically was, and continued to represent to them, a superpower
bent on political and economic expansion, prepared to pursue its
goals at the expense of Mexican national interests.92 Therefore,
Mexicans viewed the North American proposal as an effort to bring
the United States one step closer to exploiting the raw materials of
Mexico and sacrificing its economic independence and
sovereignty."3
Suspicions, fears, prejudices, rampant extremism, animosities, and
hatred were also prevalent throughout Europe. It would be
superfluous to recount the many battles between Germanic and Latin
people, in addition to those between Catholics and Protestants. 90 For
hundreds of years, European states tried to establish and stabilize
their control over swathes of national territory within set borders by
altering them and creating a permanency for them through war,
which marshaled populations in support of national consolidation."5
World War II was the unfortunate, but necessary, event that finally
precipitated discussion of an economically integrated Europe that
900. See Bagley, supra note 606, at 16 (discussing perceived divergences in
Mexico-United States relations from an American perspective).
901. See id. at 17.
902. See id.
903. See id. (describing Mexico's skepticism regarding economic integration
with the United States).
904. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 258 (depicting the Rhine Basin historically
as one of Europe's most advanced areas economically speaking, but also as a
common place for waging battles).
905. See Foucher, supra note 81, at 238 (discussing the conceptual basis of
border region analysis).
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was crucial for preserving the peace."" At last, there was a vigorous
effort in Europe to eradicate the endless vicious and vehement
conflicts over border locations.'
But war, in and of itself, naturally creates an inheritance of intense
pain, sorrow, grief, and interminable discord."' Europe, devastated
and traumatized in the same century by two tragic world wars and by
the intense emotions emanating from them," was certainly no
exception. The Allied successes in both World War I and World War
II were certain to revive an atmosphere of mutual hostility between
individuals as well as interests of both the defeated and the
triumphant sides.90
Certainly anyone living during the same period as Clemenceau or
MacMahon, as correctly pointed out by one observer, would have
been shocked to learn that the backbone of European politics today is
the present close association of France and Germany." Clemenceau
himself described France's and Europe's problem with the Germans
as one that centered around the fact that 20,000,000 Germans too
many populated Germany. '2 He thought the best way to handle the
906. See McKinney, Lessons from the WVestern European Erperience, supra
note 397, at 31 pointing out that the impetus for modem European economic
integration was initiated in 1948 with the Benelux customs union); see also Free to
be European, in A Survey of the 20th Centur": Freedom 's Journey, ECONOMIsT,
Sept. 11, 1999, at 21.
907. See Foucher, supra note 81, at 237 (presenting pro-European Union views
on European integration).
908. See Rene Albrech-Carrie, France in Europe: Prospect and Retrospect, 69
POL. SCI. Q. 161 (1954) (noting that war results in weanness, bitterness, and
unresolved issues).
909. See John A. Loftus, An Inquir. into Feasible Forms of European
Integration, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 97, 99 (C. Grove Haines, ed. 1957)
(discussing war-ravished Europe and the resultant extreme feelings).
910. See Carr, supra note 898, at 302-03 (describing the development of
"frictional-tensional situations" after World War II).
911. See Abstract 43.5282, of Jean Mathiex, German-French Relations:
Mythical Fatality or Reality of Ill-Advised Decisions?, 23 LE TRIMESTRE DL
MONDE 121-133 (1993), in 43 INT'L POL. Sc. ABSTRACTS 565 (listing abstracts
up to July 1993 including that of Mathiex's article concerning the relationship
between France and Germany).
912. See Kenneth W. Thompson, The Limits of Principle in International
Politics: Necessity and the New Balance of Power, 20 J. POL. 437, 446 (1958) For
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issue would be to imitate the Roman techniques that finally put an
end to the Carthaginian matter." This form of "blood rivalry" was by
no means a French-German monopoly. During World War I, the
Bishop of London frankly summoned the English to "[k]ill
Germans ... to kill ... the good as well as the bad, to kill the young
men as well as the old . while the Archbishop of Canterbury,
though acknowledging righteous wrath's legitimacy, nevertheless
was afraid that it could turn into "poisonous hatred", degenerating
and tarnishing the worthy objectives of England. 9'
Following World War II, many wanted Germany to suffer for the
crimes it had committed.9 16 It was obvious that feelings of hostility
would be displayed against all the Germans as the result of the rancor
bred by their occupation troops, 917and especially against German
soldiers. 8 Moreover, since Allied bombings had damaged only
approximately one-fifth of Germany's industry, therefore leaving the
overwhelming proportion of its industrial capacity unscathed and,
since little control had been placed over its technical organizations,
laboratories, and research institutes, many feared that by 1950,
Germany could possibly equip its industrial plant for another war."'
comparison purposes, by the end of World War II, Germany's total population
numbered around 50 million people. See The German Settlement, supra note 442,
at 178.
913. See Thompson, supra note 912, at 446.
914. ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A
HISTORICAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION 207 (1960); BARBARA
EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES, ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE PASSIONS OF WAR 205
(1997).
915. See BAINTON, supra note 914, at 207.
916. Cf Peak, supra note 898, at 26 (pointing out that among the official
objectives of the Allied occupation of Germany was "to make Germany atone for
her crimes").
917. See Henry L. Bretton, The German Social Democratic Party and the
International Situation, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 980, 982 (1953) (discussing the
development of the German Social Democratic party and how it lacked support
after World War II).
918. See Jane Perry Clark Carey, Political Organization of the Refugees and
Expellees in West Germany, 66 POL. SCI. Q. 191, 212 (1951) (including
defamation of German soldiers among issues that some political groups thought
post-World War II Germany should address).
919. See Germany Still Can Make War, ECONOMIST, July 7, 1945, at 15 (noting
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By the close of World War II, food, for example, had become an
immediately needed commodity worldwide,'" particularly in
Germany, where the greatest European undernourishment problem
existed.9 ' When American farmers were asked whether they would
accommodate continued food rationing following the war in order to
assist in feeding various foreignersi ' - their opinions differed
according to whether the intended recipients were enemies or allies.
While sharing food with other countries generally was viewed
favorably, only forty percent of the farmers would agree to assist
Japan and Germany following the war, while double that percentage
would agree to assist the Allied nations."'
War had also obviously left lasting emotional effects in Germany,
and these were considered at the time to be a potential source of
future problems. It was unreasonable therefore to assume that once
the Allies had defeated, occupied, and disarmed Germany following
World War II, Germany would despise the Allies any less than they
did following World War I-for actions that were significantly less
severe.92 Following World War I, a defiant and belligerent attitude
against the Allied forces, which had just vanquished imperial
the overriding concerns that if not stopped, Germany would soon be prepared for
war once more); see also Has Labour a Foreign Policy?, supra note 442, at 149
(describing the restoration of the German economy as well as the necessity of
establishing protections which would counter German economic power being used
aggressively); cf Political Parties in GermanY, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1945, at 409
(explaining that due to the suspicions of the Allied Powers regarding the political
record of Germany, various controls had to be implemented).
920. See Ray E. Wakeley, Farmers Opinions on Post-1War International
Relations, 11 RURAL SOC. 244, 245 (1946) (presenting studies of opinions on the
issue of food sharing in the aftermath of World War II).
921. See Food for Germany, ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 1945, at 856.
922. See Wakeley, supra note 920, at 245 (providing the question American
farmers were asked: "Would you be willing to continue rationing after the war for
a period to help feed the people of the following countries?").
923. See id. at 244, 246-47 (discussing and summarizing farmers' opinions
toward enemies and allies). The studies compiling these findings on food-sharing
with the major enemy and Allied countries were conducted in Iowa in late 1944
and early 1945. See id. at 245.
924. See Peak, supra note 898, at 29 (discussing Germans' attitudes toward the
Allies in 1946).
925. See Hans Speier, War Aims in Political Warfiare, 12 SoC. RES. 157, 172
(1945).
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Germany, was not out of the ordinary.9" The terrible experiences that
would continue to be a potential igniting point for rekindled enmity
toward the Allied Powers, in addition to the memories that would
remain vivid as a result of the enormous economic and physical
destruction that had taken place, obviously could not easily be put
aside.927 Soldiers of the Allied occupying forces were at times looked
upon by Germans as hooligans who were untrustworthy, reckless,
and merciless.2 It was natural, therefore, that the Germans despised
the Allies and were quick to accuse them of being responsible for
Germany's hardships.92 9
These and other intense feelings of animosity, prejudice, fears,
suspicion, hatred, and extremist enthusiasm could be considered a
natural outcome of the immeasurably exorbitant "costs of war." The
actual total cost of World War II to the Allied and Axis Powers
together amounted to between twelve and seventeen million civilian
deaths, 13.5 million military deaths, over twenty-five million
military wounded, and approximately US$1.25 trillion in economic
and financial costs.93 In comparison, the actual total cost of World
War I to the Allies and the Central Powers combined amounted to
over 6.6 million civilian deaths, more than eight million military
battle deaths, over twenty-one million military wounded, and over
926. See Bretton, supra note 918, at 98 1.
927. See Peak, supra note 898, at 29.
928. See id. at 38 (discussing the seriousness of the friction between Allied
forces and Germans).
929. See Hugh G. Latimer, Western Germany, June 1947 and Now, Impressions
of Conditions and Outlook, in 5 WORLD TODAY, CHATHAM HOUSE REV. 371, 375
(1949) (finding that Germans were quick to forget the original cause of their
misfortune). A negative attitude, specifically against the British, was apparent in
Germany after World War II; some Germans believed that England was purposely
trying to starve their country. See id.at 373, 374 (referring to the post-war German
factory dismantling policies established by England). Moreover, German distaste
for the people they had harmed over the course of World War II was additionally
among the many post-war German aversions. See Clifford Kirkpatrick, Reactions
of Educated Germans to Defeat, 54 AM. J. Soc. 36, 37 (July 1948-May 1949)
(showing tabulated results of a questionnaire given to Germans following World
War II).
930. See R. ERNEST DUPUY & TREVOR N. Dupuy, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MILITARY HISTORY, FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 1198 (rev. ed. 1970).
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US$280 billion in economic and financial costs."' Nevertheless, as
early as 1957, despite the tragic consequences of the war, political
experts assessed that since the end of the war twelve years earlier, the
ties between West Germany and England, for example, steadily had
improved and attained a level of assurance and certitude that only a
few years earlier would have been considered impossible. "2 Germany
and England both strove to enhance their interaction and, over the
course of 1956 and 1957, institutional and individual relations were
cultivated in economic, political, and cultural fields. These receptive
ties helped create an open environment for hospitable relations
between the two states! "
Such extreme passions as at one time existed between former
sworn enemies, who are now faithful friends and loyal allies, were
also apparent in the now rectified relationship between Japan and the
United States. Admiral William Halsey, the commander of the
United States naval forces in the South Pacific during World War II,
stirred his troops with the words like "Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more
Japs" and vowed, after Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, that hell
would be the only place the Japanese language would be spoken."
Such violent language epitomized the vulgar and racist character of
America's rhetorical reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor."
The hostile attitudes England exhibited toward the United States,
beginning with the War of 1812 and continuing until the 1870s, '3' are
931. See id. at 990; see also S.T.H.W., World Jiar I, in 23 ENCYCLOP- \DIA
BRITANNICA, A SURVEY OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE 748, 775 (1956) (providing
similar figures of military casualties).
932. See Sabine Lee, Anglo-German Relations 1958-59: The Postwar Turning
Point?, 6 DIPL. & STATECRAFT 787, 790 (1995) (explaining that England treated
Germany more as a subject than an object of politics).
933. See id. at 790-91. Relations between Germany and England recovered from
a 1958-59 crisis in 1964. See id. at 787.
934. See JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE
PACIFIC WAR 36 (1986); EHRENREICH, supra note 914, at 207.
935. See DOWER, supra note 934, at 36-37 (1986) (stating that Americans used
terms such as "yellow enemy." ..yellow bastards," and "yellow monkeys" in
reference to Japanese people).
936. See C. J. Bartlett, Gentlenen versus Democrats: Cultural Prejudice and
Militaiy Strategy in Bitain in the War of 1812, l(2)WAR IN HISTORY 140, 141
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also relevant in the present context. Over the course of about a ten-
year period preceding the war, British elites revived their previous
anti-American dispositions. The British hurled denunciations at the
Americans, their society, their ideas, and their institutions."38 They
used derogatory and malicious pronouncements and far-fetched
stereotypes to continuously fan the basest of biases towards the
Americans. 939 They viewed Americans as a conceited, reckless, and
clutching people, endowed with lowly moral traits, who always
whined and cried, and whose impertinence would be endless if they
were not confronted and subdued. They were brazen hooligans who
were conceited to no end, whose "lowmindedness" 940 and
"ungentlemanlike conduct" was dictated by the "insolence of the
mob., 94' The most fervent of the British were bent on showing that
the other side did not comprise "gentlemen. '4 2 It frequently was
pointed out that Americans were without honesty or a sense of honor,
morals, and culture.94 ' Animosity against Americans also appeared in
the British Parliament, where it was stated that it would not be
beneficial to consider Americans as related to the British."Over the
past twenty years, it was said, Americans had developed a clear and
(July 1994).
937. See id. at 143-44 (explaining that there was a resurgence of historical
feelings of hostility, resentment, and ill-will rooted in the War of Independence).
The British people and their government had never forgiven America for its
independence. See id. at 147. Thus, animosity between the British and the
Americans was clearly influenced by revived recollections of the United States
War for Independence. See id. at 150.
938. See id. at 142-53. British grievances and the ensuing disparagement and
criticism must of course be viewed in a contextual framework. It was just as
typical for rhetorical onslaughts to be hurled at others, such as neutral states that
conducted trade with the United States as well as those who had allied themselves
with France. See id. at 145.
939. See id. at 147 (declaring that Americans were respected even less than the
"base and bigoted" Portuguese and the "ferocious and ignorant Russian").
940. See id. at 142, 145, 152-53.
941. See Bartlett, supra note 936, at 145.
942. See id. at 144-45 (noting that the British argued that there were very few
American honest men of principle and that Americans had so "prostituted"
military ranking, that even pubs were run by full-ranking colonels).
943. See id. at 144.
944. See id. at 145.
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well-deserved trait of "low and lying knavery." ' An American
historian explained that the Washington public buildings were
incinerated by the British in the War of 1812 in the same manner as
they would have burned up "a negro kraal" or a pirates' den because
they presumed that the government of the United States was outside
civilization's realms.9 The press in England was generally in an
uproar against the Americans by 1814, chastising them frequently
with tremendous acerbity and acrimony."' In short, Americans were
derogatorily considered by the British a deplorable and contemptible
people throughout the entire course of the war.
The Americans, for their part, were not to be outdone and hurled
unceasing abuses in return against the British. Rear Admiral Sir
George Cockburn, who led the first principle attacks in the vicinity
of Chesapeake Bay in 1813, became the target of a great deal of
hostility. A reward was even offered for his death. It was written that
"Cockburn stood like Satan in his cloud, when he saw the blood of
man from murdered Abel first crimson the earth, exulting at the
damning deed, and treating the suppliant females with the rudest
curses and most vile appellations." '
The British continued to feel a sense of indignation toward their
American counterparts even following their defeat at the hands of the
Americans. 9"0 There were complaints that Americans created trouble
wherever they went, provoking only repulsion and abhorrence, and
were considered to be poisonous snakes.9f ' As late as 1861, some
British still argued that Americans had no perception of honor and
were ruled by the abhorrent emotions of unaccountable riffraff?:2
945. See id. at 146 (stating that it was thought, too. that Americans had acquired
independence at least a hundred years too early, before they had amongst them
scholars and gentlemen).
946. See Bartlett, supra note 936, at 142-43 (noting that more radical means had
to be used to subdue the Americans than were common in Europe).
947. See id. at 149.
948. See id. at 158.
949. Id. at 143.
950. See id. at 144.
951. See Bartlett, supra note 936, at 146.
952. See id. at 141.
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Attitudes between America and Britain before, during, and in the
wake of the War of 1812 were full of prejudice and extremely strong
feelings,953 yet, by the end of the nineteenth century, with the onset of
intellectual notions regarding the inevitable success of the English-
speaking world, 914 bonding between the United States and England
already was apparent, and both Americans and British viewed their
destiny as a mutual one.95 President Franklin D. Roosevelt was able
to remark by 1932 that he anticipated with pleasure a point when the
United States and England would be as one, working as one in
economic and political affairs."956
The Israelis and Palestinians should thus be encouraged by the fact
that despite a turbulent and destructive history of feverish rage
particularly in Europe and between the United States and Mexico,
considerable cooperation across borders has since evolved, often
naturally and without specific prompting at local, regional, and
national levels in Europe 917 and along the United States-Mexico
border. Yet, just as with the Western Europeans and North
Americans, it likely will take generations for the wounds of the
Palestinians and Israelis to heal. While there has existed a great deal
of spontaneous trans-border cooperation in parallel with more formal
cooperation between the Palestinians and Israelis, it may be a bit
much to expect that after countless years of hostility and suffering,
they will be able to resolve all of their outstanding differences in less
time than it took the Western Europeans or the Mexicans and the
Americans. As desirable as it may be to resolve their disagreements
more quickly than their European or North American counterparts,
the Israelis and the Palestinians cannot reasonably be expected to do
953. See id. at 150, 153.
954. See Nicholas J. Cull, Selling Peace: The Origins, Promotion and Fate of
the Anglo-American New Order during the Second World War, 7(1)DIPL. &
STATECRAFT 1, 4 (1996) (discussing the unique qualities of the Anglo-Saxons and
their increasing interest in international organization).
955. See id.at 4-5 (explaining that many influential individuals felt that only
cooperation would bring international security).
956. See id. at 1.
957. See Hansen, supra note 533, at 256 (indicating that many countries could
benefit from reviewing European success in integration).
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so.9" For example, one can only begin to speculate as to the mutual
distrust, suspicions, fear, and despair that must have existed in
individuals, families, societies, and governments in the wake of the
American war against the British in 1812. Between two currently
inseparable allies like Britain and America, it took much time for
amicable relations to prevail.
At times, however, it seems that in the midst of zealous attempts to
achieve the instant gratification of seeing an acceptable peace
agreement signed between Israel and the Palestinians, the historical
experiences of other regions is forgotten. Hence, one of the greatest
obstacles to obtaining a genuine and lasting peace may be lack of
patience. If instant gratification is not at hand, feelings of
disillusionment and failure may lead Israelis and Palestinians to
blame one another.
Yet, even if the peace process between the Israelis and the
Palestinians is progressing more slowly than might be hoped, and
experiences frequent discontinuities along the way, this does not
mean that the process is not moving forward. Ideally, over the course
of this slow and tedious progress-from a status of incessant conflict
to a more normalized interrelationship--economic and social
advancements should be able to gradually take the place of security
and military activity, as ultimately occurred in Western Europe,"
and eventually turn into something like a common market.'"
It should be understood that permeable borders do not necessarily
imply the existence of an immediate border-free situation between
two sides. After all, even the Single European Act of 1986 was rather
obscure about its encouragement of a Europe free of borders for
people.96' The process of European integration, though, guarantees
958. Cf Amos Harel, Mopez on the Desired Date lor the Permanent
Arrangement: "A 50 Year Cotflict is Not Solved Within One Year." HA'ARETZ,
Sept. 16, 1999, at IA (in Hebrew) (on file with author).
959. See Newman, Transforming Ethnic Frontiers, supra note 66, at 35-36
(explaining that change in Western Europe comes from spontaneous cross-
boundary development as much as from government policies).
960. Cf Free to be European, supra note 906, at 22.
961. See Cullen, supra note 359, at 200-01 (reviewing the decisions of the
European Court of Justice regarding border issues). It was not completely clear
whether the Act allowed police to continue controlling the borders or totally
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
that intertwined economic relationships are acknowledged and
viewed favorably, and this mutual economic dependence helps
ensure peaceful ties. 962 The Western European experience of
cooperation and planning in areas such as security, culture,
infrastructure, transport, and economics demonstrates how trans-
permeable border schemes can succeed, even between former foes."'
The Israelis and the Palestinians should thus determine reasonable
objectives and continue forging ahead, despite the amount of time it
may take to achieve these goals. They may, during this transition
process, look for positive instruction from Western Europe's
successful economic integration,9 which followed in the wake of
Europe's history of tumultuous upheavals, as well as from North
America's successful economic cooperation in the aftermath of a
violent past.
Historically, it has taken years, decades, and even centuries for
parties in conflict to put aside mutual suspicions, distrust, hatred, and
fears. It is hoped, however, that the Palestinians and the Israelis will
resolve their differences sooner rather than later and will have less
time to wait for truly productive cooperation to materialize " ' and a
genuine, durable peace to take hold between them 66
eliminated such controls. See id. at 201. Due to sovereignty concerns, it had been
much more difficult for Western Europeans to establish the free movement of
people than to arrange for the free movement of goods. See Foucher, suqpra note
81, at 237. The usefulness and legitimacy of controls at the external borders of the
EU's Member States were finally approved in the more recent Maastricht Treaty.
See Cullen, supra note 359, at 201.
962. See Foucher, supra note 81, at 238 (describing European economic
dependencies).
963. See Hirschfeld, supra note 160, at 76.
964. Cf McKinney, Lessons from the Western European Experience, sulra note
397, at 39.
965. See Dajani, The Future of Jerusalem, supra note 268, at 90: Dajani, in
Presentations and Discussions, supra note 349, at 163.
967. See Dajani, in Presentations and Discussions, supra note 349, at 163.
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